From: "michael pugliese" <debsian-AT-pacbell.net>
Subject: AUT: Fw:[H-RadHist] The Zimbabwean Elections Analysis PORTSIDE Does Not Want Its Readers To See 
Date: Sun, 24 Mar 2002 21:56:16 -0800



Received:
3/24/02 10:42:40 PM

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Subject:
The Zimbabwean Elections Analysis PORTSIDE Does Not Want Its
Readers To See 

 
>From: LeoCasey-AT-aol.com 
>Date: Sat, 23 Mar 2002 20:04:37 EST 
 
>On Thursday of this week, Portside, the official listserv of
the Committees 
>of Correspondence for Democracy and Socialism in the US, published
three 
>opinion pieces on the recent Zimbabwean elections: an op-ed
piece from 
Gerald 
>Horne, a statement of the South African Communist Party and
a statement of 
>the South African trade union federation, COSATU. Both the Horne
and SACP 
>pieces treated the stolen elections as if they were legitimate;
the COSATU 
>piece, apparently reflecting strong divisions within it, argued

>disingenuously that it was not possible to determine whether
the elections 
>were legitimate at this point. 
> 
>I immediately sent the response reproduced below off to Portside,
together 
>with a full accounting from within Zimbabwe on the ways in which
the 
>elections were stolen, also reproduced below. They have ignored
this 
>response. For all of the reasons that the response itself makes
clear, the 
>original publication of those three pieces -- and only those
three pieces -- 
>was an act of political irresponsibility on their part, an act
which shows a 
>stunning lack of commitment to the fundamental democratic principle
that a 
>people has the sovereign right to freely choose their own government.
My 
last 
>words concerning the South African Communist Party -- "Old Stalinist
habits 
>die hard, it appears." -- would seem to have been too narrowly
applied. 
> 
>***************************************************************************

*** 
> 
>****************** 
> 
>My Response: 
> 
>It was most unfortunate that Portside chose to publish together,
as its only 
>three pieces on the Zimbabwe elections, the Gerald Horne piece,
together 
with 
>the statement of the South African Communist Party and what
we are told is 
>the preliminary statement of the South African trade union confederation,

>COSATU. Unfortunate, because all three pieces maintain their
position by 
>simply omitting highly pertinent, important information, and
because all 
>three ignore what has to be the most important political principle
for any 
>individual or organization who claims to be of the left. 
> 
>Let me cite just a few of the most widely facts conveniently
absent from 
>these accounts. In reading them, one would never know, for example,
the 
>Zimbabwean opposition MDC was drawn widely from all segments
of Zimbabwean 
>civil society, especially the Zimbabwean trade union movement,
ZCTU, as well 
>as Zimbabwean NGOs, Zimbabwean churches and the Zimbabwean democratic
left. 
>One would never know that the MDC's presidential candidate,
Tsvangirai, was 
>also the head of the ZCTU. One would never know that the MDC
first emerged 
>out of opposition to ZANU-PF's imposition of World Bank-IMF
type economic 
>programs in Zimbabwe, which, combined with ZANU-PF mismanagement
of the 
>economy, have devastated the nation over the last decade. One
would never 
>know that many leaders of the MDC and ZCTU were physically assaulted,

>kidnapped and even assassinated in widespread violence by ZANU-PF
"war 
>veterans" in the period leading up to the election. One would
never know 
that 
>the MDC presidential candidate, Tsvangirai, together with his
top aides, are 
>now being charged with the crime of treason. One would never
know that the 
>polling centers in the urban areas, where the working class
and MDC support 
>was the strongest, were systematically cut down in number, with
the desired 
>effect that many thousands of registered voters in these areas
were unable 
to 
>vote, and that the Mugabe government basically ignored the Zimbabwean

Supreme 
>Court's directive to open these polling centers for a third
day of voting, 
so 
>that all could cast their ballot. 
> 
>Even Horne's description of the history of the Zimbabwean liberation

struggle 
>leaves out the most pertinent information, such as the fact
that Mugabe and 
>others who formed ZANU split from the ZAPU not for ideological
reasons, as 
>Horne infers, but out of ethnic chauvinism and tribalism --
ZANU rooted 
>itself in the majority Shona, and charged that ZAPU was "dominated"
by the 
>minority Ndebele. One of the few silver linings in the clouds
of the 
election 
>that just passed was the fact that the polls in both of the
nation's two 
>major urban centers, Bulawayo and Harare, the former predominantly
Ndebele 
>and the latter predominantly Shona, were strongly against Mugabe
and 
ZANU-PF, 
>and for the MDC. 
> 
>But if ethnic demagoguery had lost its punch for ZANU-PF, a
new base appeal 
>had to replace it. What emerges but a form of demagogic nationalism
and 
>anti-imperialism which targets white Zimbabweans: the MDC was
a multi-racial 
>formation, open to all Zimbabweans, and thus became the target
of claims 
that 
>it represented the interests of old white "Rhodesian" farmers,

>notwithstanding its roots in the Zimbabwean working class and
on the 
>Zimbabwean left. After twenty years of misrule, in which the
economic 
>situation of the nation had greatly deteriorated, Mugabe suddenly
discovered 
>that there was a rural land problem, and decided that its "resolution"
would 
>be the main plank of ZANU-PF this election. By giving credence
to the 
>demagogic way in which Mugabe and ZANU-PF used this issue, Horne
and the 
SACP 
>make themselves a party to that demagoguery. When Horne, the
SACP and COSATU 
>make so much of UK and US governments' condemnations of the
ZANU-PF's theft 
>of this election, they end up inadvertently pointing out how
politically 
>bankrupt their own stance is, that even a Bush, much less a
Blair, can do 
>better. 
> 
>But what is most disturbing about all three of these pieces
lies in the way 
>in which they dismiss [or circumvent, in the case of COSATU]
what has to be 
>the most important principle of any left movement: the sovereign
right of a 
>people to freely choose their own government. By declaring legitimate
the 
>results of such a flawed and unfair election, they make it clear,
no matter 
>how they adorn their arguments, that this principle is not paramount.
For 
>those who hoped that the SACP had outgrown the worst of its
ideological 
>roots, and embraced a fully democratic vision of Africa's future,
this is a 
>very disappointing development. Old Stalinist habits die hard,
it appears. 
> 
>***************************************************************************

*** 
> 
>****************** 
>Zimbabwe's Elections: Not Free and Fair by its own Criteria

>Facts for Policymakers and Activists 
> 
>E. Lovemore Moyo 
> 
>One way to judge the fairness of Zimbabwe's elections, is by
the criteria 
set 
>out by SADC [Southern African Development Community], which
Zimbabwe is a 
>signatory to. The SADC Parliamentary Forum's Norms and Standards
for 
Election 
>in the SADC Region (adopted March 2001 in Windhoek, Namibia).

> 
>A short list of the ways in which this election was not free
and fair, 
>according to these standards might include the following. [Statistics
were 
>primarily derived from the daily monitoring by several well-trained
civic 
>networks, i.e., the Zimbabwean NGO Human Rights Forum (Forum),
and the 
>Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN.)] 
> 
>1. Voters free to choose whom they will support without intimidation
or 
>fear of recrimination; 
> 
>* political deaths: 107 people, primarily MDC supporters, killed
by ZANU 
>members or supporters since 26 March 2000; 
>* intimidation rose sharply in the two months before the elections;

>* there are an estimated 750,000 internally displaced presumably
most of 
>which were unable to vote given the laws restricting voting
to one's 
>constituency; 
>* police direct or indirect involvement in much political violence;

>* abduction, beating and chasing away of MDC polling agents
from polling 
>stations during election days (approximately 47% in rural areas,
according 
to 
>the MDC); 
>* "militia camps" 118 counted by the Forum. Many international
observer 
>reports have confirmed the widespread presence of such bases,
often in close 
>proximity to or even at polling stations. Their purpose was
believed by 
>observers to restrict political freedom and freedom of movement;

>* confiscating of voter IDs and demands for people to have ZANU-PF
party 
>cards; 
>* forced attendance of ZANU-PF rallies, particularly towards
farmworkers 
>(international and domestic observer reports, Forum). 
> 
>2. Political parties should be free to form, operate, and campaign
without 
>restrictions or intimidation; 
> 
>* approximately 75 MDC rallies were canceled or not allowed,
either by the 
>police or local authorities in the area (this left eight MDC
rallies, 
against 
>Mugabe's eighty); 
>* MDC offices were attacked in many parts of the country and
their 
properties 
>damaged, their campaigning materials stolen, and their members
and 
supporters 
>beaten and threatened on an ongoing basis (Forum, ZESN); 
> 
>3. Independent media should be free to gather and impart information
about 
>candidates. State controlled media should contain a fair balance
of parties' 
>views; 
> 
>* since the 2000 elections the Daily News has had its offices
bombed twice, 
>and its reporters, distributors and vendors beaten up (Daily
News staff, 
>Forum); 
>* many parts of the country are considered 'no-go' areas for
the sale of 
this 
>independent daily, considered to be strongly aligned with the
MDC; 
>* the "public" media, in print, radio, and television form,
has historically 
>been biased to the ruling party; 
> 
>4. There should be an open and impartial election administration,
including 
>voter registration, vote counting and tallying, access to voter
lists and 
>early accreditation of independent monitors and observers; 
> 
>* the Electoral Supervisory Commission (ESC) the Registrar General
(which 
>actually took the key operational role in the conduct of the
elections) and 
>the Elections Directorate were appointed by either the President
or the 
>government; 
>* none of these three key bodies worked in a transparent manner
and crucial 
>information about the election process has either failed to
be submitted or 
>has been published very late (The Norwegian Observer Mission);

>* various pieces of last minute legislation, of doubtful legality,
were 
>fast-tracked by President Mugabe, overturning a Supreme Court
ruling. The 
>changes sought to ensure that the ruling party maintained control
over the 
>observation and monitoring process, that postal voting was limited
to gov 
>ernment officials, and that a "supplementary voters' roll" could
be prepared 
>to cover all of the questionably registered voters; 
>* one of these pieces of legislation made it illegal for civil
society, or 
>anyone other than the ESC, to conduce voter and civic education;

>* this legislation also outlined that "monitors" could only
be restricted to 
>civil servants, an undisclosed number of which were drawn from
the ministry 
>of defence; "Observers" from civil society were drastically
cut from 
previous 
>elections, and were only accredited days before the election.
Only 400 were 
>eventually accredited from ZESN's trained 12,000, which could
not 
conceivably 
>cover the 5000 polling stations (also, many were beaten and
chased away from 
>polling stations); 
>* voters eliminated from postal voting include approximately
one million 
>living in South Africa and 400,000 living in the UK; 
>* more than 3000 people of previously dual citizenship were
stripped of 
their 
>right to vote by the Registrar General; 
>* a 2nd January 2001 draft of the voters' roll was made available
to 
>political parties, but no later version, nor the supplementary
voters' list, 
>was made available for auditing; 
>* the deadline for registering to vote changed several times
and not clearly 
>communicated to various political parties and civic groups,
including the 
MDC 
>and ZESN. The publicly known date was 27 January, until the
Registrar 
General 
>published a notice dated 1 March extending the deadline for
registration 
to 3 
>March (Norwegian Observer Report); 
>* a severe reduction in urban polling stations (MDC strongholds)
ensured 
that 
>a significant number (some estimate 25,000) urban voters were

disenfranchised 
>(According to the Presidential Election 2002: Polling Stations
and Presiding 
>Officers Election Notice urban constituencies have an average
of 10 polling 
>stations, as opposed to 50 in rural constituencies (Mugabe's
traditional 
>strongholds), and this does not include the mobile counting
stations in 
rural 
>areas, which there are none of in urban); 
> 
>5. There should be adequate equipment and ballots, secret balloting
and 
>impartial administration of balloting; 
> 
>* members of the army and police were required to vote in front
of their 
>superiors, prior to election day. Despite a denial by the Minister
of 
>Defence, Sydney Sekeramayi, the early voting of army and police
was 
confirmed 
>by Registrar General Mudede; 
>* the number of ballot papers printed for the weekend presidential
and 
>council elections for Harare and Chitungwiza remains undisclosed.
The 
>Registrar General, Tobiaiwa Mudede, described this, as well
as the colours 
of 
>the ballot papers distinguishing council, mayoral, and presidential
polls as 
>a "security matter"; 
> 
>6. There should be prompt transfer of power to any winners,
with adequate 
and 
>impartial opportunity for dispute resolution. 
> 
>* Most definitely, a prompt transfer of power to the controversial
winner; 
>* What dispute resolution mechanism? 
> 
>These are simply the facts. The vast documentation of anecdotal
incidences 
>and abuses are overwhelming, and difficult to synthesize and
quantify given 
>capacity constraints of civil society. Moreover, the culture
of fear that 
>continues to permeate Zimbabwean society makes verification
difficult. Four 
>jets hurling over Harare skies for several days prior to, and
on Mugabe's 
>inauguration, is a not-so-gentle reminder to the urban population,
about who 
>is in charge. For many Zimbabweans, a six year nap has become
tempting. 
> 
>Leo Casey 
> 




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