Date: Sat, 09 Oct 1999 14:20:39 -0600
Subject: AUT: English Chiapas al Dia 177       I


[Notes:  This bulletin is an excerpt from the book, "The Strategies of War
in Chiapas (First Part)," by authors Onecimo Hidalgo and Gustavo Castro,
which will be released in early October, 1999.  The publication was
possible thanks to the support of Project Counseling Service and Services
and Consulting for Peace, A.C.  This publication contains maps, tables, and
more than 70 graphics.  The publication systematizes hundreds of
denunciations and letters from indigenous and campesino communities and
organizations in Chiapas.  The book breaks down the targets of the attacks,
the aggressors and the nature and process of human rights violations in the
state.  We are thankful to all those persons who helped us in the
organizational work of the study.]


ENGLISH VERSION OF "CHIAPAS AL DIA" BULLETIN No. 177
CIEPAC
CHIAPAS, MEXICO
(October 2, 1999)

THE STRATEGY OF WAR IN CHIAPAS
(First Part)


This research is based on letters, documents and denunciations from
February 12, 1994 to November 29, 1997.  There are a total of 667 documents
from communities in 42 municipalities, which recount the violence, announce
the massacre in the community of Acteal, municipality of Chenalho and bear
witness to the war strategy.  We have chosen this period as an example
because we consider it to be a watershed in the Chiapas conflict.

Has the violence increased?
At the time the dialogue and negotiation process between the federal
government and the EZLN was being carried out in San Cristobal de Las Casas
and in the municipality of San Andres Larrainzar, violence and tension were
increasing, rather than lessening, as would be expected as the peace
process was advancing.  The search for better political, military and
social positions for the negotiations led the federal government to
systematically provoke the break-off of the dialogue, through their
actions, which were increasingly at odds with their words.  At the same
time, there was increasing concern from those writing the denunciations to
make known the violence in the communities, since, of the total documents
from the time period of 1994 to 1997, 53% of them were from 1997, and the
amount of correspondence had been gradually increasing over the years.

The correspondents sent the most letters or documents during the months of
April, May and June of 1996, two months after the first accords were signed
between the EZLN and the federal government, corresponding to Table 1,
Indigenous Rights and Culture.  Why?  That was the time period during which
the EZLN was launching various political initiatives, and the government
was trying to throw up obstacles in their path.  The EZLN had proposed that
civil society and the three branches of government participate in the San
Andres dialogues;  it convened the Special Forum for State Reform;  it
convened the Independent National Indigenous Forum;  and it convened the
First Intercontinental Encuentro for Humanity and Against Neoliberalism. 

Amnesty International, meanwhile, was carrying out an international
campaign against militarization in the states of Guerrero and Chiapas, and
the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (CIDH) announced its upcoming
visit to the state, expressing their concern over the human rights
situation in Chiapas.  This is also the time period during which the Table
2 negotiating process, on Justice and Democracy, was taking place.  The
federal government was not willing to deal with, or to negotiate, the
issues that we were being raised in Table 2, since the issues and the
participation by civil society in this process was having a far-reaching
impact at the national level.  Consequently, the federal government had to
put a halt to the process, regardless of the cost.

Thus, the more social and political proposals, the greater the violence.
Between June 5 and 21 there were at least 32 deaths, 14 kidnappings and 3
woundings in the municipalities of Tila, Chilon, Sabanilla and Simojovel.
Two months previously, in the backdrop of the beginning of the Table 2
negotiations, which began on March 20, many incidents of violence and
killings were taking place.  One hundred and fifty campesinos were detained
for predio takeovers, while, on March 19, President Ernesto Zedillo was
signing the purported agrarian settlement accord with campesino
organizations.  At the time of Eraclio Zepeda's departure - as the head of
the state's domestic policy - the press recounted the losses sustained
during his term as Secretary of Government in Chiapas, from December 8,
1994 to April 8, 1997.  The chiapaneco countryside was left stained with
blood over these 28 months, with of families and children orphaned.  There
were 56 operations by public security police, judicial police and "white
guards," leading to the assassination of 111 persons, 160 wounded by
gunfire that could be counted and more than 2000 persons imprisoned - many
of whom are now released.  The majority of the police operations were
carried out in areas where the EZLN had the greatest presence.  Eraclio
Zepeda said, in this regard:  "Chiapas is going through a temporary
phenomena of political barbarism."

As we saw during the 1996 period, it is, once again, within the context of
an upturn in social formulations by civil society that the violence against
them worsens.  In the month of February 1997, three events occurred of
great importance for the social movement:  1)  the First Forum-Encuentro of
Health Promoters and Workers, from which emerged the "Moises Gandhi"
statement;  2)  the "Second Encuentro of Campesino Organizations of the
State of Chiapas," in the Patihuitz ejido, municipality of Ocosingo, with
more than 15 campesino and urban organizations attending, from 17
municipalities in the state of Chiapas; and 3)  the State Encuentro for
National Dialogue and a Dignified Peace in Chiapas.

1999 has, once again, been a year of social agendas, with a concomitant
increase in violence.  The EZLN called for the National Consultation, it
met with UNAM students, and with groups fighting against the privatization
of electrical energy and of historic monuments.  Civil organizations,
meanwhile, were planning encuentros throughout the country, in order to
draw up a citizens' agenda for "citizens' action for democracy and for life."

But the war strategy and its actions did not end there.  While it was being
reported in April that Mexico held the fifth place in Latin America in
annual spending for military ends - with 490 million dollars - and second
place in the importation of arms - with a total of 16 million dollars
annually - it was announced in May that the Department of National Defense
(SEDENA) was distributing free textbooks in "inaccessible communities."

The soldiers were, thus, continuing to penetrate the communities.  In June
1997 - when the National Council of Public Security was reporting that the
Mexican federal Army would train a thousand police officers throughout the
country - military forces were occupying more positions in Ocosingo
(Venustiano Carranza and Patate Viejo) and three Mexicans were graduating,
just a few kilometers away, from the XLVIII International Kabil Course in
Guatemala.  During that time, Amnesty International stated that there had
been an increase in military abuses in 1996 and early 1997 in Mexico.
Neither the statements by prestigious human rights bodies, nor by the
political parties of the Union, nor by the Plural Legislative Commission
for the Northern Region, nor by the different church hierarchies, none of
them have been able to totally halt the war strategy.  Civil Society has,
nonetheless, managed to resist and to continue mobilizing, and it has often
been the one able to stop violent processes and to generate initiatives.
As we shall see further along, it has also been one of the primary victims
of the war strategy.

What do we want?
In response to the escalation of violence, social organizations and EZLN
support bases began stepping up the denunciations.  Among the primary
demands, requests, petitions and/or lists of demands accompanying almost
all the documents, the withdrawal of the Mexican Army and Public Security
Police from the communities were paramount, as well as their speaking out
against the alleged paramilitary groups.  Prior to February 1995, there
were at least 74 geographical locations with a military and police
presence, from military barracks to intermittent checkpoints, with the
following municipalities being most notable:  Cintalapa, La Concordia,
Tapachula, Reforma Altamirano, Comitan, Chiapas de Corzo, Union Juarez, San
Cristobal de Las Casas, Pijijiapan, Chicoasen, Tonala, Tuxtla Gutierrez,
Palenque, Las Margaritas, Mapastepec, Motozintla and Ocosingo.  

After the February 1995 offensive, until December of 1996, 96 more military
and police locations were added, reaching a total of 170 (an increase of
130%).  From January to August of 1997, there were 39 more positions put in
place, for a total of 209.  Among the most prominent were the
municipalities of Altamirano, Las Margaritas, Ocosingo, Venustiano
Carranza, Tila, and, at the other end, Amatan, El Bosque, Chenalho and San
Andres, since there had been increased deployment towards the region of Los
Altos.  The Mexican Army, Navy and Air Force, the police and other special
forces were, at this point, in at least 63 municipalities of the chiapaneco
state (56.7% of the totality of municipalities), distributed in the
following manner:  Mexican Army in 136 locations (65.07% of the total),
Public Security Police in 40 (19.13% of the total), Immigration in 20
(9.56%), Department of Justice of the Republic (PGR) and State Judicial
Police (PJE) in 10 (4.78%) and special forces in 3 (1.43%).  The 12
municipalities with the greatest military and police presence in Chiapas,
by August of 1997, in terms of the number of positions or troops, were:
Ocosingo (with a presence in 37 locations), Las Margaritas (13), Tila (3),
Angel Albino Corzo (3), Palenque (4), San Cristobal de Las Casas (2),
Motozintla (5), Altamirano (2), Cintalapa (3), San Andres (4) and
Venustiano Carranza (2).

To whom did we write?

Of the totality of the Documents, 42% came from the Northern region,
followed by Los Altos and the Selva, with 21%, the Central Valleys with
10%, the Border with 5% and Frailesca with 1%.

During 1994 and 1995 the Conflict Zone - basically the Tzeltal region - was
the scene of the war in Chiapas.  This is the primary bastion of the EZLN
and encompasses the municipalities of Ocosingo, Altamirano and Las
Margaritas basically.  During 1996 the scene moved to the Northern region -
the Chol region - with a new strategy of Low Intensity Warfare, and whose
main actors have been paramilitary groups and the Public Security Police,
under the control of the Mexican Army.  This region is primarily made up of
the municipalities of Tila, Tumbala, Sabanilla and Salto de Agua.

During 1997, the war strategy was extended to the region of Los Altos -
Tzotzil region, although Tzeltal is spoken in some places - which
encompasses 20 of the 111 municipalities in the state.  And so, the
critical route of the war has gone from the Conflict Zone (Selva Lacandona,
Tzeltal region), to the Northern region (Chol region), and from there to
Los Altos (Tzotzil region).  Since then, conflicts have appeared in the
Sierra, Frailesca and Central Valley regions with similar characteristics.

Who is insisting?

Based on the previous, we can see the intensity with which the
correspondents in the Northern, Selva and Los Altos have been denouncing
the violent incidents, since it is where most of the documents are
originating.  In the case of the Northern region, the greatest number of
documents were sent by various actors in June of 1996, in the context prior
to the suspension of dialogue between the EZLN and the federal Government.
The next most decisive moments were in April, June and August of 1997, due
to the increase in activities by paramilitary groups.

What concerns us?

The issues and problems of greatest concern in the totality of the universe
of organizations, in all the regions and municipalities which have been
noted, are, in order of importance:  weapons, harassment, divisions and
confrontations, land, fear, fraud, health, education, elections, impunity,
electric energy and ecology.

The first five issues of greatest concern (weapons, harassment, divisions
and confrontations and land) reveal to us the level of violence and
confrontation that has been reached.  Confronting and dividing in order to
conquer, harassing in order to paralyze, banishing in order to control
lands and to cause hunger.  The presence of arms speaks of mechanisms of
dialogue, negotiation and reconciliation that have become exhausted, or
that are nonexistent, of the lack of will and structures for avoiding
division and confrontation and their replacement with weapons.  This has
been, precisely, one of the strongest strategies against the indigenous
population.  The concern over these issues has increased throughout the
last three years.

What concerns us in the Northern and Los Altos regions?

We will now compare the ten most important issues in each of the regions,
in order of importance, in the Northern region:  weapons, harassment,
division and confrontations, attacks against the Catholic Church, land,
fear, health, education, fraud and impunity.  In Los Altos:  harassment,
division and confrontations, weapons, fraud, elections, health, fear, land,
impunity and ecology.  As a common denominator, harassment and division and
confrontations among the communities and campesino and indigenous
organizations have been a central objective in the Low Intensity War.

Which of our Human Rights are being violated?

Of greatest concern, in order of importance, are:  Dislocations from
predios, threats, detentions, displacements, killings, robbery and damages
to belongings and houses, injuries, looting of houses, the theft of cattle
and domestic animals, kidnappings, torture, unjustified arrest warrants,
ambushes, the burning of real estate (private homes particularly),
disappearances, rapes (generally accusing the Mexican Army).

The five most important types of aggressions (dislocations, threats,
detentions, displacements and killings) have seen a gradual increase from
1994 to 1997.  In 1996, dislocations from predios were emphasized, followed
by threats, detentions, the displacement of the population, and, lastly,
killings.  All of these acts of violence against the population, including
the human losses, have been without confrontations against defenseless
persons or groups of a particular social or political affiliation.

In 1997, the issue of the detention of individuals was primarily stressed,
followed by killings, displaced populations, with dislocations occupying
the last place, while it occupied the first in 1996.  The strategy of
violence changed radically.  Starting in 1996, the government tried to
recover the land that had been taken over since the beginning of 1994
within the framework of the signing of the agrarian settlement with the
State Democratic Assembly of the Chiapaneco People (AEDPCh).  In 1997, as
in all election contexts, the detention of opposition leaders and arrest
warrants became a strategy for preventing the promotion of indigenous and
campesino leaders to popularly elected positions.

Which Human Rights are being violated by region?
The 10 most important in the Selva and Border regions are, in order of
importance:  threats, damages and the theft of belongings, detentions,
injuries, displaced, looting of houses, killings, dislocations, kidnappings
and theft of cattle and domestic animals.  In the Northern region:
displaced, killings, threats, detentions, damages and the theft of
belongings, looting of houses, dislocations, theft of cattle and domestic
animals, injuries and kidnappings.  In Los Altos:  threats, damages and
theft of belongings, killings, dislocations, detentions, displacements, the
burning of property, looting of houses, injuries and public looting.    The
common threads of the strategy are:  human losses (deaths), lootings,
theft, displacement, injuries, detentions, dislocation, threats and burnings.

Who is attacking us?

Of the total universe of documents, the correspondents note 64 different
aggressors.  The correspondents held the following sectors as being
responsible as aggressors, in order of importance:  Government, 38%;
Paramilitaries, 17%;  Political Parties, 16%;  Mexican Army, 15%;
Municipal Authorities, 6%;  Civil Society, 3%;  Social Organizations, 2%,
and Private Enterprise, 1%.

Society held the government to blame for the instability and violence.
Part of the government strategy, however, has been to provide cover for
their actions, and that is the reason the regime has characterized the
emergence of the alleged paramilitary groups as the product of
inter-ethnic, intra-family, intra-community and inter-religious problems.
They paramilitaries fulfill, however, a very specific function within the
Low Intensity War.  It is worrisome that the three levels of government
(Federal, State and Municipal) are accused of attacks against society.  In
Chiapas, as long as there are not free and truly democratic elections, the
interim Executive branch will always be established on weak foundations of
consensus for governing. 

We shall now examine the sector identified as "Government."  Within this
category, the correspondents identified Public Security Police as being
responsible for the majority of the aggressions, at 48%, followed by
various State Government agencies, with 21%.  State Judicial Police at 11%,
the Federal Government 5%, the Federal Electricity Commission 4%, the
Department of Justice of the Republic (PGR) 3%, the Federal Judicial Police
(PJF) 2%, Julio Cesar Ruiz Ferro (the governor of Chiapas at that time) 2%,
the Department of Agrarian Reform (SRA) 2% and "Officials" - in general
terms - 2%.

Armed Aggressors?

All the armed aggressors identified by the correspondents (Military, Public
Security Police, Judicial Police, Paramilitaries and White Guards)
increased their activities each year between 1994 and 1997.  The lead
position was held, however, by the Public Security Police, followed by the
Mexican Army, the Paramilitaries, the White Guards and, lastly, by the
Judicial Police.  It has been the judicial branch, under the military
command, whom they directly accuse of violent actions, while the military
forces have been attempting to reinforce their image as benefactors,
performing "social work," helping and protecting the population.

Who is being attacked?

Those 51 persons identified as having been attacked can also be subdivided
into 17 different Sectors.  The Sectors suffering the most attacks were:
Civil Society 62%, Political Parties 15%, Social Organizations 11%, the
EZLN 6%, the Catholic Church 3%, Municipal Officials 2%, Private Enterprise
1% and the Government 1%.  The gulf between Civil Society and the Political
Parties is very wide.  This could mean that civil society is more
mobilized, and it is the flank that is being attacked through the
government's strategy.  Once again it can be seen that the Political
Parties were not the uniting factor of the demands, of the democratic
struggles, and that social mobilization and civil and political struggle
are not being formed around them.

The Political Parties suffered attacks, in descending order of incidence:
PRD 57%, PRI 41%, PT 2%.  That is, the second and the primary political
forces in the state (PRD and PRI), since the PAN has no presence in the
rural and indigenous areas of Chiapas.  The 10 Social Organizations most
frequently attacked were:  OPEACH 20%, ARC 14%, AEDPCh 12%, KICHANOB 10%,
CNI 10%, ARIC Independent 10%, STSCC 7%, CIDECI 7%, BARZON 5% and SOCAMA
5%.  There are other organizations that do not appear among this list,
since they presented themselves as PRD, "Civil Society," "Community,"
"People," etcetera.  This figure is relative insofar as there have also
been other social, campesino, indigenous and urban organizations attacked,
but they have not been recorded.

In the case of the Mediation Sector - in which the CONAI and the COCOPA
have been included for practical reasons of systematization of information
- the correspondents identified the CONAI as the aggrieved party in 100% of
the cases.  The COCOPA was never identified as the aggrieved party.
Beginning in 1998 it became a target of government attacks, following its
reaching consensus with the CONAI, on January 22, 1998, concerning the 10
indispensable factors for renewal of the dialogue. 

Who is knocking at my door?

Within the totality of the Documents, 103 different correspondents have
been identified.  The sectors sending the most documents were:  Civil
Society 31%, Social Organizations 25%,  Municipal Officials (including
ejidal authorities) 24%, Displaced 6%, the Government 4%, Political Parties
4%, the Catholic Church 2%, Human Rights 1%, Solidarity 1%, the EZLN 1%.

The CONAI, throughout the entirety of their 36 communiques, between 1994
and 1998, mentions the concept of "Civil Society" 55 times, referring to
that party as the aggrieved, the invitee, the fundamental actor, to be
addressed regarding peace initiatives, and so forth.  The 10 most important
corresponding Social Organizations were:  the Voice of Cerro Hueco 26%,
organizations in general 22%, KICHANOB 9%, CNPI 9%, ARIC Independent 8%,
COCIDEP 6%, OCEZ-CNPA 5%, CONPAZ 5%, FOCA 5%, CIOAC 5%.  Release of the
prisoners, the problems in the Northern region and in the municipality of
Ocosingo were the primary concerns, which were  reflected in the majority
of the denunciations from social organizations.  Correspondents within the
Solidarity sector, in order of the number of complaints were:  Solidarity
55%, Sipaz 18%, Global Exchange 18% and Christian Peacemaker Team 9%.
Within the EZLN sector, the breakdown was:  EZLN 90%, FZLN 10%.

In whom do we trust?

Within the totality of the documents, 110 different recipients were
identified.  The Recipient sector, those to whom the documents were
directed, include:  mediation (the CONAI and COCOPA) 29%, the Government
21%, Public Opinion 12%, Human Rights 10%, the EZLN 7%, Social
Organizations 6%, the Catholic Church 5%, Civil Society 3%, Municipal
Authorities 2%, Political Parties 1%, Solidarity 1%, Mexican Army 1%. 

It is important to note that the primary interlocutor for the
correspondents was, in terms of numbers, the CONAI (60%) and the COCOPA
(40%), as the pair with the greatest moral credibility for channeling
social complaints, even more than the human rights bodies themselves.  We
were witness to the lack of credibility of government structures and of the
National and State Human Rights Commissions.  This makes it clear that the
conflicts in Chiapas cannot be understood outside the context of armed
conflict, as the federal and state governments are attempting to do, making
it appear to be a regional problem.

Within the Human Rights sector, as recipients, the correspondents primarily
directed themselves to the Fray Bartolome de Las Casas Human Rights Center
66%, Human Rights (in generic terms) 28%, Amnesty International 3%, CEDIAC
1%, CIDH 1%.  Within the Catholic Church sector as recipients, the
correspondents primarily directed themselves to:  Bishop Samuel Ruiz 67%,
Diocese of San Cristobal de Las Casas 21%, Mexican Episcopate Conference
7%, Bishop Raul Vera 2%, the Episcopal Commission for Peace and
Reconciliation in Chiapas 2%, the Inter-Congregational Committee for
Justice, Peace and Life 1%.  Once again, the figure of Don Samuel Ruiz
Garcia, heading the CONAI or the Diocese, was one of the primary
interlocutors for social demands.  Because of that, during 1998, the
government increased its attacks against the Diocese, the CONAI and the
very person of Don Samuel Ruiz, who was forced, for this and other reasons,
to end the CONAI on June 7, 1998.

In the Political Parties sector as recipients, the correspondents directed
themselves to:  the PRD 78%, PRI 13%, PAN 3%, PC 3% and PDCH 3%.  In the
Solidarity sector, the correspondents directed themselves to:  Solidarity
(in generic terms) 61%, the "International Community" 22%, Sipaz 11% and
Global Exchange 5%.


Onecimo Hidalgo and Gustavo Castro

Center   of   Economic   and    Political    Investigations   of  Community
 Action,   A.C.
CIEPAC
CIEPAC, member of the "Convergence of Civil Organizations for Democracy"
National Network (CONVERGENCIA), and member of RMALC (Mexico Action Network
on Free Trade)

 ******************************************
Translated by irlandesa for CIEPAC, A.C.
******************************************

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CIEPAC, A.C.
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