Contents of spoon-archives/habermas.archive/papers/erosion.txt

The Erosion of our Value Spheres? The ways in which society copes with scientific, moral and ethical uncertainty Chair and organiser Habermas Conference on 27 january 1994 at Tilburg University Papers of the conference and invited papers will be published as a book and appear( very likely) with Suny Press, Albany, New York in 1996 This paper, since it was distributed as asciifile, lack footnotes and a table. Ren‚ von Schomberg Tilburg University, Posbox 90153 5000 LE Tilburg The Netherlands email: R.vonSchomberg@kub.nl Introduction In the following, I shall discuss the current social reaction to the ecological crisis and the ways in which society reacts to technological risks, which can be understood primarily as a reaction to scientific and moral or ethical uncertainty. In the first section, I shall clarify what is meant by scientific and moral or ethical uncertainty. In the second section, I will contrast Max Weber's differentiation of science, justice and morality in the Modern world with the process of de-differentiation of these value spheres, a trend which can be observed in the present-day context of the ecological crisis and technological risks. We shall see that social contradictions emerge in the functional relationships between these value spheres, and that such contradictions go hand in hand with these value spheres or contexts of discourse losing their original function or being transformed. Science forfeits its role as a functional authority and becomes a strategic resource for politics. Justice becomes a basic constituent of an immoral form of negotiation, which can no longer be properly grasped in terms of legal categories. Morality is transformed into fear, and economics yields unprofitable practices. In the third section, I will in conclusion attempt to open up the moral and ethical dimension of how to deal with uncertainty with the help of discourse theory (Apel, 1988; Habermas, 1983, 1992), as well as outline a possible solution. 1. Scientific and moral uncertainty I shall first discuss the ecological crisis and how society handles technological risks in the context of scientific uncertainty or scientific ignorance in general. In 1976, the American climatologist Stephen Schneider published a bestseller about the threat of a new ice age, a hypothesis on which there was a consensus among certain sections of the scientific community. Less than a decade later, scientists agreed that another sort of climatic catastrophe was imminent: the greenhouse effect. Stephen Schneider's second bestseller, 'Global Warming', appeared in 1989. Once again, the author refers to a consensus among a section of the scientific community interested in publicity, but this time he is describing the well-known hypothesis that a greenhouse effect would ensue, something put forward as early as 1896 by Arrhenius, who cited the same reasons, but whose work fell on deaf ears. Such initial consensus is by no means cast in stone, because one thing is clear: we will always have an incomplete knowledge of the crucial factors that would enable us to predict with certainty whether the greenhouse effect will or will not occur. We are then faced with the following dilemma: should we wait until a consensus has been reached among scientists, which will probably arise at too late a date , if it arises at all? Or must the public and those responsible for decision-making rely on the one-sided hypothetical perspectives put forward by one individual scientific discipline - a commitment which appears more or less arbitrary, given the various scientific alternatives that float around in political debate? This kind of integrative perspective enables us to see that the individual disciplines, as they advance, are generating more and more knowledge on a small number of details, or microfields. However, they would appear to have to leave certain crucial questions unanswered, because discussing ecological questions scientifically means attempting to understand open systems. As a result, certain epistemological viewpoints can be considered true only if we assume the existence of more or less plausible presuppositions, which we nevertheless cannot assume are exhaustive. Climatological and ecological theories cannot be applied as forecasts as if they were based on proven empirical, nomological statements. Rather, they are best put to use in explaining changes after the fact. Taking the example of the discourses of science, the politics of science, and of politics itself on the ecological consequences of the deliberate release of genetically manipulated organisms into the environment, I have shown elsewhere that transferring issues that are epistemically conceivable in the context of politics to the level of science causes them to be inappropriately translated into a discourse on truth (see Schomberg, 1992, 1993). This is expressed, for example, in the translation of prospective plausibility claims (that cannot be formalized) into predictions containing a probability value, in the translation of illustrative data into proof, and in the transformation of dangers into risks. Through this process, technological risks receive a one-sided scientific definition, which becomes a resource utilized often by different interest groups in social debate. This kind of perspectivism robs science of its functional authority. It no longer serves to disencumber political discourse, but instead constitutes a strategic resource which one simply has to possess. The macabre discussion on the number of casualties resulting from the Chernobyl catastrophe (at the very beginning ranging from 35 to thousands; recent estimation show a figure of 8000 ) makes it clear just what such definitions are used to determine: they determine, among other things, the size of potential dangers, whether they can be localized, the social and biological characteristics of those affected as well as the cost and the likelihood that the risks will indeed become reality. These risks are new in character because they are collective and often irreversible, they are neither willingly nor intentionally taken, and cannot be limited either in time or in space, which ultimately makes identifying future victims an impossible task. This last feature corresponds to the principle that it is impossible to insure against such risks, and seems to be the greatest source of concern for the social actors involved (Beck, 1986). Thus, technological risks that are the products of society are given the same status as natural disasters. Where technological risks are concerned, we are dealing not only with scientific uncertainty, but also with ethical and moral uncertainty. In this regard, technological development has opened up an ethical and moral dimension to the discourse. The result is a form of uncertainty that is constituted by the undecided ethical status of animals, for example, or embryos, and/or through the wide gap or contradiction between the justifications of moral theory, on the one hand, and intuitions of ethics and morality, on the other. In other words, our ethical and moral knowledge does not suffice to solve the problems facing us in a manner that satisfies all those affected. Analogously to scientific uncertainty - for example, in the political discourse on the application of future medical technology - our existing (inadequate) ethical and moral knowledge is defineddominated by utilitarian concepts. The point being made systematically here is that recognizable uncertainties are transformed in political discourse unilaterally and inappropriately into certainties. 2. The diagnosis proposed by social theory According to Max Weber, Modernity consists, on the one hand, of the differentiation of value spheres, which include science, law, and morality. These are the result of a cultural process of rationalization, and stand in contrast to the systems of 'state' and 'economy', which become differentiated as the result of a societal rationalization. Modern social theory has not managed to sidestep this differentiation, regardless of whether the spheres are understood as discourses (Habermas), systems (Luhmann) or fields of argumentation (Toulmin). Traditional sociological theory assumes that value spheres and systems must be understood in terms of their autonomy and mutual independence. They are autonomous in the sense that what Habermas terms the specific validity claims - for example, claims to truth in science, or juridical claims to being correct in the law, or codes (see Luhmann: true/ untrue, justice/ injustice) - are generated, selected and utilized in socially authorized discourses by a culture of experts. They are mutually independent in the sense that progress can be achieved within one sphere without this impacting on the results of the other discourses. Abstracting away from all other validity claims within a specific value sphere is necessary and essential for the successful development of that sphere. Seen from an empirical point of view, however, functional relationships arise between value spheres and systems. I wish to distinguish here between the procurement function and the appellation function of such relationships. Thus the procurement function of science for politics consists in science procuring authorized data for politics. This data then creates a consensual basis for further political discourses. As a result, science can perform the function of relieving political discourse of having to act. The appellation function of politics, for example, in relation to science, consists in the fact that politics calls upon science to tackle the various aspects of overly complex problems and render them perceivable, or even controllable, in a form that has been reduced, simplified, and tailored to applications. The reaction on the part of society to overly complex problems and uncertainty requires that all value spheres of society appropriate the specific aspects of the problem . In this way, for example, scientific, legal, and ethical investigations all contribute to defining and classifying the concept of death or of freedom from bodily injury. Here we are dealing with concepts that need to be redefined owing to developments in science and technology (i.e., in intensive care medicine). Apel (1988) has termed the fundamental validity claims of rationality, which can be explained through the presuppositions of the argumentation process, as nichthintergehbar, i.e., we cannot go back behind them and thus avoid them) (Apel give these presupposition an transcendental status whereas Habermas only speaks of presuppositions we cannot avoid). In Modernity, there is a socially valid concomitant in the value spheres to these validity claims, namely, agencies for uncertain and complex problems that society cannot sidestep. In the following, I shall describe the functional interactions, i.e. the existing procurement and appellation functions, of the value spheres and systems. Taking the specific empirical case of the social reaction to scientific and moral or ethical uncertainty in the context of the ecological crisis and the way in which the new technologies are being implemented, we can pinpoint specific contradictions by means of an analysis of such functional interactions. As we shall see, the individual value spheres and systems, with their special codes or claims, are not capable of reacting adequately to new uncertainties. They display functional losses or appear to work against one another. The contradictions in the procurement and appellation functions can be summarized in the following formula: the necessary is impossible (procurement function) and the impossible is necessary (appellation function). This contradiction can be shown to exist in every functional relationship between the value spheres. The ineluctable coding systems of the value spheres þscienceþ (true/ false) and þlawþ (justice/ injustice) can no longer, for example, be demonstrated in terms of a desired output, one that is moreover essential for society to be able to find an answer to uncertainty. I shall first devote my attention to the functional relationships between science - politics, law - politics, morality - law, the public sphere - politics, and, finally, law - economics as well as science - economics. The phenomena that are in need of description in this context are summarized according to the key words in the adjoining table: Science - politics The necessary is impossible (= procurement function): what needs to be done, namely, to translate scientific information into a basis for consensual political action, is impossible because authorized data cannot always be procured through science. The reason is that a certain degree of dissent cannot be completely eliminated within science itself, that is, it will always exist between the individual disciplines. This gives rise to the structural problem that epistemic plausibilities are inappropriately redefined as likelihood or truth in the manner in which the value spheres normally do this. Politics is constantly anticipating new scientific consensuses that are obtained by assigning tasks to (interdisciplinary) research groups, which then produce data that constitute a fresh batch of explosive material to feed further discussion. Carrying out research on risk often serves, in this context, to provide a political alibi. The impossible is necessary (= appellation function): many of the questions posited by science and which arise within the scope of risk research cannot be answered by science, at least not in a realistically constrained time frame. So-called 'trans-scientific questions' (Weinberg 1972) should in particular be mentioned here. While such questions are of a factual nature, we cannot expect that they will be answered because they require experiments that are either ethically impossible to carry out (for example, human testing) or empirically impractical (i.e., a large number of experiments to verify small probabilities), or because they demand a degree of overall knowledge of a field that can never be attained (i.e., a knowledge of all the factors relevant to the occurrence or non-occurrence of the greenhouse effect). Such trans-scientific approaches are not normally included in the portrayals scientists give of the facts. Nonetheless, in situations where a political decision must be made, science may come under pressure from outside to produce "hard facts" in exactly those areas where it is not capable of doing so. Although it is impossible to appeal to science directly, it is nonetheless necessary if we are dealing with problems that at least partially arise in fields that are the proper jurisdiction of science, and that are in addition so complicated that they cannot be perceived or made into an issue without the help of science. As a reaction to this uncertainty, science reacts to politics by de-differentiation: it does not take on systematic problems as a challenge, but rather simply clings to the claimed truth of its statements. At this juncture, the function of science, namely to reduce the complexity of things and to help lay the groundwork for political decisions, turns into its opposite: it becomes a strategic resource of political action. In such a situation, the interest groups participating in the discourse choose to cite those experts who subscribe to their political goals. Thus, in the political arena, scientific data is used as a weapon in the battle for access to information. Instead of serving to disencumber the political discourse, science contributes to burdening it down further by spreading dissent and sparking conflicts within the political arena. Law and politics The necessary is impossible (= procurement function): the necessity of regulating technology systematically or of coming up with some kind of technology policy (by which I understand something more than indirect control via the market economy) cannot be met on the basis of normative legal standards, because in the legal system, that which cannot be justified by science appears to be politics. In Germany, the controversy surrounding the fast breeder reactor in Kalkar has shown that the legislative is not duty bound to fulfill a normative function, and the decision regarding the safety of the reactor has been left to politics. There is a strong trend in the field of environmental law to devise a legal form for all eventualities, although this does not guarantee that the desired goal will in fact be attained. Law is being instrumentalized by politics in order to achieve environmental objectives on the basis of norms and 'scientific' standards which in practice cannot be controlled or adhered to. In the context of norms being set for dealing with new technologies and risks, the process of implementing the law is characterized by an informal practice of "bargaining". It is not possible for the public authorities to monitor the practices of those who operate all this technology, which means that opportunities to perpetrate environmental crime are inherent in the very structure of the system. The impossible is necessary (= appellation function): citizens must be able to take legal action when their rights are infringed, and infringements of legal norms must be met with sanctions that are there for all to see. It is precisely these fundamental demands upon the legal system which can no longer be guaranteed in view of the problems arising from the uncertainty generated by science. To quote Rainer Wolf (1991): in this respect, law is shown to be antiquated. It is impossible to guarantee actionability, but at the same time this is a necessary element of a functioning legal system. The following four observations attest to the reality of this contradiction: 1) The principle that the person who has committed the offense is guilty, as well as the principle of causality, are inapplicable; neither perpetrator nor victim can be identified. For example, it is impossible for a "statistically possible victim" of the Chernobyl catastrophe to take the matter to a European court and provide sufficient evidence that the illness from which s/he is suffering was caused by the radioactivity released during the accident. When genetic engineering is used in agriculture, the following scenario is conceivable: possible negative results of such technology can no longer be distinguished from those that were caused by previously existing, or conceivably natural, factors. 2) It is no longer possible to take legal action to serve rights because no one can explain their practical significance. As of 1983, the Dutch constitution has stipulated that a clean environment is a basic right. In an era when companies boast that their products sport the label for environmental responsibility (genetic engineering can also be defined as environmentally friendly technology) because the concept of 'environmentally friendly' gives them sufficient leeway to do so, it seems that it is impossible in practice to file for fulfillment of such a basic right, even as environmental damage is increasing. 3) The permissible level of risk is correlated with the current level of technology, which means that a slackening in the preventative principle goes along with technological progress. In many Western countries, nuclear law states that reactor safety shall be in keeping with the 'level of science and technology'. A European Union committee has also adopted this formula for the more recent developments in genetic engineering. Thus, the acceptance of risks is determined by taking the current state of technology as the standard. 4) Social conflict between interest groups, each of which wants to get its own definition of risk politically accepted, cannot be overcome under the conditions of equality of power that form the basis for judicial decisions. Instead, these conflicts are handled via social unrest, where inequality of power is the prevailing condition. Moreover, degrees of risk depend on the awareness of individual citizens. However, individual citizens are no longer in a position to recognize the risks, or symptoms of being affected by risks, without having access to expert knowledge. Morality and Law The necessary is impossible (= procurement function): it is impossible to procure a consensual statutory basis within the context of ethical and moral uncertainty. However, this problem enters the awareness of the majority of the population only after technological innovations have already become established facts of society. Nevertheless, it is necessary to procure principles so that a consensus may be reached. Introducing an anticipatory preventative principle would be a potential candidate. In the meantime, the scene is dominated by a typically knee-jerk, restrictive technological policy which is characterized by the selective and arbitrary perception of ethical and moral problems. The fears that are triggered within the population by the opaque and overwhelming development of technology are a crucial constituent element of this policy. Luhmann (1986) elucidates the situation as such: "he who has fear, has the law behind him"). Fear is irrefutable, and reactions based on fear may very well be thoroughly understandable and even, for a certain period of time, legitimately fulfill a function. However, the result of allowing fear to transform the value sphere þmoralityþ is that the latitude for development within the legal system - which is necessary if technology is to develop in a constructive way - is replaced by a potential for fear, which functions restrictively at best. The impossible is necessary (= appellation function): As concerns morally and ethically uncertain problems, it has been shown to be impossible to pinpoint principles of morality which can be generalized to the extent of creating a basis for legislation that would be compulsory for the general public. Moral dilemmas often arise when several incompatible ethical insights come into conflict with one another. Who could presume to have the last word, for example, in the debate on test-tube babies, or in the discussion on whether women over 60 years of age should also have access to in-vitro-fertilization technologies. The necessary development of law cannot appeal to a binding concept of morality, with the result that it simply follows in the footsteps of technological development, which in turn, uncontrollably, produces faits accomplis. The Public Sphere - Politics The necessary is impossible (= procurement function): The contradiction between the public sphere and politics has, in my opinion, been in the public eye for quite some time as a result of the failures of environmental policy. It is impossible to procure the necessary power for those responsible for making decisions. On the one hand, politicians, who in any case are elected for relatively short terms of office, are unable or unwilling to pursue long-term environmental goals. On the other hand, the decision-makers quarrel over how to define the problem and how to implement various measures outside of the domain of government, with science performing a mediating function. In a number of Western countries, the membership of environmental groups far exceeds the total membership in the major political parties. The fact that politics lacks legitimative powers has also extended to the apparatus of government. According to recent results, citizens trust information that has been provided by experts from environmental organizations more than the information they receive from the government. The impossible is necessary (= appellation function): given this position, it is impossible for politics to take over the necessary task of coordinating the objectives of environmental policy, because the required trust on the part of the public is lacking. Any coordination tends to disintegrate as a result of the social confrontations between various interest groups. While some interest groups can promote the more or less popular environmental objectives, they do not need to concern themselves with transforming these objectives into policy so that they can ignore the problem of the politically and legally coordinative implementation of such objectives. In fact, at different points opposition to all available possibilities (for example, the use of nuclear energy and coal and coal gasification and hydropower plants, etc.) can be mobilized. What is also problematic here is a governmental practice which, through appeals to the public, calls upon its citizens to behave ethically in their choice and use of consumer goods, but at the same time promotes the production of those same goods in a way which will benefit the economy regardless of ethical repercussions. This kind of interaction between state and the various interest groups contributes to an inappropriate moralizing of the problems involved. Law - economy, science - economy The necessary is impossible (= procurement function): the legal system has the task of clarifying the legal basis for property rights as a pre-condition of a functioning economic system. That such clarification is necessary hardly needed explaining in Germany, in face of the unclarity over ownership of property in former East Germany. However, this relationship between law and property cannot be smoothly transferred onto social discord over the possibility of patenting living organisms within the framework of potentially exploiting biotechnology in business terms in the fields of agriculture and medicine. It is also not applicable to patenting human genes within the scope of the 'human genome project', which involves analyzing the total content of human genetic material. It appears impossible here to assert the degree of liability necessary for engaging in economic actions because, on the one hand, it is impossible to justify, scientifically and technically speaking, exactly what constitutes property, as is the case if an as yet unidentified human gene is to be patented. And, on the other, the consequences of using this property cannot as easily be thought through as if genes were real estate. The impossible is necessary (= appellation function): the impossibility of satisfactorily clarifying property rights, or in other words of a necessary precondition for economic action, renders the exploitation of genetic engineering for business ends a dubious undertaking. Most patents could be shown to be worthless because in practice they are presumably easy to circumvent. The peculiar compulsion (on the part of scientists) to establish a means of protecting their products with legal patents is also a result of the de- differentiation of science and the economy. For scientists as well, the possibility of patenting their results and products (in addition to utilizing them for economic gain) functions as a motivation to carry out research. Science, and which is subsidized by the state, is thus guided by economic motives without actually yielding economic practices that turn a profit. Industry need only wait until the results are published of the human genome project, which is receiving unparalleled financial support from the state as being culturally and scientifically legitimate. Industry can then step in selectively and utilize only those patents which have proven to be lucrative. Any social or economic risks therefore fall only upon the shoulders of the state, and must also be compensated by the state. So, as before, it is possible for human genome projects as a whole to prove economically unsound because none of the participating actors is truly compelled to carry out a cost (risk)- benefit analysis, and to use it to create a truly economic viable project. The possibility of establishing a patenting practice, and at the same time privatizing research, contradicts in principle the public availability of scientific knowledge within the context of science as a culturally differentiated value sphere. However, if one clings to the conception that genes should be merely mapped within the framework of the human genome project, in other words that they are simply waiting to be 'discovered', then the project must be seen as a work of industrial production rather than a cultural undertaking. An interpretation of this nature comes much closer to the actual daily experience of the scientists and subjects employed in the project. The demand that industry carry out and finance the entire undertaking (if it were still willing to do so under these circumstances) would then be logically consistent. This would have the additional advantage that the companies involved would also have to come up with risk calculations, while the scientists can once again devote their attention to deciding which basic questions still need to be clarified. The ideological demand by scientists that the human genome be researched 'as fast as possible' would quickly disappear from public debate. 3. Discourse theory's evaluation of the erosion of value spheres The interaction between value spheres and systems that is triggered by the reaction to uncertainty seems to jeopardize the functions of the individual spheres and call into question the differentiation between the spheres. The interdependencies that were elaborated upon above show that value spheres and systems are eroding, suffering functional losses and being transformed into their opposites. Reactions to uncertainty require an unavoidable coding system for value spheres and systems. This means that for society to cope with this problem, detailed analyses must first be carried out within the value sphere affected solely with respect to truth (science), law and morality. These codifications, for example the true/false coding of science, cannot be established given the matter at hand; epistemic uncertainties cannot be understood in terms of truth, and moral and ethical uncertainties do not lead to universally applicable moral principles to which the legal system could appeal. However, codifications either ensue despite the uncertainties involved, or are left, undifferentiated, to some value sphere or other. In political discourse, the result is an inappropriate transformation of uncertainty into certainty and to a legal vacuum arising with a concomitant lack of coding in the legal system. In this way, the current ecological crisis and new technological risks could trigger a social crisis also bringing the law into disrepute. Discourse ethics is tailored to the problem of society's handling of uncertainty (Habermas, 1983, 1992; Apel, 1988; although, perhaps surprisingly, Habermas has moved away from what calls too normativistic approaches to Law and has given discourse ethics the status of a moral theory of a philosopher, which cannot support a normative foundation of law, and even would be neutral to ethical principles!). Discourses are sought where doubt and uncertainty prevail. The basis for the problem of uncertainty only becomes clearly recognizable by mediating all validity claims within a discourse. A discourse is called for precisely when given the potential irreversibility of the consequences of having made a decision. The circle of potential discourse participants, the need for available information, and the relevancy of the problem to the future are all factors here. Although discourse theory does not have any specific relevance to a particular field (see Apel & Kettner 1992, pp. 317-48), it is based on a specific starting point: the principle that conclusive arguments are simply not available. Discourse theory is ambivalent where the problem of uncertainty is concerned. It requires that all relevant validity claims be stressed and differentiated. At the same time, it demands that the differing aspects of the validity claims be integrated after the fact - in other words, after passing through the value spheres - and normatively opposes any universalization of one individual aspect of validity (for example, it opposes utilitarianism, moralization, or aestheticization) as well as the use of one value sphere instrumentally or functionally to serve another. If discourse ethics is understood as the ethics of responsibility (in the sense of its so-called Part B justifications for the problems of application), then according to Apel neither law nor politics falls beyond its range of application (Apel & Kettner 1992, pp. 29-61). Law, says Apel, establishes itself between morality and politics as a responsible intermediary between the two. In contrast to legal positivism, stress is laid here upon the dependence of politics and law on morality, although there is of course no intention of moralizing politics or law (unlike the various versions of an environmental ethics, provided that this can be taken seriously as a philosophical ethics in the first place). Although the reaction to uncertainty is well-suited to the point of departure taken by discourse ethics, the former yields no arguments for the application of latter. In my opinion, the question posed by moral theory as to the 'best ethics' or the 'best moral theory' cannot be answered by pointing to a practice in which the best ethics or theory would function. As a consequence, what is of prime importance is the morally justifiable demand that differentiated validity claims be mediated both procedurally and integratively. Against the backdrop of the contradictions discussed here, problems of legitimation arise, characterized by a state which, on the one hand, in its planning, cannot concur with opposing interest groups on how to interpret situations. On the other, it is confronted by citizens who are protesting against being overwhelmed by innovation processes which they are not allowed to decide upon. The problem of legitimation and the phenomena mentioned above are only partially offset by the tendency of the administration to become increasingly involved in bargaining and negotiating processes with social groups. While a number of sociologists of science regard the extension of this kind of social consensus itself as a solution (see Bijker, 1987; Callon, 1991), in my opinion not much can be expected in terms of the quality of these consensuses, which, after all, arise in the context of strategic action and under conditions of unequal power. As I see it, what is far more important is whether there can be a just procedural solution to the historically novel problem of decision-making under conditions of uncertainty. That we might need exactly this kind of procedural solution is, in my view, a consequence of the fact that in modern societies there are no pre-given notions which would clarify which actors are to participate in which way during decision-making processes in the context of such uncertainties. However, this question has not yet appeared on the political agenda. The historically novel contradictions that exist between the value spheres cannot simply be eliminated through political decisions. The political system must react independently of the subjective will of political actors; for example, to the ongoing stream of information generated by science. In this way, a successful response to uncertainty is not a question of what the better political option might be, but rather a structural reaction to the growing problem of uncertainty, which could usher in a new evolutionary stage of social development. The essential hypothesis informing my analysis is that the need for differentiation of authorized discourses stands at odds with the impossibility of such differentiation on the level of the actual problems. There are two social responses to this: de-differentiation will ensue within the value spheres and systems, or the various insights of the specialized discourses will be subsequently integrated via an intermediary. The first possibility (de-differentiation within the value spheres and systems) leads, in my opinion, to regressive tendencies and to transformations of the value spheres: science surrenders its role as a functional authority and becomes a strategic resource for politics; law becomes a constituent element for an immoral negotiation practice which can no longer be correctly understood using categories of legality; morality is transformed into fear, and economics yields unprofitable practices. The second possibility appears to be the progressive one, as I see it. Here, the question arises whether democratic will formation can be extended to the problems of ecological crisis and technological risks. It is a matter of whether the social strife among interest groups can be settled through just, democratic decision-making processes. This seems to bring with it the disadvantage of slow decision-making. Often our attention is called to the supposed failure of Western democracies; a plea is often sounded for the faster and politically more neutral decision-making capabilities of an elite group of specialized experts, for example in the second major report of the Club of Rome. However, this plea fails to recognize that the problem is characterized by social argument. A democratic solution, if it were to be found, would also be more efficient. In other words, from a social point of view the reaction to uncertainty oscillates between progression and regression. Unlike systems theory and constructivist approaches in sociology, discourse theory has the advantage of being able to deliver normative justifications. Seen from this angle, I tend to favour promoting the institutionalization of discursive procedures, which must be organized for the specific case of uncertainty. They must also substitute for the functional relationship between the value spheres and systems, as well as counter the contradictions and de- differentiation of the latter. Within the scope of a discursive procedure, those interests which could hold universal appeal could be identified, thus preventing them from falling victim to social conflict. In order to achieve this, a number of general norms that can be justified by discourse theory would have to be given the authority of administrative law: - An information law entailing the right to obtain, and the obligation to provide, information. - A selective suspension of the majority principle, because this principle can no longer guarantee that political decisions remain open to revision. It might be possible to ensure the reversibility of decisions, for example, by approving only those epistemic risks which have a particular, limited time frame. - The elimination of unfavourable possibilities for action, which could give rise to irreversible damage or imply irreversible decisions. If a discursive procedure were integrated into the political planning process and a procedural form of law, the following would become plausible: 1) A procedure for recognizing scientific dissent reduces scientific information being used as a strategic resource. This would also serve to contain the tendency to politicize or instrumentalize science and law inappropriately. 2) Law can have a normative impact if discursive procedures can formally employ a recognized preventative principle as a means of fostering consensus. This would thus involve partially breaking away from a model of law that is oriented toward conflict in favour of one that is oriented toward consensus. This would make it possible for significant decisions to be made based on laws (as opposed to the current areas not subject to legal regulation and the loss of the meaningfulness of basic rights). Discursive procedures should contribute to breaking up the usual sequence of actions - which involves first acquiring knowledge (in other words, the consensual use of science), and then making decisions - by applying anticipatory reason, which can create political regulations as a form of prevention. 3) Pragmatic conditions, which constitute proof, are different in a scientific context than in the contexts of political planning. From a scientific point of view, the dangers of genetic engineering, for example, cannot be refuted by pointing out that there have been no perceivable accidents for some years now. However, this is perfectly possible in the political arena, and even reasonable given certain conditions. However, in the case of social conflict concerning the consequences of officially controlled experiments in which genetically manipulated organisms are released into the environment, in view of epistemic uncertainty it can be questioned whether this pragmatic condition of the line of argumentation is indeed reasonable. Therefore, I suggest that we consider data that have arisen in this context not as normal scientific facts, but rather as a source of information for a mediating discourse in the framework of discursive procedures. Now, it would be possible to create a juridical basis for a pragmatic condition that has been altered in this way; it would have to replace the previous dictum according to which decisions regarding risks must correspond to the current level of science and technology. We can simply agree, pragmatically speaking, that evidence is not being established here, but rather that informed discourse is being enriched. Such a change in pragmatic conditions could preserve in fruitful discourses the rational core at the heart of contemporary activist protest (among others, destroying experiments involving genetically manipulated organisms). 4) The discursive procedure would have to be able, subsequently, to integrate the differentiated validity aspects of the various systems and value spheres. To this end, the state could create a legal framework for initiating talks among the typically antagonistic interest groups in a manner analogous to institutionalized collective bargaining between employees and employers. The state determines the rights and duties of the participants, i.e., as concerns the procurement of information and scheduling. The talks could provide the scope for articulating common interests, which serves to keep the participants at the negotiating table. Simultaneously, the business world would get a glimpse of what might be desired and profitable from the point of view of society. Consumers and environmental organizations can draw ethical boundaries and help to determine in which direction technology will advance. The state would have to ensure that conditions exist for fair self-regulation, and in particular ensure that weaker parties would have access to adequate power. Perhaps an equivalent could be devised to the right to strike, an essential element of wage policy. Consumer boycotts have already gained importance as a means of pressure with respect to food products that have been genetically manipulated. Clearly, such procedures can also clearly sow dissent. A minimum level of consensus among participants (on the willingness to compromise, for example) is a precondition here - however, this is also true in the case of parliamentary will formation. Luhmann (1991) has diagnosed a gap between those participating in decision-making and those affected by possible damage. What I have been describing, however, is a more profound disintegration, because in my opinion it is not possible to distinguish between decision-makers and those affected by technological development. They cannot even be identified as a group. We are faced with the impossible task of coordinating incompatible political, economic, and ethical objectives. At the same time, this very task appears to be necessary from the abstract perspective of making decisions that are valid within a prescribed period of time. The solution that I propose lays emphasis on expanding and reforming the scope of administrative law rather than on renewing constitutional rights (as Hans Jonas has suggested). Renewing constitutional rights would only further accentuate the diminished significance (and function) of law, and in any case are not necessary in the first place, because ecological objectives can already be considered as constitutional rights, in light of the fact that endangering the ecosystem also poses a threat to the survival of humanity. As I see it, in functionally differentiated societies, the only domain in which an ethics of responsibility can be applied is the sphere of a public that engages in critical thinking. The actors within this sphere must be truly free to act according to precepts of action that they have chosen themselves, without having to limit themselves to some code or other belonging to one value sphere, and without having to concern themselves with whether their actions or the goals of their actions can be coordinated and achieved politically or legally. The possibility of making a normative appeal to the public is certainly of consequence for discourse theory. However, such an appeal does not clarify the problems of mediating between politics and the public; but instead allows them to be formulated in the first place. For example, the mere demand that the discourse be strategy-free would be highly quite problematic in terms of the ethics of responsibility: can one assume contrafactually that everyone would be able to accept the outcome of a given discourse? Many would dismiss delaying the decision-making process through discourse as unethical, or misunderstand it as being simply another dilatory strategy. The most important question is whether the process of reaching consensus within the scope of the rationality of political planning, driven forward with great effort over the years, can be partially replaced by a discourse involving the general public. Indeed, the political planning process would also have to be reconstructed as a discursive learning process, which the general public is hardly in a position to understand. At this point, the question arises as to what balance can justifiably be struck between the benefit of giving decisions more legitimacy by drawing social interest groups into the decision-making process and the risk of decreasing the substantive quality of the decisions. This question needs to be examined more closely in empirical terms. 4. Outlook Expressed in terms of discourse theory, the above-mentioned loss of function seen among value spheres and system rationalities calls for new institutions. Assessment agencies and official inquiry commissions, etc., can be seen as the (still) inchoate forms taken by discursive procedures, and also as the result of a social learning process. The new institutions would have to function as mediators between the value spheres and systems, acting as a discursive intermediary between differing validity claims. Although developed countries have begun to cultivate such intermediaries for the interface of science and politics, they are almost completely lacking in other areas. The problems discussed also urgently call for the conceptual reform of political planning and law. Discourse theory is continuing to set its normative hopes by the quality of public opinion formation. Where the latter is concerned, the only thing that can be guaranteed is that truth prevails only to the same degree rational people prevail. However, every state that wished to guarantee more would be adopting a course leading away from democracy. Notes 

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