From: Lucy Mair <rights-AT-cesr.org>
Subject: AUT: The Final Approach to Final Status - MERIP PIN by Roger Normand
Date: Mon, 10 Jul 2000 13:40:09 -0700


NOTE:  Roger Normand will appear live on BBC-TV on Tuesday, July 11 at
9:40am NY-time to discuss the Camp David Summit.  Please tune in!

>MERIP Press Information Note 25
>
>The Final Approach to Final Status
>
>Roger Normand
>
>Roger Normand works as policy director at the Center for Economic and Social
>Rights in Brooklyn, NY.
>
>July 7, 2000
>
>The Israeli-Palestinian summit scheduled for July 11 at Camp David carries
>high stakes for the principal parties. President Clinton's hoped-for legacy
>as a statesman rests to a large degree on mediating a comprehensive
>settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The future of Prime Minister
>Barak's fragile government depends on reaching some agreement on the
>Palestinian track, especially after his recent surrender to Shas on domestic
>issues. Chairman Arafat's political survival requires an agreement that is
>most Palestinians do not see as a capitulation to Israeli (and American)
>hegemony.
>
>Media hoopla about the undoubted differences between the Israeli and
>Palestinian positions at Camp David obscures a fundamental confluence of
>interests in the Oslo process between Israel, the PA and major Western
>donors: a globalized economic order in the region. Further, media pundits
>misread the differences themselves. There is little dispute over Palestinian
>statehood. The real dispute concerns the level of Israeli control over this
>state, and the resolution of the crucial issues of land, refugees and
>Jerusalem. Israel holds all the cards on these issues, having created
>numerous "facts on the ground"--former Prime Minister Rabin's euphemism for
>annexation, settlements and military control. Arafat has been publicly
>reluctant to attend the summit because he does not want to enter history as
>the first Arab leader to legitimize Israeli military conquest. For Arafat,
>the summit presents a Catch-22: lose Palestinian and Arab legitimacy by
>accepting an imposed final status framework agreement that effectively
>repudiates basic Palestinian rights under international law, or lose
>international (and especially US) support by choosing the path of
>resistance.
>
>THE LOGIC OF ISRAELI HEGEMONY
>
>During the interim phase of the Oslo process, differences between the two
>sides have consistently been resolved by Israeli diktat followed by
>Palestinian complaints. All disputes over central issues such as Israeli
>military withdrawal, construction of settlements and bypass roads,
>cantonization of Palestinian land, imposition of closure and travel
>restrictions and refusal to release all political prisoners have been
>settled in this fashion.
>
>Israeli dominance is an inevitable result of the structural logic of the
>Oslo process. Bilateral negotiations between the strongest political,
>economic and military power in the region and the weakened and corrupt
>leadership of an occupied people are bound to produce one-sided agreements
>and even more one-sided implementation of those agreements. This imbalance
>in negotiating power is exacerbated by the rejection of UN participation in
>the Oslo process in favor of active mediation by the US, often through the
>CIA. The US is not only Israel's staunchest ally and military supporter, but
>also the only Western country not to extend full diplomatic relations to the
>PLO.
>
>Indeed, seven years after the famous handshake on the White House lawn,
>Oslo's balance sheet is decidedly skewed in favor of Israel. Palestinian
>concessions--rejection of armed resistance and full recognition of the state
>of Israel--were made up front. In contrast, Israel has bestowed its main
>concession--ending the military occupation and enabling Palestinian
>self-determination--grudgingly, gradually, and always subject to unilateral
>Israeli interpretation. While Palestinians today retain few bargaining chips
>beyond the threat of sporadic violence, Israel continues to occupy
>Palestinian land and deny Palestinian self-determination. Israel is also
>winning the battle for world public opinion, having transformed partial
>withdrawal from an illegal occupation into the appearance of "giving" land
>to the Palestinians.
>
>Despite Israel's advantages, the Camp David summit is unlikely to secure a
>total Palestinian surrender. Arafat's room for maneuver on the domestic
>front has been limited by recent events, notably Hezbollah's success in
>driving Israeli forces out of South Lebanon. Despite Arafat's effort to
>muzzle media coverage, Hezbollah's victory galvanized the Palestinian street
>and placed an unflattering spotlight on the meager territorial returns of
>the Oslo process. Combined with President Asad's refusal until his death to
>recognize Israeli control over any Syrian territory, the example of
>Hezbollah undermines the legitimacy of Arafat's past and potential future
>compromises on land.
>
>Until now, the PA's multiple security forces have crushed all manifestations
>of dissent through security sweeps, military courts, torture and other
>repressive tactics. The PA has justified its failure to deliver either
>political or economic self-determination by the temporary nature of Oslo's
>interim arrangements. But a final status agreement that fails to recognize
>Palestinian claims to their land, to Jerusalem and to the rights of refugees
>could spark an explosion of long-suppressed opposition.
>
>SYMBOLIC INDEPENDENCE
>
>The dilemma of Camp David therefore seems to be that while Israel retains
>the power and American backing to dictate terms, Arafat may no longer be
>able to satisfy Israeli demands without delegitimizing his own leadership.
>According to inside accounts of the negotiations, the likely solution to
>this dilemma will conceal the reality of continued Israeli control under the
>guise of Palestinian rights and independence.
>
>On the issue of land and borders, Arafat will reportedly accept Israeli
>annexation of major settlement blocs (including the new "suburbs" of
>Jerusalem) and connecting bypass roads in the West Bank, possibly in
>exchange for the return for some Arab towns inside the Green Line. Less
>significant settlements will be dismantled, and the settlers returned to
>Israel. On Jerusalem, Barak appears willing to cede certain Arab
>neighborhoods to the Palestinian state. To maintain the illusion of
>Palestinian sovereignty over most, perhaps even 90 percent of the West Bank,
>Israel will control land in the Jordan Valley through a long-term lease
>rather than outright annexation.
>
>The solution to the refugee issue also appears calculated to serve Israeli
>interests while at the same time enabling Arafat to claim symbolic victory.
>The plans call for a long-term formula of host country absorption, third
>country resettlement, repatriation to Palestine and very limited return
>inside the Green Line (through family reunification). An enormous
>international bribe, in the form of an aid package worth up to $100 billion
>to be allocated among the PA, Israel and frontline Arab states, will soften
>official governmental opposition in the region. Of course, the effective
>abandonment of the Palestinians' human right to return to their homes will
>be couched in language purporting to recognize the very right.
>
>Under this scenario, Arafat's claim to have liberated most of 1967 Palestine
>will enjoy broad international and even Arab regime support. But Israel will
>maintain effective control over Palestinian political and economic
>independence through the mechanism of closure and separation, already tested
>and deployed successfully during the interim phase of Oslo. Military
>deployments at settlements, bypass roads and border areas will still cut the
>West Bank into separate cantons and restrict travel between the West Bank
>and Gaza, enabling Israel to expand or contract the Israeli market for
>Palestinian labor and to decisively influence Palestinian social and
>economic welfare. Many Palestinians, especially refugees, will reject the
>agreement, but they lack organized mechanisms for dissent and will face
>brutal repression inside the new state.
>
>GLOBALIZED OPPRESSION OR INTERNATIONAL LAW?
>
>Underlying the negotiating positions of all the parties is a push for a
>Middle Eastern free trade regime--with the ultimate goal of accessing Arab
>markets, Arab consumers and cheap Arab labor. Various development plans put
>forward by the PA, Israel, the World Bank and donors during the Oslo process
>share a common vision of free trade zones and industrial estates at the
>Palestinian-Israeli borders. Modeled on the maquiladoras at the US-Mexican
>border, these zones will employ cheap Palestinian labor, repressed by a
>corrupt, authoritarian state and unprotected by the rule of law, in the
>service of Israeli and foreign capital. Goods and capital will flow freely
>across the borders, but people will be divided within (relatively)
>ethnically pure states.
>
>This future of globalized oppression is by no means inevitable, even if Camp
>David produces a one-sided agreement. Organized opposition has thus far been
>ineffective, but dissent is growing as the final agreement comes into view.
>Voices from inside Palestine are increasingly confronting the corrupt and
>repressive PA, despite significant personal risk. Palestinian communities in
>the diaspora, working with solidarity groups, are organizing broad public
>campaigns to protect the right of return. A growing minority of Israeli and
>Palestinian intellectuals are rejecting the entire Oslo formula and
>promoting the idea of secular, democratic binationalism.
>
>Could international law serve as the basis for resolving the
>Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as these diverse efforts envision? Given the
>current balance of forces, Israel is hardly likely to dismantle the
>settlements, withdraw to the pre-1967 borders, and recognize Palestine as a
>fully equal and sovereign state. Nor is the PA likely to end corruption,
>tolerate opposition and respect the rule of law. But international law is
>nonetheless important as a long-term alternative vision and strategy to the
>current drift towards ethnic separation and economic exploitation.
>
>In this regard, it should be recalled that resolution 181, in addition to
>providing the legal basis for Israeli and Palestinian statehood, mandates
>full equality and human rights for all citizens of these states. Such basic
>concepts of rights and democracy pose a radical challenge to the ideology of
>separation and discrimination underlying not only the final agreement
>formula under Oslo, but also Israel's treatment of its Arab citizens inside
>the Green Line. Genuine implementation of international law would collapse
>the differences between the two-state and binational solutions by ensuring
>the full and equal rights of all citizens, including the right of return for
>Palestinian refugees, and thereby promoting a future for all people of the
>region based on liberation and justice.
>
>(When quoting from this PIN, please cite as MERIP Press Information Note 25,
>"The Final Approach to Final Status," by Roger Normand, July 7, 2000.)
>
>-----
>
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Lucy Mair
Middle East Program Coordinator
Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR)
162 Montague Street, 2nd floor
Brooklyn, NY 11201
Phone:  (718) 237-9145, ext. 18
Fax:  (718) 237-9147
Email:  LMAIR-AT-cesr.org
Website:  http://www.cesr.org/

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