Date: Tue, 02 May 2006 11:12:25 +0100
From: "Iolo Savill" <ppyxis-AT-nottingham.ac.uk>
To: <feyerabend-AT-lists.driftline.org>
Subject: [PKF] My dissertatation


Hi, I've been writing my final year dissertation on Feyerabend. It's on an article by Achinstein called 'Proliferation: Is it a good thing?' and basically examines proliferation from each of their perspectives. Hardcore readers of Feyerabend will probably remeber that Achinstein is the same guy who had a discussion with Feyerabend in 'On the meaning of scientific terms.' The bit that I've found trickiest is the exposition of the argumentative structure of AM and how proliferation fits in.
I would be grateful if you could point out any of the mistakes I've made.
Many Thanks,
Iolo

The argument of Against Method.

One of the most troublesome aspects of reading Feyerabend's works is the ambiguity in the intention of the argument: there seem to be both positive arguments that have clear conclusions, and collages of perspectives and arguments that do not establish conclusions but do make them plausible (AM, p.1). It is a little misleading to suggest that there is a valid, sharp distinction to be made between when each style is used, however, in exegetical terms, it is helpful to pretend that there is such a division. For the purposes of this essay a positive argument shall be one in which the premises of the argument are not meant to be called into question by the conclusions, whereas the opposite is true for a negative argument. Feyerabend makes this distinction, when discussing epistemological anarchism (hereafter anarchism) in Science in a Free Society (SFS, pp.157-162, passim). In 'Explanation, Reduction and Empiricism' (1962) positive arguments are prominent, in 'Against Method' (197
 5) negat
 ive arguments are more evident. As has been noted, there is not a sharp distinction to be made here, and where it seems a positive argument has been given it is wrong to suppose that the negative argument has been thereby excluded; it is merely that the purposes of the essay do not require an examination of this aspect. 
 The change from a positive to a negative argumentative style can be seen as a tightening of Feyerabend's position, as the logic of his arguments became more clear to him, and, alternatively, as a result of his desire to dissociate himself from the 'Popperian Church.' It is also the case that the new argumentative style is much tougher and more durable because it uses hypotheticals, and is directed at showing problems and difficulties rather than solutions. The new style of argumentation is thus strongly reminiscent of Wittgenstein's method in the Philosophical Investigations, in its wariness of theorising and emphasis on giving a full account: "don't think, but look!" (PI, 66). What can be particularly difficult exegetically is that Feyerabend uses many of the 'same' arguments in both ways. One of the best examples of this are the arguments for proliferation. It is clear that in the earlier papers, when Feyerabend approached the matter in terms of the search for and improvem
 ent of a
  universal scientific method, proliferation was seen as a necessary step towards improving scientific method. Quotations from 'Explanation, Reduction and Empiricism'  and 'Reply to Criticism' show this:
"Variety of opinion is a methodological necessity for the sciences"  (E, R &E, p.76)
"The model which underlies my own discussion has as its aim maximum testability of our knowledge. The main consequence is the principle of proliferation" (Reply to Criticism, p.105)
 Although these statements seem fairly unambiguous, reading of either of these papers in full makes it clear that Feyerabend, even at this stage, is aware of the hypothetical nature of the demands. This is shown by the use of the word 'model' and the statement that: "No argument will be given for this aim [maximum testability] here" (Reply to Criticism, p.105). However it is clear that at this stage Feyerabend had not become intensely critical of the elevation and consolidation of methodological principles/assumptions themselves in the way he was to be later. The later criticism of the monist methodological systems of critical rationalism (e.g. Popper and Lakatos) and empiricism (e.g. Hempel and Nagel) (where a single theory is the aim of the methodology) can, though, be seen as a direct consequence of Feyerabend's appreciation of the value of proliferation. The change of emphasis is important because it makes it clear he is not trying to defend proliferation from a monist vi
 ewpoint.
  The form of his ideas makes it necessary that they are developed in opposition to a monist position. No positive presentation of proliferation can work without considerable difficulties, as will be discussed in the concluding part of this essay.
 By the time of 'Against Method' the new picture is in place. Instead of trying to show the virtue of proliferation as a methodological principle per se, or that proliferation follows from 'reasonable methodological demands' (E, R & E, p.57), his intention is solely to show that proliferation cannot be ruled out as a methodological principle by the rationalist (SFS, p.145). The difference here is that the attitude towards basic methodological principles is always informed by the basic argument of the book: that we do not have any, and nor should there be an attempt to enforce any, "universal and stable" (SFS, p.98) scientific method (this is not to say that no method should aim for universality). However it would also be easy to find statements, from 'Against Method', that would support the idea that Feyerabend was trying to present a positive case: for example, "Variety of opinion is necessary for objective knowledge." (AM, p.32) Here, though, we see that 'objective knowledg
 e' itsel
 f is not consecrated as an ideal. This is the key difference between the earlier and later approaches.
 According to Feyerabend, this would be to misread the book: "I do not show that proliferation should be used, I only show that the rationalist cannot exclude it." (SFS, p.145) Part of the confusion here is due to the conflation of proliferation and epistemological anarchism. The other part is about the role of anarchism for Feyerabend: it is explicitly stated that it is to act as a 'medicine' (AM, p.9) (in a positive fashion), and also in a polemical capacity against typical rationalist and empiricist positions (in a negative fashion),  whereas many critics and reviewers have wanted to see it as a self-contained positive philosophy, no doubt as this would make it easier to criticise. This interpretation, that Feyerabend insists in 'Science in a Free Society' is the correct one, is supported by a close analysis of the text. By insisting that anarchism is a medicine he avoids presenting a candidate for a "universal and stable" method. On close examination the statements he mak
 es are h
 ypothetical, thus avoiding any positive presentation of a system of rules. From up to the end of the second chapter of Against Method it is possible to find the following quotations supporting this interpretation:
"'Anything goes' is not a 'principle' I hold" (AM, p.vii)
"I don't have the intention of replacing 'old and dogmatic' principles by 'new and more libertarian ones.'" (AM, p.vii)
"It is both reasonable and absolutely necessary for the growth of knowledge." (AM, p.14) (See next quote.)
"My frequent use of such words as 'progress', 'advance', 'improvement', etc., does not mean that I possess special knowledge about what is good and what is bad in the sciences and that I want to impose this knowledge on my readers. Everyone can read the terms in his own way... Thus for an empiricist, 'progress' will mean transition to a theory that provides direct empirical tests for most of its basic assumptions....And my thesis is that anarchism helps to achieve progress in any one of the senses one cares to choose. Even a law-and-order science will succed only if anarchistic moves are occasionally allowed to take place," (AM, p.18) (Note: although Feyerabend says here that "Everyone can read the terms in his own way", he seems to assume that his audience are rationalists, cf."I reply that I assume my readers to be rationalists. If they are not, then there is no need for them to read the book." (SFS, p.14n) It does seem to be necessary to that the book is adressed to ration
 alists, 
 like Lakatos, cf. "it is a letter to a friend... Imre Lakatos was a rationalist" (AM, p.vii). The 'everyone' is a mistake.)
"There is only one principle that can [my emphasis] be defended under all circumstances and in all stages of human development" (AM, pp.18-19)
"In the first case it emerges..." (AM, p.20)
"A scientist who wishes..." (AM, p.21)
"My intention is not to replace one set of general rules by another such set: my intention is, rather, to convince the reader that all methodologies, even the most obvious ones, have their limits. The best way to show this is to demonstrate the limits and even the irrationality of some rules which she, or he, is likely to regard as basic. In the case of induction (including induction by falsification) this means demonstrating how well the counterinductive procedure can be supported by argument." (AM, p.23)
 As has been noted above, it is easy to forget the hypothetical nature of the arguments of 'Against Method', partly because they are often extended and the reader is not constantly reminded of the nature of the argument as the book progresses, but also because many of the arguments appear in Feyerabend's earlier work in positive contexts, where the basic principles such as 'empirical content', 'truth', 'rationality' and so forth are assumed. The quotations make it clear that in as far as Feyerabend is making any positive statement it is that there is no all-encompassing rule system. It is very easy to confound this thought with the idea of proliferation (as proliferation is almost the same as counterinduction, and arguing for counterinduction is one way that Feyerabend supports anarchism) and because the idea that there can be no all-encompassing rule system is very similar to the idea that proliferation is necessary. As the quote for page 23 (see above) of Against Method sho
 ws thoug
 h, this is wrong. Now it may be objected that if Feyerabend did not wish to establish counterinduction as a 'principle', necessary for a scientific methodology, then how could he have been sure that his conclusion (that there is not any all-encompassing methodology) followed? The answer to this is that Feyerabend did not believe that his conclusion was logically entailed: "Such support does not establish it; it makes it plausible." (AM, p.1)
 Achinstein, in 'Proliferation: Is It a Good Thing?' only examines proliferation in the context of it being a positive, "universal and stable" principle. Whilst this is understandable, for the reasons given above, and because Achinstein does not differentiate Feyerabend's position at different times, to do justice to Feyerabend's argument it will be necessary to show where Achinstein's criticisms are affected by the different style of argument adopted in 'Against Method'. Sometimes it can be difficult to see exactly what is meant by saying something is not meant as a positive principle - for what other types of principle are the? The idea behind the contention is that if we adopt the position and assumptions of the empiricist or the critical rationalist then this would be how they would describe the situation. It does not imply that such a description is valid, rather that it is the natural outgrowth from a certain picture. It is not, therefore, an attempt, to describe the si
 tuation 
 'objectively', because a certain way of looking at things is presupposed. Any 'principles' thus derived must be regarded in this light. This is why it is not fair to accuse Feyerabend of not presenting a position: whilst it is true to say that Feyerabend does not present any positive prescriptions for the scientist, what he does do is to engage with the arguments of his opponents, and show where these arguments lead. 
 A similar objection (though remember we must separate proliferation from anarchism) is: "O.k., so Feyerabend does not wish to present a methodology, but he does say that anarchism is an "excellent medicine for epistemology, and for the philosophy of science." (AM, p.9) So what does anarchism consist of? What does he mean by the term 'anarchism'? If he does not mean anything by it, then why aren't his statements concerning it meaningless?" 'Anarchism' cannot be a methodological principle or adaptation, because then Feyerabend would be simply suggesting a superior methodology. Rather anarchism is a suspension of the accepted methodology and allowance of principles that contradict it. There are two closely related questions, common to philosophy, which immediately arise:
a) Why can't anarchism be elevated into a methodology?
b) Isn't the denial of a principle/methodology itself a principle/methodology?
Feyerabend deals with a) by suggesting (AM, p.1(as noted above)) that anarchism cannot be elevated into a methodology because arguments of the type used in Against Method could not establish such a methodology, and if they could they would only work as reductiones ad absurdum of such a position (SFS, pp.156-157, 210), rather than as a modification thereof. b) is much more complicated as it involves one of the principal problems in philosophy of language: self-reference and language hierarchies. Indeed anarchism, even as a medicine, seems to present a sort of super-principle, saying that for any set of rules it is right to break those rules sometimes, which appears to be self-contradictory. For, taking such a super-principle to its logical conclusion, it would seem to imply either that it should itself be broken, and therefore that there are self-consistent and practical sets of rules, or that there is an infinite hierarchy of levels of language. However, taking anarchism as a
  methodo
 logy, it is less obvious that the denial of a methodology is another methodology and so it could be considered that Feyerabend avoids these problems, insofar as he avoids presenting an 'eternal' principle of the rationalist sort (SFS, p.162n). This is the key difference, alluded to earlier, between his earlier and later attitudes to the role of the proliferation argument, and what it shows: the awareness that proliferation and anarchism clash at a basic level with a rationalist presentation.
This issue is, in a way, subsidiary to the main argument of this essay, becuase it deals with (epistemological) anarchism as such, rather than with an argument (proliferation) used to support this position. Perhaps it is justified by the need to have a broader perspective on the structure of Feyerabend's argument.
 There is one further interpretive aspect that it will be useful to mention, before Achinstein's criticisms of the principle of proliferation are examined. This is that, in 'Proliferation: Is It a Good Thing?', Achinstein, when trying to make clear what the proliferation claim is, introduces the criterion that it should be 'shocking', as he attributes this aim to Feyerabend. This is clearly stated: 
"To begin with, if we understand proliferation in accordance with Feyerabend's explicit formulation above, there is nothing particularly shocking about it." (Pro., p.37)
"Since Feyerabend wants to shock and exaggerate, I doubt that this is what he has in mind. The principle of proliferation, so understood, has no teeth." (Pro., p.38) 
However, whilst it may be true that Feyerabend deliberately chooses "more paradoxical formulations" (AM, p.xiv) of his ideas, he also makes it clear that:
 "As far as I am concerned the main ideas of the essay... are rather trivial and appear trivial when expressed in suitable terms". (AM, p.xiv)
"None of the ideas that underlie my argument is new. My interpretation of scientific knowledge, for example, was a triviality for physicists like Mach, Boltzmann, Einstein and Bohr."
 It is possible that Achinstein has not read this, as this description is found in the preface to the third edition, nevertheless, it cannot be ignored. Given this, it is a false demand, to make upon the 'proliferation claim', that it should be 'shocking' however formulated, and so this demand will be ignored.
 As we have seen, there are two main issues with Achinstein's interpretation of Feyerabend:
1) Achinstein wishes to present the principle of proliferation as a stand-alone methodological prescription.
2) Achinstein wants to make the 'proliferation claim' something shocking, in all its possible formulations.
Both 1) and 2) are at odds with Feyerabend's approach in Against Method, so 2) shall be ignored, as it is not paricularly instructive even to suppose it. In contrast, it is illuminating to examine proliferation as both a positive and a negative principle, and so each of Achinstein's arguments will be examined from both perspectives, with the necessary adaptations (distortions) made to Feyrabend's arguments.
As to the nature, or essence, of the ''principle' of proliferation', that will be made clear in the next sections, where Achinstein's arguments against the value of proliferation are examined.


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