File deleuze-guattari/deleuze-guattari.0907, message 5


From: "Harald Wenk" <hwenk-AT-web.de>
To: <deleuze-guattari-AT-lists.driftline.org>
Date: Fri, 10 Jul 2009 15:41:08 +0200
Subject: Re: [D-G] internal, external teleology, immanence, transcendence


Dear filip,

Very astonishing to read you again, again without
any introduction or  explanation.

I already wrete a lot here, on some questions, especially on difference and 
mechanics
(Question 3, Nietzsche, non equilibrium mechanics, Stengers, Prigorin).


Aristotle is a very big "thing" in philosophy.

To answer your question 1,
Normally transcendental means, from the
most influentual Kantian framework in this respect:
The condition of the possibility of.....
.

Now, the main tune in Aristotle is:
Knowing is knowing by causality.

So, as his first mover is ousia, which means essence, substance and some 
more
combine this "transcendental" in a causal manner:
Being the condition of the possibility of movement, as it is
the causing mover without being caused,
that is the first mover.
The "ontologocal status" of Kants transcendentals are not so clear.
Because of purity of thinking as we don't know it, says the "idealistic 
school,
because of unjustfierd scepticism on "independent" existence of the real 
world,
say the realists, like Arsitoltle.
In my eyes the idelistic school is defintely ruled out by real atomism,
which was very surprising in its real empirical data, therefore
not preformed by our "conception".
Even more convinving are cosmological data,
where Kant may have the scepsis, if it is really
"all" of effects, what we get from universe.
But this was already foreseen by the realist Spinoza with his infinity of 
unknown
attributes.  In my eyes, Kant is to a high degree
a restricted version of Spinoza with emphasis on "subjectivty".



You know, that "movement" in Arsitotle meant "change" (kinesis) in a gerenal
sense, but which, by hard work of natural science, can be brought back
to movement. The body mind problem or theory of the soul, desire, power to 
act on its own,
you mentioned,  is very intriguing too,
The answer here is, that the substance is the cause of the desire to desire 
thinking
as the best or highest action, theoria, taken up by Kant.
This dominance of theoria is thus transcendental.

Note that kinematic means, that the framework of movement remains, while 
dynamics
means that the framework or system of movement changes.

After this pleasure of telling some Aristotle,
and answering your  question 1,
a little more context would be welcome,
making answers, which are laborious, a bit more easier.
For example references to definitions
technical scale of the question and answers.

Maybe you already finished or gave up your work on Deleuze's Difference.


I hope you recoverd from your sickness you mentioned a while ago.


Best regards

Harald Wenk


--------------------------------------------------
From: "filip" <fildh-AT-gmx.net>
Sent: Saturday, July 04, 2009 6:43 PM
To: <deleuze-guattari-AT-lists.driftline.org>
Subject: [D-G] internal, external teleology, immanence, transcendence

> Hello everybody,
>
> i got some questions.
> In "difference and repetition" and "la conception de la difference cheze 
> bergson" deleuze attacks some philosophers for seeing difference as 
> external difference or not as difference at all.
>
> *1)aristotles: *difference between things is no real difference
> still Aristotels uses internal teleology which gives the things there own 
> purpose and power
> QUESTION1
> aristotles needs the unmoved move to give a final acoount of what is: so 
> that makes him a transcendent philosopher?
>
>
> *2)mechanism: *difference as a closed mechanical structure : no newness is 
> possible.
> QUESTION 2
> mechanism is using an internal teleological model: is this true ?
>
> *3)darwin:* difference is not evolution of species but evolution of life. 
> evolution of species
> does not give an fundamental account on live itself
> QUESTION 3
> how does Darwin see the true nature of life ? immanent / transcendent.
>
> *4)plato:* difference is not teleological inspired: the good is external 
> to life.
> QUESTION 4
> plato has an external teleological model. Is an external teleological 
> model not always transcendent ?
>
> *5)hegel* : difference is going to an "infinte externality": thing differs 
> with all the rest.
> QUESTION 5
> hegel is using an interal teleology, but needs an external at the end ? is 
> this true ?
>
>
> thanks
>
>
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