Date: Thu, 10 Jul 1997 09:34:44 -0500 (CDT) From: "Harry M. Cleaver" <hmcleave-AT-mundo.eco.utexas.edu> Subject: AUT: Strategies for Resisting Low-Intensity Conflict in Mexico (fwd) ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Wed, 9 Jul 1997 14:14:22 -0500 (CDT) From: Stefan Wray <stefanwray-AT-MAIL.UTEXAS.EDU> Reply-To: zapatismo-AT-mcfeeley.cc.utexas.edu To: accion-zapatista-AT-mcfeeley.cc.utexas.edu Cc: zocalo-AT-GIL.COM.AU, greenleft-AT-peg.apc.org, will-AT-anarki.net, moonlight-AT-igc.apc.org, zapatismo-AT-mcfeeley.cc.utexas.edu Subject: Strategies for Resisting Low-Intensity Conflict in Mexico Strategies for Resisting Low-Intensity Conflict in Mexico by Stefan Wray Austin, Texas July 9, 1997 Several people have recently commented on the need to develop new strategies for resisting the current form of low-intensity conflict in Chiapas and elsewhere in Mexico. In thinking about this, we might consider the role the U.S. mass media plays in keeping the U.S. population in the dark and about how we can possibly change that relationship. In trying to visualize a potential route or path that can have some real effect, we need to understand what we are up against. In the United States we are faced with a populace that generally knows very little, nor cares very much, about what happens in Mexico. Although some people in the United States learn about Mexico from family, from travel, or from education, the vast majority of U.S. citizens learn about Mexico from the mainstream mass media, be that film, other forms of popular culture, or foreign news. Given that the mainstream media, and even to a large extent the so-called alternative media, have given scant attention to the militarization of Mexico or to the low-intensity conflict (LIC) campaigns being waged in Chiapas and elsewhere, we can say with great confidence that the vast majority of people living in the United States have absolutely no clue that there is low-intensity conflict happening several hundred miles south of the Rio Grande. Secondly, even if there was widespread knowledge in the United States of the extent and nature of LIC in Chiapas and elsewhere in Mexico, I doubt that this alone would set people in to action. Besides poor coverage of LIC campaigns, both in Mexico and generally, the U.S. mass media has been and continues to be a propaganda tool and sounding board for the Pentagon. The result is a majority mindset that supports military solutions to foriegn policy "problems." So long as U.S. youth are not coming home in body bags, the U.S. public cares very little about how the United States asserts its military muscle in the rest of the world. Since the nature of LIC is to obscure the direct role that the U.S. military plays, creating an environment in which military advisors advise and intelligence analysts surveil and observe well outside of public view, there is even less concern on the part of the general public. Given this dismal situation, in which most Americans are ill-informed about LIC in Mexico and if even they were they wouldn't care much anyway, what can we do to realistically effect change? And what stance or approach ought we have toward the mass media that helps to create this situation? One of the purposes of a public demonstration, be it a rally, picket, march, etc., is to visibly show opposition to a particular policy. In the case of Chiapas, demonstrations at U.S. consulates in January 1994 and February 1995 have been cited as being partly responsible for the retrenchment on the part of the Mexican army and the continued survival of the Zapatistas. This strategy worked then. But it is probably no longer a good option for several reasons. First of all, because of what has already been stated above (and in other people's comments), we are not likely to draw that many people to stand in front of Mexico consulates unless there is a shocking action (like helicopter gunships killing 1,000 people). Even if we can muster 20 to 50 people, the media is not likely to cover the event. Although I'm not able to quantify it, my suspicion is that media coverage of demonstrations at Mexican consulates all over the U.S. have dropped off dramatically. At the several demonstrations I've attended in front of the Mexican consulate in Austin media coverage has been virtually nonexistent. Another aspect of consulate demonstrations, is that the consulate offices themselves are usually in physical spaces in which people that pass by have no idea what it is. Most consulate offices are located in business sectors that don't have audiences that want to understand the protest. Apart from the occasional car that honks its horn in support, we have no audience there on the street. If the media doesn't cover the consulate protest, the only people that know about it are the consulate workers inside, the police outside, and any number of intelligence agents monitoring the small affair from afar or from within. All it does is allow them to count us and determine the extent of visible opposition. But for the most part it has become pointless. Despite a valid concern that even a U.S. public well informed about the nature and extent of LIC in Mexico would not be moved in to action, it is still worth pursuing a campaign to educate the public through the mass media. What I mean is that rather than targetting Mexican consulates in the United States we ought to consider targetting the mass media with respect to U.S. assisted counterinsurgency in Mexico. In San Francisco during the Gulf War there were some people who organized a "Break the Media Blockade" campaign that specifically targetted local television and radio stations, as well as mainstream newspapers. Organizers prepared and distributed literature to media workers at these various institutions as they were leaving their work sites. In addition, media packets were developed and given to editors, reporters, and others. A concerted effort was made to get the media to stop being a cheerleader for the Pentagon. This tactic was not able to cease the jingoistic and patriotic way in which the mainstream media was covering the Gulf War, but it may have if the war had progressed over a longer period of time. A similar strategy might be tried with respect to U.S. military, police, and intelligence intervention in Mexico. This is only one example of a media activism strategy that could be applied. There are a range of strategies of this sort that go from writing letters to editors, arranging meetings with editorial staff, to fax or email zaps. On the more extreme level can be ways of direct intervention in the distribution of news. False front pages can be inserted into newspaper boxes. Radio or TV signals can be overridden (this has occurred). Individuals can make their way into news rooms and be on the air momentarily. (Such as when an AIDS activist got on to Dan Rather's news program briefly). There are a number of media related actions that can fit the spectrum of what activists are willing to do, from the tame to the wild, from the legal to the illegal. I've only mentioned a few. We can think of more. On a more pragmatic level, there needs to be a group effort to produce a video documentary about the militarization of Mexico that can be used as a tool for local activists. Better yet, Frontline or some other public television venue needs to be convinced of developing such a work. These are some of the thoughts I have in the ongoing dialogue about how best to resist low-intensity conflict in Mexico. As the several people before me have suggested, I think it is important that we begin to assess the methods we've used so far and to determine what makes the most sense for continuing to expand resistance. As you may notice from other listservs, the NCDM has called for demonstrations at Mexican consulates on July 25. For reasons stated above, I'm not so sure this is the best strategy. But perhaps with creative attention this could be an effective approach. Merely repeating the worn-out image of a small group of people standing on a street corner with hand drawn signs will not generate much interest in the media, nor in activists ourselves. People are bored with this approach. Our enemies on the right, and in think-tanks like RAND, have identified that the best sort of anti-war propaganda is that which becomes theater, which creates a spectacle. For example, purchasing 40 used mannequins, pouring fake blood all over them, putting them into bodybags, writing the names of Mexicans killed in the LIC campaign on the outside of the bag, and dumping them on consulate steps, in concert with similar actions all over the United States, would be a spectacle, a form or theater, that the media would soak up and put as the headline news item. Unfortunately news people are largely only interested in shock value. Again, as is suggested below, there needs to be more discussion about how best to deal with the present counterinsurgency and slow strangulation happening in Mexico. >On Wed, 2 Jul 1997, Harry Cleaver wrote: >Folks: > >I would suggest a discussion not only of how to respond to another >largescale military offensive, but also of how to respond/dealt with the >intensification of the so-called "low intensity war" in Chiapas. For the >last several weeks reports from La Jornada and from the Human Rights >groups in Chiapas have made it clear that the garrote is being tightened >on the Zapatistas and their communities. The road building into the >mountains, the stationing of more troops in more places, the widening of >paramilitary operations, etc. There may be another large scale operation; >there may not be. There may be instead a steady tightening, small >increment by small increment, to squeeze the life out of the resistance >but in a way that provides no overt cause celebre that could trigger a >world wide protest movement as in early '94 and early '95. > >The situation in Chiapas reminds me of what happened in Egypt back in the >1970s. When in 1976 creditors forced Sadat to dramatically reduce food >subsidies as a means to impose austerity and discipline, the country >exploded and the subsidies had to be restored. But in the years that >followed, having learned from that experience, the Egyptian government >began reducing subsidies and raising food prices in little increments, no >one of which was enought to trigger the kind of largescale uprising that >occurred in 1976. The result was an unfortunate success in imposing lower >standards of living on the Egyptian poor. > >We have some experience in responding to large scale repressive actions >that everyone can see. I think we need to have more discussion about how >to deal with this kind of counterinsurgency slow strangulation. > >Harry >............................................................................ >Harry Cleaver >Department of Economics >University of Texas at Austin >Austin, Texas 78712-1173 USA >Phone Numbers: (hm) (512) 478-8427 > (off) (512) 475-8535 Fax:(512) 471-3510 >E-mail: hmcleave-AT-eco.utexas.edu >Cleaver homepage: >http://www.eco.utexas.edu/faculty/Cleaver/index.html >Chiapas95 homepage: >http://www.eco.utexas.edu/faculty/Cleaver/chiapas95.html >Accion Zapatista homepage: >http://www.utexas.edu/students/nave/ >............................................................................ > --- from list aut-op-sy-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
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