Date: Mon, 18 Nov 2002 00:38:56 -0800 (PST)
From: Gary E Davis <gedavis1-AT-yahoo.com>
Subject: HAB: Truth and Ethics (part 2 of 3)


Continuing from part 1, 14 Nov, re: Vic P,
"Habermas vs. Putnam, " 4 Nov
--------------------------------------------------------

V> I also wonder whether Habermas's recent position on the
justification of "truth" claims in "Truth and
Justification" is a step backwards from his thoroughly
postmetaphysical position on the  justification or moral
claims.  The latter, but not the former, is an "epistemic"
conception....

G: What essay is *that*? It seems to me that JH's
justification of truth claims in "Rightness vs. Truth" is
epistemic. 

------------------------------------

G>> Earlier, I've sketched a view of ethics that looks for
a complementarity of virtue and duty, so I'm glad to see
that Putnam anticipates something similar, though in
traditional terms that I find counterproductive: "I have
often remarked to friends that in ethics we need both
Aristotelian and Kantian insights, and I never cease to be
astonished at the resistance I meet when I say
this....But...our imperfect but indefinitely perfectible
ability to recognize the demands made upon us by various
values is precisely what provides Kantian (or "discourse")
ethics with *content*" (134).

V> Aren't Aristotelian insights into the role of values and
virtues accommodated sufficiently by the ethical dimension
of practical reasoning in Habermas's theory?....

G: I agree that "insights...are accomodated...," but
accomodation is contrary to the complementarity I have in
mind. A deontic-moral theory may indeed see values and
virtues as its content (as Putnam puts it) or be concerned
about "sufficient" accomodation. But---by the way---my
being "glad to see that Putnam anticipates something
similar" to the complementarity of virtue and duty I'm
looking for is not about subscribing to an Aristotelian
sense of virtue and a Kantian sense of duty; I was just
trying to find what praise I could for Putnam's discussion.
But even if I did seek a specifically Aristotelian-Kantian
complementarity, I don't see complementarity of any A and B
as being basically about accomodation of A by B (or B by
A).    

V> Or does Habermas's Kantian view of moral norms imposing
deontic constraints on the scope of morally permissible
values and virtues fail to accord these ethical phenomena
their due dignity, so to speak?  

G: That's an accomodative question---which could be taken
to presume no problem with the view of moral norms that is
allegedly only faced with a question of accomodation, i.e.,
its apparently Kantian character that "accomodates."

Ethics and pragmatics are sufficient for "moral" theory; I
see no reason to not see 'ethic' and 'moral' as lexical
synonyms---but prefer to focus on an 'ethics' because
'moral' is so enmeshed with moralistic morality.
Besides--by the way--I'm confident that there is a sense of
the good--in Phillipa Foot's sense of "natural goodness,"
let's say--that can prove preferability of understanding
rightness/justice as deriving from goodness/care rather
than the converse--which, by the way (further), isn't
contrary to what Habermas wants from "moral" theory, it
seems to me:  In short, I think there's no tenable
(non-overbearing, non-paternalistic---non-demanding) sense
of morality distinct from ethics (contrary to Habermas'
insistence in many essays that there needs to be some sense
of the moral apart from ethics) ALONG WITH  pragmatics
arising from ethical insights via progressive social
policies (including the therapeutic interest in so-called
"weakness of will"), good educational practices, and
constitutional legislation. 

The "moral" (the interest in just rule?) in Habermas's
texts turns up in various uses: as a stand-in for
normativity in general (matters of discourse-ethical
principle D), a stand-in for an interest in rights or
justice (matters of social policy based in realist claims
about human interests), a stand-in for legislative
interests of social policy (matters of constitutional law),
and a stand-in for advocacy of what I call value
universalism (matters of discourse-ethical principle
U)--and perhaps most of all: a stand-in for the
emancipatory interest (morality as a compensatory force
against ethical akrasia). But discourses on any of these
"moral" issues have their own characteristic features, such
that reference to morality distinct from any of this has no
point other than to stand in for these other discourses
(but Habermas *does* go on to these discourses, *with* a
"moral" claim distinct from these other discourses AND
distinct from ethics!). At best, the moral in Habermas'
discourse is an heuristic for other kinds of discourses
apart from ethics, especially universalist advocacy. If we
think and talk about ethics, pragmatics, norm formation,
the reality of human interests, social policy,
emancipations, legislation and universalistic advocacy,
what's left? Drop the moralistic fetish, and get on to
these important topics (but don't think you can turn to
Kantism for guidance in ethics, pragmatics, norm formation,
the reality of human interests, social policy,
emancipation, democratic legislation, or even
universalistic advocacy). 

------------------------------

V> Does your alternative view manage, like Habermas's
theory, to capture the universal and unconditional validity
of moral norms and judgments....?

G: Claims about standing universals are either (1) realist
claims about human interests, which is a very complex
discourse about evolution and the developmental conditions
of individuals (which Habermas has not handled well, in my
view); or (2) about historically recent declarations of
social policy (grounded in various ways, including realist
claims about human interests that are regarded as
self-evident--which I endorse, but *why* are they
self-evident? This needs extended attention, for the sake
of working with those who find these claims not at all
self-evident--and for universalist discourse and social
theory). Making claims about morality, in terms of
universal values (that aren't yet recognized by those who
most need to find universalistic arguments compelling),
independently of ethics (which JH does in _J&A_ and his
recent essay against liberal eugenics) basically begs
issues of epistemology that aren't going to find tenable
guidance in "moral" discourse that is somehow *other than*
ethical insight applied pragmatically. Or so I will argue,
in a detailed examination of Habermas' "Rightness vs.
Truth" essay later. 

Universalistic claims are only compelling to those whose
education level can recognize the compellingness of
universalistic claims (apart from *provincial*
understandings of that which is *claimed* by foreigners to
be "universal" and apart from mythical-religious views of
the basis of universal values, which are problematic in
their own ways). In other words, claims about "moral"
universals are always claims about a *value*-universalism
which is enmeshed with presumptions about the
universalizability of values not yet universalized (in
those important cases where one wants to make
universalistic arguments, which are the only cases in which
one *needs* a better argument to have force). Claims about
universality are part of a *universalistic* discourse that
has a teleology: to universalize candidate values which
work--or are supposed to work--like ultimates. But
Habermas' sense of the "moral", apart from ethics and
(apparently) apart from a pragmatic systemization of
ethical insights via social policies and legislation, seems
to me to have no content, as it acts like a Derridean mask:
standing in for what is still deferred in the discourse.
Follow the "moral" of the story, and you find a focus on
normativity, human interests, social policy, legislation,
and advocacies of value universalism that entail
educational and activist agendas. But the "moral" itself?
*Kantian* bases are untenable, for a "detranscendentalized"
reason that is sociocentric, as Habermas' thinking is.
(Readers confuse [1] the project of *re-thinking* that
which Kant originated and [2] a basically Kantian
position.)

V> [Does your alternative view manage...] also [to]
recogniz[e] the reasonable pluralism of views of the good
life?

G: One problem that a virtue-ethical basis for value
universalism (as I'll put it now) easily *avoids* is
insufficient appreciation of pluralism. Ethics and ethos
were born together. But how this appreciation accords with
value universalism, I haven't yet said anything. In fact,
Habermas' views seem to be to require only modest
modification. My later discussion of "Rightness vs. Truth"
will become toward the end a detailed revision of his text
to show how it can be modestly edited to be more tenable,
without undermining the importance of universalistic
advocacy. But presently, let me merely yield again to
Michael Slote (who doesn't mention Habermas, by the way):

------------------------------------------------------
G>>A converse approach [to Putnam's traditional dyadism] is
more tenable, encompassing deontic views within
virtue-ethical deliberation--or "agent-based" ethics, as
Michael Slote argues in  _Morals from Motives_ (Oxford
2001)....

G: What I outlined above, about the "moral", fits very well
with Slote's attention to deontological interests and the
appeal of basing concepts of social justice in an ethic of
"balanced caring. " 

V> I'm focusing on the word "within" in your first sentence
in this paragraph.  When valuational deliberation is
encompassed within a deontic view, ....

G: No, the "within" above is about "encompassing deontic
views WITHIN virtue-ethical deliberation--within an ethic
of care. You misread. So, no, to your question:

V> ...are you referring to morally justified norms
deontically constraining the scope or morally permissible
values and virtues (which is roughly Habermas's view)...?

G: What would you say is the difference between a justified
norm (say a professional protocol or organizational bylaws)
and a "morally" justified norm? I claim that 'moral' is a
stand-in for valuational considerations that are better
addressed in their own terms: ethical, pragmatic,
policy-formative, legislative, rehabilitative, etc. You
might say that a morally justified norm is one which
basically relies on universal values. But this very
problematically presumes a realism toward values that needs
careful attention. 

V>...or are you describing valuational deliberation somehow
occuring within specifically moral discourses (as your
contrast suggests)?  

G: No, I would argue that moral discourses are *made from*
valuational deliberations; there's no such thing as a
"specifically moral" discourse that is not either based in
views arising from traditions specifically called "ethical"
or is a stand-in for specific other kinds of considerations
(suppressed by fixation on an autonomous "morality"), which
were mentioned above. 

V> .... Is the basic idea that justice is a virtue, and
that agents can include institutions as well as persons? 
If so, is justice ranked (absolutely or at least
presumptively) above other virtues?

G: I would argue that the concept of justice is best
understood as derived from an ethic of care, in terms of
the pragmatic systemization of reciprocities we first learn
in the lifeworld localities of ethical life. An ethic of
care is a better basis for moral thinking than deontology,
such that understanding justice as a systemization of
dispositions that basically belong--developmentally and
historically--to ethical life provides for a richer
understanding of a good, open, *pluralist* society than
deontological ethics/morality.  

G>> .... "moral-cognitive development" (_MCCA_) is the
keynote of Habermas' basic value of mature autonomy, and a
post-conventional *cognitive* stance toward ethical-moral
issues gives virtue-ethical considerations primacy over
deontic considerations (a claim I've hardly begun to argue
beyond brief sketches).

V> Your attraction to "mature autonomy" reminds me of a
grad school friend who was also very focused on "moral
maturity" in Habermas's ethics (and who, coincidentally I'm
sure, was significantly older than the rest of us grad
students).  

G: The notion comes from two sources in Habermasian work:
Kantian "mundigkeit" (mundigheit?), which John Viertel
translated as 'mature autonomy' in _Theory and Practice_;
and the presumption of developmental psychology that one
grows up, in specific senses, which is necessary for
Habermas' advocacy of so-called "Stage 7" moral cognition. 

V> Seriously, though, I'm sure you're aware that the basic
reason why virtue ethical approaches are not at the apex of
 moral consciousness is that they're susceptible of only a
conventional (i.e., traditional) level of justification...

G: I don't grant that at all. There's nothing basically
conventional to giving priority to caring about the
well-being of others and oneself. The basis of care is not
conventional; only a post-conventional level of
understanding allows one to care truly deeply and broadly.
Though caring, love, altruism, generosity, integrity,
sincerity--most traditional ethical values--are sensible
(having an accessible sense) at each stage of cognitive
development, you don't fully grasp these values yet in a
conventional perspective. 

V> ...[Virtue-ethical approaches] do not survive the 
problematization that arises from the recognition of
reasonable pluralism of values....  

G: This is not the case. Ethics is, if anything,
life-centered, and recognition of the plurality of kinds of
lives is not a stretch of understanding--as anyone knows
who has worked in "blue collar" jobs. 

V>....Also, for Habermas personal and societal moral
development consists in accepting post-conventional
approaches to moral reasoning....

G: I disagree. Firstly, development doesn't basically
consist in "accepting approaches," rather in *achieving*
kinds of capabilities at each stage, capabilities at a
given stage that don't yet make sense at the previous
stage. Ethical development (now using 'ethical' in the
sense that is traditionally synonymous with
'moral'--without respect yet to a stance that needs to
insist on a sense of 'moral' that is importantly different
from what is specifically ethical) is about practices
(deliberation and exemplification), which *result* in
associated stances and kinds of justification. Secondly,
"societal moral development" for Habermas takes place as a
development of normative structures that is not simply
personal moral development writ large (as, say,
subject-centered reasoning would suggest).

V>....but you reverse this [priority of reasoning over
development] when you argue that a virtue-ethical approach
to moral reasoning is supported by the centrality of moral
development. 

G: Reasoning requires a *development* of the skills or
abilities of good reasoning. Undergraduates in philosophy
classes would disagree, but they outgrow their
presumptiveness. 

V> Moral maturity consists in a post-conventional level of
moral consciousness rather than uncritically accepting
traditional values and virtues, but you want  to make moral
maturity the more fundamental concept and to base upon it a
virtue-ethical approach to moral reasoning.  

G: I referred to "mature autonomy" which, I would argue, is
more than mere *moral* autonomy. Mature autonomy
encompasses all three world relations of Habermas' basic
model. Idealization of so-called moral maturity depends on
the idealization of mature autonomy generally, which is
basically a matter of cognitive competences. A
post-conventional level of reasonING (practice) affords a
post-conventional relationship to self, objectivity, AND
sociality, ALL of which come into play with ethical/moral
deliberation. What I am claiming (or wish to claim, in an
extended manner) is that a virtue-ethical comprehension of
"moral maturity" is better able to account for "moral"
reality than a deontic-moral (or, in my view, moralistic,
overbearing, "demanding") comprehension.

V> Again, how can virtue-ethics  be post-conventional, the
hallmark of which is reversability of perspectives?  

G: The capacity for role reversal originates in childhood
and develops along with general mental development, long
before one reaches a post-conventional capacity for
distantiation  and deliberative reflection on one's
ongoing, developed engagement in reciprocal and
reciprocitous interactions (Accordingly, a model of role
competence involves all stages of development, in Habermas'
approach to moral-cognitive development). The
post-conventional state is not hallmarked by reversibility
of perspective, rather by reflective hypothesization and
analytic stance toward *any* aspect of understanding,
including self, objective representations, and layers of
interaction (nests of contexts), which may come into
specifically ethical/moral thinking.

V> Even a virtue ethics that is somehow postconventional
would still focus on evaluating the character of agents,
rather than also assessing actions and action norms.  

G: I'm not sure I get your point here. An ethics is
primarily meant to guide one's actions, in particular, and
generally, one's ongoing way of life. Evaluation of oneself
and others is not especially an ethical/moral endeavor,
since one may be evaluable by any number of norms,
including relationship-specific ones, organizational ones,
programmatic ones (e.g., an educational program). However,
I would agree that attention to character evaluations has a
primacy for evaluation in ethics (a relatively internalist
way of thinking) that is lacking in "externalist" morality.
Indeed, many moralists are more concerned with
self-confidence about judging others than with ensuring
understanding the other's way of life in the first place.
It would be useful to focus on the prevailing "moral"
interest in evaluation vs the prevailing ethical interest
in well-being. 

V> Can you overcome this one-sidedness,...

G: Excuse me, but who is "you"?

V>... as discourse ethics [overcomes this] by accommodating
(within deontic constraints) the specifically ethical
evaluation of characters and ideals as well as  actions and
action norms?

G: Burrrrrr. Is the moral world cold or am I just lacking
an adequate sense of reversibility? This isn't a specious
comment! Michael Slote commonly refers to an ethic of care
as "warm". *You're* warm, Vic; thanks for the responses
(which are warmly conveyed and received). But your moral
idiom abundantly recalls Bernard Williams' objections to
the regime of morality, in _Ethics and the Limits of
Philosophy_. I don't read Habermas' concern for
justification to be primarily about judgment.

[to be continued, just one more installment].

Best regards,

Gary




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