Date: Tue, 11 Mar 1997 10:06:54 +1100
Subject: Re: Strategy and violence


As far as I'm aware - I'm too young to have any experience of the movement
of the 60s/70s here or elsewhere - the fetishization of *political*
violence and certainly a gang-mentality if not gang-like actions
contributed to the implosion of a lot of the European and North American
Left in that period, because it descended into a stupid terrorism (not to
say there is anything other than *stupid* terrorism!) rather than any
notion of armed self-defence, etc (as for example had been advocated and
practiced by many black American communities for decades in the US). From
what I understand these groups in the 70s progressively distanced
themselves from any real social base, and hence their political violence
became random or at least substanceless and terrorist tactics tend to
reflect this. Both the tactics of violence (whether armed struggle or
strike or looting/shoplifting, etc) and the social force which does it
(army or union or privatized mass/gang) need to be considered in relation
to some social base and the precise relationship of that force and the
social base out of which it emerges. This is what I think is one of the
most interesting things about the EZLN, is that they admit a logical
disparity between democratic practices of communities and autoritarian
practices of an army and have sought to produce a "synthesis" that affirms
the democratic elements.

I would probably have to disagree with Laura to some degree that the
internet and communications have proved more effective than guns for the
EZLN, becuase I think that there is still a strong need for armed
self-defence in Chiapas but also because arms to a significant degree
*guarantee* part of the autonomy that the Zapatista movement has there -
the Mexican government is not prepared for a bloodbath. If I can refer to
another thread - on Bougainville and PNG - the political and ideological
struggle of the BRA (Bougainville Revolutionary Army) is far less developed
than that of the EZLN but nonetheless (even with Australian military
assistance, etc) the BRA seems to be achieving the upper hand thanks to
both political and military crises within the PNG regime, capturing better
wepons, etc.

There are many points in the latest posts which would be great to comment
on, and I'm more likley to produce some jumbled response. But I have at
least two responses at the moment, 1) in the end I find Laura's sentiment
critical of "violence" in the revolutionary movement an attractive one, yes
we have to invent weapons better than "more force," if that means a
violent, debasing, dehumanizing force. And I think that Laura in her posts
in referring to how the phenomenon of violence develops within the
movement, how it can become the means of paralysing and decomposing the
essence of the revolutionary movement. And just as capital does not just
use physical violence but intimidation, extortion, economic deprivation,
etc, so the limits of force within this movement are not "gangsterism" and
terrorism but even the processes of strike, looting, etc being alienated
>from the working class directly into the hands of "new bosses" (especially
as bargaining tools within capital, etc). 2) In the actual development of
organized force and violence now, the example of mercenaries and also
return of warlords, banditry and so on around the planet, makes me question
the efficacy of the "state's monopoly on legitimate violence". In the
context of Mexico or Russia or even regions of the US the state (factions
within the state) seems to have made or is making deals with "non-state"
forces ("organized crime," etc) and absorbing them into the ruling bloc on
a semi-official basis. This is the real basis of "corruption." (Apparently
in Indonesia they say "Governmnent *is* corruption.") This may long be a
foundation of the state is some places (eg. southern Italy or Columbia - I
should add Queensland for other Australians on the list!) but it seems to
be developing on an unpredendented level, especially in those regions where
the state, once all-powerful has suffered political, economic and
legimitacy crises (eg. Mexico and E. Europe). Are these the forces with
which the IMF or even the working class attempts to cut deals in future,
thus rendering them "legitimate claims to organized violence"? What does
the revolt against this bloc look like? Perhaps Albania.

And what the hell is happening in Albania anyway?

Bruce.





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