Date: Tue, 05 Oct 1999 09:41:16 -0600
Subject: AUT: English Chiapas al Dia 176       I


ENGLISH VERSION OF "CHIAPAS AL DIA" BULLETIN No. 176
CIEPAC
CHIAPAS, MEXICO
(September 25, 1999)


MONSANTO AND NOVARTIS, THEIR INTERPRETATION
OF NAFTA IN THE CHIAPANECO COUNTRYSIDE


The Savia groups (of the Pulsar Mexican group), Monsanto and Novartis, as
noted in the Chiapas al Dia" Bulletin No. 175, are several of the primary
multinational companies producing transgenetic seeds in the world.  We
shall now look at a concrete example of campesino experiences with these
companies in Chiapas.  These are the results of research carried out in the
countryside by CIEPAC in several municipalities in Chiapas, in the border
area with Guatemala.

THE HISTORY OF THE REQUIEM FOR THE COUNTRYSIDE

Before addressing the subject, and in order to better understand the
problem of the impact of the Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on the
countryside, it is essential to clarify at least two fundamental elements:
what PROCEDE is, and what CONASUPO was.

As a prerequisite for entering into the Free Trade Agreement with Canada
and the United States, former President Carlos Salinas de Gortari amended,
in January of 1992, Article 27 of the Political Constitution, which
regulates ejidos (an agricultural unit of not less than 10 hectares for the
common benefit of a set number of families or ejiditarios).  The following
month the decree of Agrarian Law was passed, which was to regulate Article
27 of the Constitution.  In order to make it operational, the Program of
Certification of Ejidal Rights and Titling of Urban Plots (PROCEDE) was
created.  This agency would direct the regulation of the ownership of
ejidal lands, through the issuing and delivery of ownership certificates
and titles.  Through this, campesinos who were part of an ejido would be
able to voluntarily, freely, and by a vote of 75% of the ejiditarios,
choose whether or not the members would receive the agrarian certificate.

The challenge for the federal government was to achieve - prior to NAFTA's
coming into effect (January 1, 1994) - the certification of more than
29,000 ejidos and agrarian communities occupying 4.6 million parcels of
land and 4.3 million urban lots.  It is worth noting that the ejidos' area
represents 50% of the national territory, and their population constitutes
a little more than 25% of the total of the country's inhabitants.  In the
specific case of Chiapas, the challenge was forced on the 1925 ejidos in
the state.

And so, exactly one year ago, in September of 1998, the government of
Chiapas stated that PROCEDE had made progress in 23.4% of the state's
ejidos, primarily in the municipalities of Palenque, Salto de Agua, Tonala,
Tecpatan, Cintalapa and La Trinitaria, among others.  In summary, 68% of
the municipalities of the state have made advances already under the
PROCEDE program.  Under the slogan of the "freedom" that the government was
"granting" campesinos to have a certificate for the piece of land
corresponding to him in the ejido, he could freely opt to associate with
others, to rent or sell his land.  This was an elegant description for
dispossession of the land after drowning in the poverty of the countryside.
 But this was the condition for private investment in the countryside.
Further along we shall see how this took place.

In the reality review workshops carried out by the CIEPAC team with the
state's campesino and indigenous communities, the PROCEDE program was noted
as one of the primary reasons for divisions in the communities and
organizations.  For the interim governor, Roberto Albores Guillen, however,
"the PROCEDE is an instrument of the greatest importance for detente in
Chiapas.  We will redouble our pace in this great campesino and
governmental effort."

The National Company of Mass Subsistence (CONASUPO) was created as a
decentralized public agency for the purpose of regulating the market in the
basic grains that are consumed by the majority of the population, primarily
maize, the main agricultural product of the Mexican diet.  Their chain of
warehouse stores throughout the country would, at the same time, allow
maize to be distributed throughout the country.  Like the fertilizer
industry (FERTIMEX), the CONASUPO was also privatized at the beginning of
1999, two key elements in agricultural production. 

In Chiapas - except for the tons that were warehoused in the disaster zone
created by the heavy rains of September 1998 - the CONASUPO calculated that
it acquired 400,000 tons of maize from the chiapaneco countryside, which
would represent 75% of the harvests in the state.  Of these, around 220,000
tons were harvested in 54 municipalities with high marginalization rates,
distributed over six of Chiapas' nine economic regions.  With the closing
of the more than 170 CONASUPO stores, the government buried the only option
existing for the indigenous and campesinos.  Meanwhile, at the same time,
the MASECA company was expected to acquire 150,000 tons of maize in
Chiapas, the MINSA company between 30 and 35,000 tons, and small companies
around 15 to 20,000 tons of the grain.  Other sources confirm, however,
that the maize loss in 1998 - first due to the 2000,000 hectares destroyed
by forest fires, and secondly, due to the worst natural disaster in the
country since the 1985 earthquake, caused by the floods (according to
President Ernesto Zedillo) - led to the loss of at least 70% of the
production in Chiapas. 

THE HISTORY OF MELONS

Campesinos from the Riego San Gregorio District, which takes in the
municipalities of Frontera Comalapa and La Trinitaria, turned these
national lands into ejidos in 1985.  They began producing melons, and for a
while, it worked, without pests or diseases, and with a high level of
production.  Then, all the campesinos in the area began planting it,
causing the market to be flooded.  In 1992, a society formed by campesinos
in some of the ejidos entered into partnership with a purported businessman
from Texas, who promised them a market, and they planted 300 hectares of
melons.  The businessman took some of the product with him, and he has
still not returned.  In other cases, campesinos have been told that the
product did not sell, and therefore there was nothing to pay them with.

On two different occasions, the campesinos sent their representatives to
the address of the purported company in Texas, and they met with the sad
reality:  the business did not exist, neither offices nor stores of the
alleged company.  They were subsequently left with a debt of a little more
than 300 million of those pesos, a debt which continues to increase with
the successive frauds that have followed.  And, as they themselves say:
"We just keep going further and further down."

The pests and diseases came, brought by monoculture, and they then began
planting maize once more.  The privatization of the CONASUPO stores
followed, however, and the maize could not find a market.  Campesinos in
the region confirm that municipal, state and federal officials themselves -
starting with the municipal presidents - when giving out information on
government programs for the countryside, insist that maize is no longer to
be planted, since they are now buying it - and more cheaply - in the US.

THE HISTORY OF WATERMELONS

In the first half of 1999, it was proposed to the same ejiditarios that
they plant watermelons, with the promise that this time there would indeed
be business inside the country as well as for exporting.  The Novartis
company delivered hybrid seeds of the ROGERS brand (P.O. Box 4188, BOISE,
IDAHO 83711-4188, (208) 322-7272, Exclusive Property of Novartis Seeds,
Inc.;  "This act prohibits the propagation of seeds without the
authorization of the NOVARTIS Seeds, Inc.", as stated on the watermelon
seed can).

The cans of seeds were given to them at a cost of approximately 2000 pesos,
and they contained 5000 seeds each, enough for the planting of one hectare.
 Along with the seeds, they were given fertilizer and herbicides which, in
the credit package, included products from Monsanto, who carries out a very
strong advertising campaign for their products throughout the region and
has technicians in place for giving advice.

The average watermelon production was 35 tons per hectare, although in some
instances, it reached 25 or 35 tons per half hectare.  In all, 189 hectares
of watermelon were planted in the Riego District.

Under the Monsanto, CO. label (St. Louis, Missouri, USA), "Food, Health,
Hope," the multinational company ("Made in the US and Canada," "Created by:
Monsanto Co. USA and/or Monsanto Canada, Inc," as stated on their products'
labels), herbicides are being widely distributed, such as the Ranger and
Rival brands, in Chiapas.  Another is the FAENA herbicide, which costs
between $78 to $89 pesos per liter, or $70 per gallon.  The campesino needs
6 liters of this product per hectare, which promises to destroy all weeds
and grasses that go along with the cultivation of avocado, citrus fruits,
plum, peach, pear and apple trees, coffee, banana, mango, papaya, alfalfa,
Swiss chard, oats, rice, peanuts, sugarcane, rye, chili, beans, maize,
melon, potatoes, cucumbers, sorghum, soy, watermelons, tomato, wheat,
carrots, etcetera, etcetera.

In an ejido in Frontera Comalapa, 35 hectares of watermelons were planted
among 13 ejiditarios.  They entered into an agreement with the alleged
company (who was never identified) for export and for domestic consumption:
 at 80 centavos per kilo for watermelon for the domestic market, which were
later purchased for between 40 and 50 centavos.  The watermelon for export,
according to the agreement, would be purchased at $1.20 pesos per kilo,
and, ultimately the company bought them at 60 centavos.  Afterwards, "the
watermelon was taken, and they never paid us, they never showed us their
logo, but it's assumed that they were coordinating with the government,"
Don Juan said, sadly and terribly deceived.

This time it was not a surprise.  The campesinos harvested tons and tons of
watermelons.  Hills and hills which, owing to the care taken by the
campesinos - with brigades and watchfulness, day and night, cooling them
down with water and covering them with leaves, in the hopes that the
company would return to complete the sale - ended up bursting and rotting
under the criminal rays of the sun.  And once more, debt:  altogether the
13 campesinos ejiditarios owed $307,000 pesos for the credit they had
solicited.  We know that some of the owners were threatened with the
seizure of their houses, lands and tractors.  One family turned their 8
hectares, where they had been harvesting maize, into watermelons, and they
did not sell anything, despite their offering each watermelon for just one
peso.  Now they are offering them improved tomato seed for sowing.  "The
government and the companies come in and they commit themselves to
exporting the products, we set the prices through agreements, but then they
don't carry them out," the ejiditarios say.

The representatives of the companies, like the government technicians,
grant credits to the ejiditarios of the Riego District, since that is the
only way that they can now guarantee the success of the harvest, and,
therefore, the payment of the credits.  Each contributes half the amount of
the credit, which includes the giving of hybrid seeds, fertilizers,
herbicides, the preparation of the land for the sowing, for the paying of
day laborers, and so on.  Neither the government nor the company assumes
100% of the cost of the granting of credits.  On the other hand, in order
to receive the credits, they are asked for the agrarian certificate issued
by PROCEDE.

THE HISTORY OF CEMPASUCHIL

Now, another company and more government technicians are arriving.  They
are promising them the ultimate:  that, if they plant cempasuchil (a flower
used as a coloring agent, among other things), wealth is promised.
Understandably, not everyone took it upon themselves to plant this flower,
not wanting to go further into debt.  Others left the lands, others are
looking for someone to lease them, even at a low price, and some others
left for the United States, to face the metal wall, the desert and the
border patrols.

In one ejido, only 25 hectares were planted with the cempasuchil seed, in
an agreement with a purported company from the state of Queretaro, BIOMEX
REKA S.A. of C.V. (Carretera Campo Military Km. 0.950, Col. San Antonio de
la Punta, C.P. 76135;  Apdo. Postal 5/78-c, Queretaro, Qro.).  In the
agreement, the company committed itself to purchasing a ton of these
flowers for $900 pesos, and, even though the campesinos find it hard to
believe, they assured them that each hectare would yield between 20 to 25
tons of cempasuchil.  The credit was for $4777.75 pesos per hectare, and
included land preparation, transplanting, fertilization (15% of the
credit), plant health control (fungicides and insecticides), manual labor
(fertilization, plant health control, weed control, etc.), risks,
harvesting, and agricultural insurance, representing 4.4% of the total amount.

It is now the time, in September of this year, for the first harvesting of
the cempasuchil.  The ejiditarios are waiting for the sound of the first
engine announcing the arrival of the company's trucks that will take away
the tons of harvest.

REFLECTIONS

As long as the debts are not being paid, or as long as they continue
mounting, the campesinos do not qualify for credits.  In order to be able
to reactivate them, the possibility is being considered of their being paid
through returning to the government the money that was granted them though
official "poverty fighting" programs, such as PROCAMPA (economic aid to
campesinos per hectare sown with maize, which will last for 15 years
following the signing of NAFTA, in order to mitigate the negative impact on
the campesinos' economy).  Another means would be the return of "salaries"
granted through the temporary Jobs program or through the crumbs from
PROGRESA (the Education, Health and Food Program).  And so the government
would be able to recover and reinvest their monies, due to the very poverty
that created their agrarian policies of putting the campesinos and
indigenous in debt.

Some multinational companies want to come into the indigenous lands of the
Selva, Northern and Los Altos regions through organizations or the church.
In doing this, using the same structure described here, one agricultural
cycle would be sufficient to impoverish thousands of indigenous over such a
short time period.  Because of that, there is pressure for the PROCEDE
program to be promoted more energetically, not without causing divisions
inside the communities, ejidos and campesino organizations.

We can also verify that the Selva, Los Altos and Northern regions of
Chiapas, in addition to being noted for their oil and lumber wealth, their
possibility of generating light through large hydroelectric projects, and
biodiversity for the creation of pharmaceuticals, is, in addition,
characterized by a very strong militarization in the indigenous regions.
In the Border and Sierra regions, and in the irrigated districts,
campesinos are being driven into poverty on immensely rich lands.
Similarly, in the Selva region, credit is not what is impoverishing them,
but rather the thousands of soldiers illegally posted on ejidal and
campesino lands, creating division, hindering production and marketing,
creating populations displaced to the mountains, or exerting pressure on
and watching over them from their camps, forcing their fields, vegetable
gardens and herds to be abandoned.  This is also leading to the worsening
of the siege of hunger for the next agricultural cycle.

There are, nonetheless, three elements that are preventing the neoliberal
program in these areas from devastating the indigenous even more quickly:
1)  the difficulty in implementing PROCEDE,  2)  the presence of
responsible campesino organizations with a long tradition of agrarian
struggle, and 3) there are no irrigation systems which would guarantee that
the companies would be able to recover the credits awarded to the indigenous.

The National Institute of Forestry, Agricultural and Fisheries Research
(INIFAP), a government institution), is carrying out research work and
technology transfer with "high quality protein" maize at a national level,
and in Chiapas, through their "Genetic Improvement of Maize" program.  They
are hoping to produce 258 tons of registered maize seed in 1999 for the
"Kilo for Kilo" project of the "Alliance for the Countryside" program,
being promoted by the Department of Agriculture (SAGAR).  But, as Don Juan,
a campesino from the border region, says:  "Before, they were buying a 75
kilogram bag of maize from us for $115 or $120 pesos, now it's 90 kilos and
70 pesos." 

Another campesino says:  "Sometimes we campesinos know more that the
companies' technicians and the government who ask us how we do it, planting
this or that."  "After planting the watermelon, we were left without maize
seed."  "The government credits come from the Alliance for the Countryside
program, and that's what they buy the hybrid seed with, but when the
program's ended, we'll have already gotten used to the hybrid, and we'll
have to put everything in ourselves."

THE HISTORY OF TOMORROW

In summary, the vicious cycle is increasing the spiral of poverty:  the
multinational and national companies (from Queretaro, Jalisco, Yucatan,
etc.) come to the campesinos, along with government officials who do not
know who they are, they give them credits (herbicide packages) and
"improved" and hybrid seeds, eliminating, thus, autonomy in the production
and storage of their own criollo seeds, and also assuring the purchase of
those seeds and a permanent market.  They ask them for ownership titles of
property in order to grant them credits.  They offer them markets, export,
transportation and written and signed agreements.  They transfer technology
and knowledge that the campesinos have acquired.  They flood the market,
purchase the product at a lower price than that agreed to and take over
their property, or they recover in product what was delivered in credit,
plus some.  Or they simply make off with the product without paying the
campesinos and never return.

The trends, then, are:

1)  Acceleration of the privatization process of campesino lands into the
hands of large owners and companies.

2)  Acceleration of the country's lack of self-sufficiency in food
production.  Mexico has gone over the top in recent years in its importing
of maize from the U.S., with Monsanto, along with other companies, being
one of those benefiting the most from the sale of transgenetic maize in our
country.

3)  Depression in the domestic market of agricultural products and their
seeds, through the disappearance of the CONASUPO stores.

4)  The conversion of the campesinos, as owners of their lands, into
agricultural day laborers.

5)  The accelerated indebtedness of campesinos, with consequent increase in
poverty or migration to the U.S. or to nearby cities.

6)  Substitution of maize cultivation with other transgenetic agricultural
products, which, at the same time, reinforce dependency in the acquisition
of seeds.

7)  Gradual elimination of subsidies or credits to campesinos by the
government, towards credits from the private sector with other conditions
for credit.

8)  Dependency on multinational companies for pesticide packages.

9)  The companies are deciding on the kinds of agricultural production,
based on export,  rather than on the needs of the country.

10)  Towards the return of a chiapaneco coffee plantation finca of decades
ago, but globalized, with dependent peons, without autonomy, and with a
kind of multinational "company store":  if you want to eat, you buy even
the seeds from me.

11)  Recovery of funds for "fighting poverty" spent by the government, by
using them as payment for credit debts.

12)  Privatization of processes, technology transfer, or, in other words,
piracy of campesino technology.

13)  Degradation of campesino lands and the ecological effects created by
monoculture.


Gustavo Castro

Center   of   Economic   and    Political    Investigations   of  Community
 Action,   A.C.
CIEPAC
CIEPAC, member of the "Convergence of Civil Organizations for Democracy"
National Network (CONVERGENCIA), and member of RMALC (Mexico Action Network
on Free Trade)

 ******************************************
Translated by irlandesa for CIEPAC, A.C.
******************************************

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CIEPAC, A.C.
Center for Economic and Political Investigations of CommunityAction
Eje Vial Uno Numero 11
Col. Jardines de Vista Hermosa
29297 San Cristobal, Chiapas, MEXICO
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_____________________________________________________________________
CIEPAC, A.C.
Centro de Investigaciones Económicas y Políticas de Acción Comunitaria
Eje Vial Uno Número 11
Col. Jardines de Vista Hermosa
29297 San Cristóbal, Chiapas, MEXICO

Tel/Fax:	en México	01 967 85832
		fuera de México	+52 967 85832
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