Date: Thu, 14 Oct 1999 11:01:59 -0600
Subject: AUT: English Chiapas al Dia 178       I


ENGLISH VERSION OF "CHIAPAS AL DIA" BULLETIN No. 178
CIEPAC
CHIAPAS, MEXICO
(October 8, 1999)


THE PRE-ELECTION POLITICAL SCENE

The elections for the presidency of the Republic, which will be held next
July 4, will be of historical importance for the country as well as for the
political parties, since the possibility looms of an Opposition Alliance,
made up of eight parties, in order to confront the Institutional
Revolutionary Party (PRI), which has been in power for more than 70 years.
The hopes of many Mexicans evaporated, however, when, on September 29, the
National Action Party (PAN) stated that they would not enter in to the
alliance.  For the first time in Mexican history, a citizens' "Council of
Notables" had been formed, in order to draw up and to propose a method for
selecting the sole opposition candidate who would confront the PRI.  The
"Council of Notables" somehow managed to include in its proposal the survey
system suggested by the PAN, as well as the system of democratic election
proposed by the PRD.  It made a valiant effort in this regard, which was
rejected by the PAN.

One assumes that this rejection was owing to the fear that the PAN
candidate, Vicente Fox, might lose, and because the PAN would not enter in
to a coalition government.  They were only willing to join forces for the
elections.

The fact that the alliance has not been formalized does not mean that the
other parties cannot join the alliance, accepting Cuauhtemoc Cardenas,
since he is the only candidate proposed up to now, by the PT [Labor Party].
 Thus far, that party and the PRD continue to maintain the alliance, but it
cannot be predicted how far it will go, and what they will be able to do in
order to achieve good results.  Nonetheless, the PAN, as well as the PRD,
will be paying a high price for their failure to construct the alliance.
That project represented not just the opposition united against the PRI,
but also the hopes for the broad participation of organized and unorganized
expressions of civil society, which is not active in the parties.

An increase in abstention is being predicted, due to the high level of
partisanship that prevails among the parties, and their traditional way of
doing politics, which has not changed in response to the country's current
circumstances.

The parties had the opportunity to move closer to that civil society that
is organizing more and more and seeking to participate in greater spaces in
the democratic construction.  The parties will have to put great effort -
not into presenting their plans and programs - but in approaching the
people, in order to gather their demands, aspirations, their needs, what
they are looking for and hoping for from a particular candidate.  It is on
those foundations on which they must create a government project and
program, based on needs, and from the communities, neighborhoods, ranches,
etcetera.

The opposition parties' campaign work is not easy, because they are
confronting two difficult challenges that they must overcome.  On the one
hand, they are facing the PRI, which has the entire government machinery at
its disposal, willing to help the PRI win.  But, on the other hand, they
face internal conflicts.  This is a symptom that the party system is
ceasing to be functional for democratic participation, because the majority
of the leaders are seeking to gain power, but they are not proposing the
country's structural change, and nor are they proposing the structural
participation of society in the building of a new model for the country.

The PRD has shown itself to have serious internal problems, when the
different elements and political positions should be the plural wealth that
would strengthen the party.  But they have lost the values of tolerance, of
inclusion, of internal dialogue, of listening, and, above all, of knowing
how to recognize the mistakes they have made.  The hard-liners, the
radicals, the moderates, the PRIs disguised as PRDs, the infiltrators, and
all the rest that the party possesses, should present the possibility of
assembling a different, tolerant and inclusive program.  This is not
possible, however, because of their way of doing politics, since there is
always a group that wants and tries to "tow the line," or to give orders so
that the others will just obey, which, in current times, is no longer
possible.  Meanwhile, others talk of being excluded and marginalized from
the party and of not being taken into account.  The last two elections for
the party's leadership showed that they are repeating some of the PRI's
practices, using the same methods and frauds, governing under the same
scheme.  The majority of NGO members who were brought into the Federal
District government's cabinet have had to resign, because of a series of
practices and vices that demonstrate a lack of a new kind of ethical,
plural and political vision.

The registration of the candidacy of Porfirio Munoz Ledo for the Authentic
Party of the Mexican Revolution (PARM) is an indication of what is
happening, and of what could come to pass within the party.  Regardless of
Munoz Ledo's difficult personality, it is necessary to more objectively
evaluate what could happen.

Within the PRD's current situation, one must distinguish between the
personality of Cuauhtemoc Cardenas, as the figure of coalescence, who,
despite the entire propaganda campaign against him by Azteca Television,
has, on many occasions, managed to save both his image and to prevent
larger fissures within the party.  Cardenas is one thing, however, and the
PRD is another.

Similar situations are occurring within the PAN, which has not avoided
internal problems over the struggle for power inside the party and for the
presidency of the Republic.  The old and neo-PAN members, however, have
indeed been able to maintain unity around the current alliances with the
PRD, in order to blackmail the PRI and the government, and then, when they
achieve their objectives, to break the alliances.  It is the party that
makes tactical alliances to the left in order to achieve their strategy
towards the right.  

The PRI is going thorough one of the worst moments in their history.  There
is the risk of a great rupture, due to the main fight - between the
official candidate, Francisco Labastida, and his opponent, Roberto Madrazo.
 Francisco Labastida is not taking off politically as he had hoped, because
he is surrounded by a team accustomed to commanding, to giving orders and
to carrying out a "two-faced" politics.  Today, having to confront
political work, where there must be negotiation and tolerance, they are
failing.  They always use the tactic that one should negotiate with a great
enemy, crush a small enemy and force a mid-sized enemy to become allied
with them.

Humberto Roque and Manuel Bartlett are the internal enemies whom they shall
force to become allied with them.  Labastida is always inviting Roberto
Madrazo to "have some coffee" with him, in order to negotiate.  However,
since Madrazo believes the correlation of forces are in his favor, he is
making him beg, and he refuses, believing he will win the internal
selection process.

The friction among the PRI aspirants has been due to their objections to
the use of the state government machinery at the service of Francisco
Labastida's support campaigns in at least eight states in the Republic.
This has been denounced and pointed out by Roberto Madrazo's campaign
coordinator, and they have also filed complaints of irregularities with the
Development and Monitoring Committee for the selection of the PRI
candidate.  Another aspect of the confrontation has been the advertising
campaigns in the media, which are taking place in the midst of mutual
attacks, statements and denials, heating things up even more, leading one
to presume that this could result in violence.  Three incidents indicate to
us that this could occur:  the attack on Francisco Labastida's campaign
office in the state of Mexico;  the kidnapping of Roberto Madrazo's son in
Mexico City, with warnings that he is being pursued on all sides, and that
they are aware of all his movements (Proceso No. 1196, from October 2,
1999); and, the fire set at Roberto Madrazo's campaign office in Culiacan
in the state of Sinaloa.  It should be emphasized that, at the core, this
is a fight between Salinismo and Zedillismo.

It is apparent that a change in government, in party or in persons will not
change the situation in Mexico.  What is required for that is the wide
participation of society, taking into its own hands the control of all
those bodies which will allow them to be, and to build, a government from a
broad gamut of common points, articulating an agenda of those social
sectors that have been marginalized and excluded by the political system.

THE POLITICAL CAULDRON IN CHIAPAS

After the President of the PRI in Chiapas, Rodolfo Soto, attended his
party's National Political Council, he announced that the convocation for
the selection of the PRI's candidate for the government of Chiapas would
come after November 7.  This is obvious, since the chiapaneco candidate
will have to be someone who represents the interests of the nationally
selected candidate.  They cannot be in conflict.  Nonetheless, four
aspirants have already appeared:  Jose Antonio Aguilar Bodegas, Sami David
David, Cesar Augusto Santiago Ramirez and Juan Carlos Gomez Aranda.

Sami David is the aspirant being supported by Governor Roberto Albores
Guillen.  Jose Antonio Aguilar Bodegas is supported by major businessmen
and coffee growers of the Chiapas Coast, and he has shown up at Francisco
Labastida's political appearances in Chiapas.  Cesar Augusto Santiago
represents those power groups in Los Altos of Chiapas, especially the
"Authentic Coletos," and he is demanding that the selection of the
candidate not be imposed.  Meanwhile, Juan Carlos Gomez Aranda represents
the interests of the Comitecos, and is not given much chance of winning.

Opposition political parties still have hopes of an opposition alliance,
which has thus far gained the support of the PRD, PT, PAN, the Central
Democratic Party and the Democratic Convergence Party, but we do not yet
know how far it shall go.

Up to this point, the only visible person for leading this coalition is
Independent Senator Pablo Salazar Mendiguchia, who represents the Movement
of Hope.  Inside the PRD, however the right wing, headed by Jorge Moscoso
(the role played by this person in Ruiz Ferro's government should be noted,
especially his work alongside Eraclio Zepeda, when he was Secretary of
Government), by Placido Humberto Morales (originally from the PRI), and by
Gilberto Gomez Maza (perhaps the least stained of the three), are playing
opposition within the opposition.  Jorge Moscoso returned to Chiapas
shouting that "if the PRD accepts an outside candidate, that is, someone
who doesn't belong to the party, it will be making a serious mistake, since
they aren't recognized because of their lack of work within the party, and
it's taking rights away from the real party members" (XEWM - Radio 6:40,
News Show, at 2:30 PM on October 8, 1999).  His position, however, seems to
have more to do with blocking the alliance.

What has been seen, however, and reported in the press - the demonstrations
for Pablo Salazar - is that the PT got the jump on putting him on the table
as their candidate, because they know the work he is doing, the support he
has, from social organizations, political parties, organized truck drivers,
people from civil society, Evangelicals, Catholics and even a good part of
the PRI Municipal Committees in the Isthmus, Coastal and Northern regions.
The PRI will have to resort to an exceptionally exaggerated fraud in order
to be able to win. 

Those people who are working with Pablo Salazar are citizens, and new to
political participation, which is good, but also risky because of their
inexperience.  This citizens participation is much more far-reaching,
because it involves a network of citizens relationships, of social
organizations, or, simply, of persons who influence people.

His support is not, however, blind.  The everyday citizens ask questions.
What guarantees do we have that Pablo is not going to betray us, or go back
over to the government?  This reflection is not unwarranted.  Their history
of struggle have brought them the experience of many of their leaders, to
whom they have given their trust, having betrayed them, dialoguing with the
government behind the peoples' backs.  They have been co-opted by the
government.  They have sold out the social movements.  They have divided
organizations.  And they have only benefited from the organizational
processes.  They ask themselves, then:  What to do?  It is a question that
they themselves must answer in an organized manner.

In the face of the possibility that the opposition alliance could achieve
greater participation, and truly act as a countermeasure to the PRI,
several scenarios are possible:

1. -  The most brutal and blatant would be Pablo Salazar having an "accident".
2. -  The crushing of the social movements, rendering them leaderless.
3. -  The government and powerful groups could unleash a slander campaign
against the Movement of Hope and their leader.
4. -  Non-executed arrest warrants could be reopened against campesino
leaders.
5. -  An increase in violent actions in order to provoke the vote of fear
and terror, in order to achieve votes for the PRI and give the impression
that only the PRI can take care of them if they vote for them.
6. -  What is already occurring, which is the conditional distribution of
credits.
7. -  That the social movement truly does rebuild, prepares a good agenda
of its demands, and that Pablo Salazar commits himself to defending them
and carrying them out in his government.  The triumph would be, not just
his votes, but, rather, their demands.
8. -  Control of the roads, highways, ballot boxes and intimidation by the
soldiers, alleged paramilitary groups, PRI caciques and regional power groups.
10. -  Poorly located voting booths and a reduced number of ballots in
places where the Alliance could win.


Onecimo Hidalgo

Center   of   Economic   and    Political    Investigations   of  Community
 Action,   A.C.
CIEPAC
CIEPAC, member of the "Convergence of Civil Organizations for Democracy"
National Network (CONVERGENCIA), and member of RMALC (Mexico Action Network
on Free Trade)

 ******************************************
Translated by irlandesa for CIEPAC, A.C.
******************************************

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CIEPAC, A.C.
Centro de Investigaciones Económicas y Políticas de Acción Comunitaria
Eje Vial Uno Número 11
Col. Jardines de Vista Hermosa
29297 San Cristóbal, Chiapas, MEXICO

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