Date: Sat, 31 Oct 1998 11:36:06 -0800
From: Dave Hayman <dhayman-AT-igc.org>
Subject: Re: Rights


Aaron Micheau wrote:
> 
> Message text written by Dave Hayman
> >>Jeremy:
> > hey dave.....stars got a right to shine, you got a right to moral
> > opinions, paint got a right to dry......er, what exactly is 'right'
> > adding?
> 
DHH:
> The concept does not apply to stars, paint, or any other non-sentient
> things. A "right", as I understand it, and poor Jeremy doesn't, is a
> mutual agreement, such as, "I will take your moral opinions seriously if
> you do me the same favor." Then we both have the "right" to moral
> opinions.<
> 
APM:
> Actually, a  "right" is not necessarily based upon agreement. In a
> practical sense, rights are legal claims- powers that are enforceable under
> some legal system. In the abstract, as for example, in the case of "human
> rights" or "animal rights", rights are inalienable powers that are inherent
> in a being and not based upon any implicit or explicit contractual
> relationship or sentience. From this abstract position, one could
> extrapolate that an object has the right to do whatever it, by its nature,
> does.

I stand by my position as quoted above.  A "right" is *necessarily*
based on agreement, whether at an immediate and local level or some
distant remove.
Anything worthy of the name "Law" is based on agreement at a fundamental
level, or it's just tyranny. In the present circumstances I firmly
believe that no such law exists, that the abstraction is only a lie. If
we want to have a legal system, it will take a revolution to do it.
Therefore I do not think it "practical" to say that rights are legal
claims; rather, it is naive.

And I repeat that it is absurd to apply the term to non-sentient beings.
Nothing is gained and much confused thereby.

> "Rights" is a term that is bandied about quite frequently, and i believe
> Jeremy's point was that if one insists upon claiming rights in such an
> abstract sense, as in the statement that we have rights to our "moral
> opinions", then the term essentially becomes meaningless for any practical
> purposes.  From this point, it follows that perhaps moral opinions, not
> being enforceable powers, are not something we "should" have. Particularly
> if they are simply tools  we use to judge the conformity of our own or
> others' behavior according to completely subjective standards.
> 
> -apm

I strongly object to the above position, whether taken by Jeremy or
Aaron or Jesus. However abstract moral relativism is, it's got far
better grounding than absolutism. To say that having moral opinions is a
mistake is to be unclear on the concept. Nothing like a society or an
individual as commonly understood could exist without moral opinions. Of
course they can be terribly wrong, and used to support the worst
abominations--Nazis have their own version of "morality". But if you
abandon them, what have you left but an "anything goes" chaos, perhaps
even worse than what we now suffer? And though they are subjective, they
are never *completely* subjective, because they develop in a dynamic
relationship with other sentients.