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From: pmargin-AT-froggy.com.au
Date: Sun, 07 Oct 2001 06:51:14 +1000
Subject: AUT: wallerstein on US state options after 911


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http://fbc.binghamton.edu/74en.htm

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                                          Fernand Braudel Center,
Binghamton University

                                                                        
                                                     http://fbc.binghamton.edu/commentr.htm

 

                                                                 
Commentary No. 74, Oct. 1, 2001

                                                          "The Outcome
Could Not Be More Uncertain"

In his speech to the U.S. Congress and to the world, President Bush
said, in asserting what the U.S. intended to do, that there
were many difficulties ahead, "yet its outcome is certain." This could
not be more untrue. If his statement was meant as
hortatory rhetoric, it may be considered normal discourse for a leader
of a nation besieged. But if it reflects the analytic view of
Bush and his principal deputies, then it is a dangerous misperception.

Of course, the first obscurity is to which outcome Bush is referring. He
may mean the destruction of Al-Qaeda, which is a
possible albeit extremely difficult objective. He may mean the
elimination or defanging of all groups anywhere that the U.S.
will designate as "terrorist," in which case the possibility of success
seems extremely dubious. He may mean a restoration of the
belief of the American people and the world in general in the military
prowess of the United States government, which is, as of
this point, an objective whose success is quite uncertain. He may mean
sustaining the interests of the United States as a country
and of its enterprises, an objective whose likelihood of success is at
best shaky.

It is important in thinking about "outcomes" to give oneself different
time lines. I propose three: six months, five years, 50
years. The picture for Bush looks rosiest within a six-months
perspective. Consider what he has already gained in the short
period since Sept. 11. Before that day, the Bush administration was
subjected to opposition, of varying degrees, from just about
everywhere, and notably from the Democrats in Congress; the allies in
Europe; Russia and China; the governments and
populations of most of the countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America;
and a worldwide "anti-globalization" movement. That's
a formidable list, and almost all of this opposition has either
disappeared or been greatly muted since the attack on Sept. 11. The
Democrats in Congress and the allies in Europe have rallied round the
U.S. under siege. Russia, China, and most of the
governments of Asia, Africa, and Latin America have given some kind of
at least qualified support to a U.S. response to the
attack. The "anti-globalization" movement has been relatively quiet and
is wondering whether it should transform itself into a
"peace" movement.

Of course, Bush is not the only one to derive some immediate political
advantage from the attack. Since the U.S. is so anxious
to line up everyone everywhere on its side, at least minimally, it has
been ready to pay a diplomatic price in exchange, and
others have not been hesitant to ask, especially those further away from
the inner core of "friends." The Democrats in Congress
and the allies in western Europe have not yet dared to demand anything.
But Russia, China, Pakistan, Sudan, the various Arab
states (and who knows whom else Powell has been promising things) have
been less bashful. And soon the Democrats and the
allies in western Europe may join in the game. So, for the moment, it
sounds like a win-win game for everyone whom Usama
bin Laden doesn't appreciate.

However, the bill comes due in six months. By then, the U.S. will have
had to do something, something military. What it is we
don't know for sure, and it seems that even the U.S. government may not
know for sure. This is because, as has been widely
admitted, there are no good options. A surgical strike against bin Laden
by special troops parachuting into Afghanistan runs the
risk of the U.S. fiasco in Iran in 1980, which lost Carter his
reelection. Bombing Afghanistan, the most probable single act, has
multiple limitations: few plausible targets, likelihood of great
civilian carnage plus a refugee flood into Pakistan, great political
discomfort in Muslim states, and a low likelihood that bombing alone
would end Taliban control of central Afghanistan.

There are some in the U.S. administration who want to bomb Iraq, which
at least has plausible targets. The problem is that
Saddam Hussein is not an ally of Usama bin Laden, more plausibly one of
the bin Laden's future targets. And bombing Iraq
would not only undo all of Powell's efforts to create a grand coalition
but also place the U.S. before the same dilemma it faced
in 1991: would it dare assume the burden of a land invasion and occupation?

And when the U.S. decides which of these doubtfully effective
alternatives to choose, then what? If it "fails" militarily, this will
reinforce bin Laden's point that the U.S. is a paper tiger, and we all
know how fickle allies become when a great power
demonstrates military weakness. If it doesn't fail in its actions per
se, but gets embroiled in a long military confrontation, any
of the following may occur: significant loss of U.S. lives (bringing on
all the internal U.S. debates about escalation that
pervaded the Vietnam war); great civilian destruction in Afghanistan
(which might make the world think that the 7000 lives lost
in the Sept. 11 attack did not justify such a massive response); great
political turmoil in some Muslin countries - Pakistan, Saudi
Arabia, Indonesia, Egypt, Algeria, Lebanon, Palestine, and others less obvious.

None of this would look too good for the U.S. government. Suddenly,
there might be a vast "peace" movement in the world.
And George W. Bush might reflect, like Lyndon Johnson, that it would be
prudent not to run again.

Of course, perhaps this picture is exaggerated. Perhaps the U.S. could
in fact pull off a surgical strike. Perhaps the Taliban
would collapse conveniently by themselves. Perhaps Bush would come out
as a victorious hero, as his father did in 1991. At that
point, he would still face two other hurdles. 

One hurdle would be domestic. His father went from victory and
incredible poll ratings to an electoral defeat within 18 months
because, as the saying went then, "It's the economy, stupid." Just this
week, the Wall Street Journal, the incarnation of
economic conservatism in the U.S., said that Secretary of the Treasury,
Paul O'Neill, risked losing all his credibility because of
his rosy optimism about the economy. Clearly, a lot of U.S. capitalists
are hunkering down for the stormy period ahead. U.S.
voters notoriously have a short memory and, once the flag-waving has
passed, will vote their pocketbooks. And they always
blame the ins for economic troubles.

If that weren't enough, suppose the U.S. took out bin Laden, overthrew
the Taliban, and then three months later, somebody else
was able to pull off a spectacular attack, in the U.S. or in western
Europe, would not all the U.S. credit for success disappear in
a huff of smoke before the emergence of a hydra-headed monster?
Certainly, the bravado and the self-confidence would be
shaken. Is this so implausible?

Now, then, if we move to a five-year perspective, will the U.S. position
in the world-system be stronger than today? Will
today's geopolitical line-ups survive as a serious mode of organizing
global politics? Might the "anti-globalization" movement
perhaps have been metamorphosed into something more coherent and far
more militant than today? These are not unreasonable
questions to consider. Above all, may not chaotic conditions become
something much more the universal norm, and insecurity
the daily potion of still more of us? And might the world economy not
begin to oscillate wildly?

And if it does, where will we be 50 years from now? Nothing could be
less certain. But looking back from 50 years ahead, it is
doubtful that Sept. 11 in itself will seem all that important.

President Bush, in that same speech to Congress, said "And we know that
God is not neutral." I guess Bush is not known as a
theologian. I thought that the way the three great Western religions -
Judaism, Christianity, and Islam - had all dealt with the
problem of evil ("If God is omnipotent, why does He permit evil to
exist?) had been by saying that God had endowed humans
with free will. But if God is not neutral, then humans do not have free
will. And if humans have free will, then God is distinctly
neutral about human conflicts.

Immanuel Wallerstein

[Copyright by Immanuel Wallerstein. All rights reserved. Permission is
granted to download, forward electronically or e-mail to
others and to post this text on non-commercial community Internet sites,
provided the essay remains intact and the copyright note
is displayed. To translate this text, publish it in printed and/or other
forms, including commercial Internet sites and excerpts, contact
the author at iwaller-AT-binghamton.edu; fax: 1-607-777-4315.

These commentaries, published twice monthly, are intended to be
reflections on the contemporary world scene, as seen from the
perspective not of the immediate headlines but of the long term.]

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