Date: Mon, 06 Oct 2008 22:15:48 +0200 To: deleuze-guattari-AT-lists.driftline.org Subject: Re: [D-G] Close reading : Bergson's conception of difference [2 Essentially, Bergson criticizes his predecessors for not having seen true differences of nature. The constant presence of this critique also signals the importance of the theme in Bergson's work: where there were differences of nature, others have found merely differences of degree. And certainly we find the opposite criticism: where there were only differences of degree, others have introduced differences of nature, for example, between the so-called perceptive faculty of the brain and the reflexive functions of the medulla, or the perception of matter and matter differences of nature between things of the same kind. If differences of nature do exist between individuals of the same kind, we must then recognize that differ=AD ence itself is not simply spatio-temporal, that it is not generic or specific=97in a word, difference is not exterior or superior to the thing. This is why, according to Bergson, it is important to show that general ideas, at least most of the time, ptesent us with extremely different facts in a grouping that is merely utilitarian: "Suppose on examining those states grouped under the name of pleasure, we dis=AD cover they share nothing in common, except being states that a person seeks out: humanity will have classified very different things as the same in kind, simply because humanity attributed the same practical interest to each and acted in the same way towards them."' In this sense, differences of nature are already the key: we must start from them, but first we must find them. Without prejudging the nature of difference as internal difference, we already know that internal differ=AD ence exists, given that there exist differences of nature between things of the same genus. Therefore, either philosophy proposes for itself this means (differences of nature) and this end (to arrive at internal difference), or else it will have merely a negative or generic relation to things and will end up a part of criticism and mere generalities=97in any case, it will run the risk of ending up in a merely exter=AD nal state of reflection. Opting for the first alternative, Bergson puts forward philosophy's ideal: to tailor "for the object a concept appropriate to that object alone, a concept that one can hardly still call a concept, since it applies only to that one thing." This unity of the thing and the concept is internal differnce, which one reaches thorugh differences of nature. _______________________________________________ List address: deleuze-guattari-AT-driftline.org Info: http://lists.driftline.org/listinfo.cgi/deleuze-guattari-driftline.org Archives: www.driftline.org
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