Date: Wed, 17 Feb 1999 20:52:53 -0500 (EST)
From: rosaphil <rugosa-AT-interport.net>
Subject: Agro-terrorism (fwd)


shhh. don't tell anyoen you got this or that you got this from me.


+********** Snail me yer rosehips if you liked this post! ************
*Better Living Thru Better Living!* http://www.interport.net/~rugosa *

---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 1999 18:51:38 +0100
From: Peter B Martin <pbmarti-AT-ibm.net>
To: CLOAKS-AND-DAGGERS-AT-MAELSTROM.STJOHNS.EDU
Subject: Agro-terrorism

AGRO-TOXICOLOGICAL TERRORISM


Political scientist, Ehad Sprinzak, under the questionable auspices of the United States Institute of Peace, not long ago wrote a buoyantly optimistic article in FOREIGN POLICY entitled: "The Great Superterrorism Scare"=2E Therein he wrote, "Despite the lurid rhetoric, a massive terrorist attack with nuclear, chemical or biological weapons is hardly inevitable. It is not even likely. As terrorism expert Brian Jenkins has remarked, terrorists want lots of people watching, not lots of people dead. Terrorism, we must remember, is not about killing. It is a form of psychological warfare in which the killing of a small number of people convinces the rest of us that we are next in line." Astonishing remarks considering the lives lost in, the Kenya/Dar-es-Salaam, Oklahoma City and Lockerbie terrorist attacks.

The threats are not improbable, even though some think-tank nabobs might imagine the opposite, the intent to harm the United States through terror is real. The director of CIA, Mr Tenet recently testified before a congressional committee: "I must tell you we are concerned that one or more of bin Laden's attacks could come at any time." President Clinton has just made an urgent requisition for preparedness, deterrence and prevention against  terrorism, proposing  a $10 billion package of measures to shield the country from a terrorist attack. The State Department is putting protective coatings on all embassy windows to help prevent flying glass injuries. The White House anti-terrorism czar, Richard Clarke warns of an electronic Pearl Harbor - invisible attacks on computer networks by people who hope to "extort us, to intimidate us, to get us to abandon our foreign policy." But have we uncovered all the dangers, are we building defenses against the obvious while ignoring another more subtle, just as insidious possibility? The economy of a nation is inevitably and closely linked to the security of that nation. Follow the logic.

When you think about it, biological weapons (BW) might emerge to be the consummate instrument of destruction for a terrorist. Imagine a BW attack against our agriculture, our cereal crops and livestock are particular vulnerable. Our advanced transportation methods, holding pens and huge slaughter houses are optimal ingredients to further the transmission of a biological agent. Our meat and dairy industry would be helpless and bankrupt=2E The economic consequences could be catastrophic and long lasting, which would lead to a great loss of social adhesion with people adopting "bunker-mentality", each one for himself - the hell with society. Economies are relatively more vulnerable to terrorist attack than people, but once people go hungry, they lose all sense of social responsibility becoming desperate, despairing and disillusioned, which jacks up the fulcrum for further terrorist leverage. Therefor, the intrinsic value of BW to the terrorist is not the amount of causalities they would inflict, but in the psychological impact they would engender. (Ehad Sprinzak would appreciate that.) And judging how some of the population is already reacting to the Y2K countdown, it could be just a preview of how people might act in a worse crisis.

Anyone with an access to a decent laboratory or a pharmaceutical facility can produce BW agents easily and relatively cheaply. Readily obtained literature contains nearly all the recipes one would need. The proliferation of scientific exchanges almost guarantees one is kept abreast of the latest methods. It is impossible to block dissemination of such material since so much of it is used in commercial  fermentation and various biotechnology industries. For example, one of the processes most coveted for the dispers it can be detected. Russian defector, Dr Kanatjan Alibekov (aka: Alibek) from Biopreparat (non-military division of Russia's biological warfare research) testified before a congressional committee in 1992, that he was responsible for 32,000 employees and 40 research and production facilities in Russia, all involved in germ warfare or related projects, and some were designed to destroy livestock and crops. Subsequently, 2 other defectors, both also from Biopreparat, have given testimony to the fact that Russia is still working in BW, despite pledges to the contrary. There is grave concern in the US intelligence community that some of this material might make its way, or already has made its way, into the black market and that renegade scientists might also defect and exploit their knowledge to malevolent circles. For example, it is well known that Libya, with Iraq's assistance, is developing biological weapons in a medical facility called The General Health Laboratories near Tripoli and they have attempted to recruit the services of technicians from South Africa and possibly other countries.

As for delivery systems, again BW is very cost efficient. All it takes is a plane, such as a crop duster or even a truck or van equipped with aerosol sprayers, either in aerosol spray cans or a manual pump type. A more complicated method is by way of a vector, using an animal or insect to transport the biological agent to be dispersed among livestock. Whatever the method of conveyance, there is no realistic economical treatment to save large areas of cereal fields or herds once infected. As in the case of cereal blight by something like Pyricularia oryzae or Puccinia graminis triticci (wheat rust), the only cure is to search for fungus resistant strains of wheat, which can mean years of research. What is more depressing, is that the terrorist group can stay ahead of the game by developing mutant strains which would override the new strains discovered in the laboratory. Moreover, the perpetrator  has plenty of time to make good his escape or remain anonymous. Such is the down side.

The up-side - what little amounts of it, is that most microbial toxic agents need pretty critical climatic conditions to insure crop disease on a large scale, and crude biological weapons are highly dangerous and complex to work with, especially when it comes to filling the aerosols or other biological dispenser. What's more, the distribution of toxic particles has to be reasonably uniform, and in the required optimum concentration, or they won't be very effective. Many toxins have a low tolerance to environmental variables such as heat and ultraviolet light. However, Alibek informed us that Russia has made significant advances in microencapsulation, which means heretofore fragile viruses can now be effectively delivered using conventional means, research that no doubt will one day fall into enemy hands. Recent sensor research has made major progress in the detection of biological agents. No longer are they bulky, cumbersome machines that are long to give out data and prone to errors. In the near future the US should have easily operated, portable devices that can identify toxins in real time at concentrations less than 10 pathogens per sample, essentially using immunoassay devices and DNA/RNA amplification.

To respond to the danger of an agro-biological attack, a top priority has to be an active, aggressive intelligence that anticipates a threat before it happens, so defensive measures can be put into action. And that means international cooperation. Every effort should be made to see that Russia adheres to the provisions of the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) which, after all they signed and ratified. Russia and Libya should be monitored more closely for clandestine traffic in biological weapons. 

Detection, interdiction and prosecution should be the key goals of any anti-terrorist program. Biological weapons trafficking is more transparent than many think. Just because it is called a black market, doesn't mean it is totally obscure. Trafficking in such goods, as in any black-market, means middlemen such as suppliers, illegal movements of money and commodities across international borders, all of which can be detected if one knows what to look for. Admittedly, the more experienced terrorist are resourceful and adapt readily and quickly to law enforcement countermeasures, therefor countermeasures should be flexible and multiphased, not rigid and linear focused. Law enforcement analysts, using all-source intelligence should investigate the potential smuggling routes, methods and possible individuals that might be involved. The importance of multilateral capabilities can't be overemphasized. Forensic detection and analysis of BW material is crucial to prevention of BW terrorist acts, but many countries do not have the potential to detect such substances, thus sharing of capabilities and guidance is important in countering the threat. HUMINT capability should be expanded to be able to infiltrate biological warfare related activities of terrorists, religious fanatics and other militant ideological organizations. And finally, substantial governmental rewards should offered for information concerning any attempt at/or introduction of BW into the United States.

The battle against agro-toxicological terrorism has to be fought like any other form of conflict, but it is a battle never really won, constantly on-going as long as the enemy is out there. If  "war is nothing more than the continuation of politics by other means", as Karl von Clausewitz defined it, then the same could be said of terrorism. Granted, it is a primitive approach to politics yet it is effective, whose ultimate aim is to undermine authority using an instrument of terror, a form of torture; not so much against a single individual but against a group of people. In the end, there are no high-tech methods, no magic bullet to eliminate such raw aggression, only enlightened, dynamic leadership, awareness of the threats and the will of  society to fight against it, can it ever be subdued=2E


Peter B. Martin
February 1999