File spoon-archives/aut-op-sy.archive/aut-op-sy_2002/aut-op-sy.0211, message 88


From: "Harald Beyer-Arnesen" <haraldba-AT-online.no>
Subject: Re: AUT: Re: Russia without the Bolsheviks???
Date: Thu, 21 Nov 2002 07:59:25 +0100



----- Original Message -----
From: <Montyneill-AT-aol.com>
To: <aut-op-sy-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu>
Sent: 17. november 2002 18.13
Subject: Re: AUT: Re: Russia without the Bolsheviks???


I will try to get to your questions further down Monty.
First I would like to very briefly cover some other ground.

It would be interesting if Jens would be more
specific about  why he thinks the Russian revolution
was doomed from the start, and would have been
so *regardless of* what course had been taken. Or
in other words, what where according to him the
negative objective conditions that taken together
not only constituted a great, even enormous challenge
but also an impossible one? I could also pose the
question as: Do you with "objective conditions"
imply narrowly defined economical and military
factors alone, or do you include cultural factors
as well?

To add to the following, I think it is important when
addressing these questions to separate the issue if the
revolution could survive in isolation year after year,
and quesrion if it could have achieved and mantained
genuine socialist relations at least during a
considerable period. The latter was never achieved,
not even for 5 minutes. What existed for a very brief
period, might better described as a moment of
contested power, or simply a power vacuum.
        Even if the revolution had been lost in the end,
if something of the "real thing" had been allowed to
blossom for a while, this would also have made a
substantial long term difference, not only within the
realm of the old empire but globally.

My general viewpoint is, that while by taking the commanding
heights in October, the Bolshevik Party inherited a
crisis, this alone, nor other forces outside the
power of the new regime, cannot explain the depths
the crisis reached, nor the nature of the social
relations that developed. On the other hand, the
depth of the crisis can easily be explained by the
enormous disorganizational effects of the particular
Leninist (to give it a name) state capitalist (market)
politics-- idealist and utopian in the worst sense -- ,
where any relation between the map and terrain
most of the times is very hard to discover. Precisely
*because*  an economical  crisis already
existed, the political course also had such a
determining, and desasterous impact. In "normal
times" politics matter less. 
        I am not at all here taking into account the
Stalin period -- which I do not believe was bound
to follow in the way it did -- only what evolved
under the specific Leninist period, which was
desasterous enough in itself.
        Neither do the civil wars (in plural) explain
what happened, as these wars to very large degree
where a direct consequence of the politics followed,
not entirely, but their scale was. As Trotsky rightly
pointed out in the text forwarded by Scott, the 
Bolshevik Party did not exist in a vacuum, thus
their politics also had an effect and  radical impact
on the "objective conditions".  For one who as Trotsky
believed his Party represented  The "conscious factor"  in
history, this should not be too hard to understand.
If you jump from the Empire State Building, objective
conditions will almost certainly assure your death,
but it becomes somewhat more complex
explaining the reason for jumping. Acts tend to have
consequences. Not always agreeable ones.

When this is said, in historical terms the most
fundamental question remains, why was it that
the Bolsheviks became the dominant political
force (if not in the rural areas, nor for that in all urban
and industrial centres) in the last months of the
year 1917, and that the second most dominant
poltical forces at the time where the Socialist-
Revolutionaries (left, right and center) followed
by the Mensheviks?
 


So to your question,  Monty. You write:

"I largely agree with your short statement, Harald.
The question that emerges from your  text I block
above is: who is the <one> to do these many
necessary things? You note there are examples
of activity "from below" - but rather evidently, no
where near enough, not generalized or networked
or organized sufficiently either. Something similar
in terms of questions to be answered (what
<ones>?) albeit in many, many very different
particulars, is emerging in Argentina, I think. To
link to that thread, Scott suggests there could
be need for a repressive apparatus (sad but
most likely true) that he says should be demo-
cratically controlled (indeed) - but, how?
        "I have not even a suggestion of an answer
beyond the abstract and the formal - real answers
require real concrete knowledge and willingness
to investigate and think (the argentina solidarity
list serv noted a few days ago seems dominated
by folks who lack one, the other or both
requirements)."

I do find the comparison with South America
intersting, however much also the great differences,
as it seems to be the only continent that a
social revoltionary situation would at all be likely
to emerge in any near future. Unfortunately the
same cannot be said about the United States,
although if a generalized social revolutionary situation
was created in South America, this would almost
certainly also significantly radicalize the working
class within the United States, and as such
open up entirely new possibilities.
        I am all to ignorant about the situation in
Argentine etc to come up with anything but suggestive
answers on a general level. One thing I am
certain about is that an absolute precondition is
the creation of horisontal workers-to workers,
(as well as peasants-to-peasant and workers-to-
peasants) human links. The other, and in relations
to a question addressed on the list concerning
occupied factories, is that without as far as at all
possible breaking with the market logic, as well
as, and interlinked to this, statism, you will
not get very far (A critical lesson from 1917-18 is
precisely how interlinked statism is with the
continuation of the logic of the market).
        Related to what just said, it is critical to never
forget that a social revolution is a constructive
project or nothing.

The <one> to do these many necessary things?
If the above links first are firmly establised, then
the most important part of the answer gives itself.
This is also what poses the greatest challenge.
But without it, you can forget about a social
revolution, which is something much more than
a rebellion or uprising.
        All, those who believe this to be perhaps
the most fundamental issue, can do, is to
ecourage such developments, and spread informa-
tion about the concrete practice of those who
have already taken the first steps. In anyway a
social revolution is first and foremost about politics,
politics, politics, or in other words about human
communication, (at certain points also with
"counter-revolutionary elements," another important
lesson from 1917, as well as from 1936) about
social relations in a very literal sense. The more
such human links within the working classes are
already created, the more likely also a sucessful
outcome.
        The <one> can only be the <many>, or we
are not talking about a potential social revolution,
but the changing of the guards.
        [This is also why I insist on that while the
"objective conditions" can be for the better or
the worse, but never anywhere close to perfect,
without the subjective aspect, no social
revolution is possible. To become masters of our
own destinies can in the final and determining
instance never be anything but a subjective
project. It cannot be done in sleep. Also Jens
admits as much when writing that a potential
revolution in Germany and elsewhere was lost "not
because of the Bolshevics in Russia, but because
of the Socialdemocrats in Europe..." . For the
"Socialdemocrats in Europe" surely is a reference
to something much more than its leaders. This
is no way to deny that" the objective conditions"
do influence the subjective side of things. But if
that was all it was to it, if we were and only could
be mere reflections, or so to speak unreflected
reflections of circumstances beyond our control,
then we could also forget about revolution. Saying
that the subjective side is important is however
something else than (leninist) voluntarism. As
I have already suggested, I see the perhaps most
critical part of the subjective simply to be the
creations of spaces of human communication
where it is allowed to evolve and flourish. In
other words the creation of the objective conditions.
This again being related to individual and collective
confidence building.]

Otherwise is am still convinced that the basic
structures of anarcho-syndicalism (under whatever
label) and libertarian communist confederalism --
always with concrete adaptions on the level of
direct links to existing needs and conditions --
makes practical sense. The form does matter,
and the basics of what structures that will tend
to make libertarian communist course possible,
and what structures that will not, does not
change that much over time.  Calling for "All
power to the All-South-Americian Soviet of ..."
would for instance in effect be a counter-
revolutionary step, if acted upon.


Anyway, linked to the question of organizational
structure is getting an overview over what it is possible
to produce through co-ordinated combined forces
within Argentine, South America or whatever,
if isolated in terms of imports.
        That this is a question of skills and knowledge
too, should be unnecessary to say. Precisely on
this level, concrete solidarity from workers and
other sympathisers in other parts of the world might
prove to be of great importance. The internet  has
made this potentially easier. But also extra expertise
of flesh- and blood in various fields might prove
invaluable. A social revolution will entail a very
concrete technical aspect. Again it becomes crucial
not to think in market terms. If one does, one is bound
to fail, sooner rather than leter.
        It is very unlikely that it will be possible to deal
with the "outside world" in other than monetary 
erms. So a question that would have to be dis-
cussed and agreed upon is how large the sphere
of export/import need to be and what it should
consist of in concrete terms, but also how imported
products could be replaced by self-produced ones.
Again the question of knowledge and skills -- as
well as communication -- becomes a central issue.
Obviously this question will also be linked to how
widely the social revolution has spread in geo-
graphical and population terms. There certainly is
a great difference between Argentina, Brazil and
Chile, and Venuzuela with its oil-resources for that,
and Guatemala; Columbia  and Bolivia.

As for U.S military intervention, I will generally claim
-- pardoxically but logically -- that the more anarchistic/
communistic the revolution,  then also the greater the
change to reduce such intervention to a minimum.
This is of course directly related to the opposition it
will meet from the working class in the United States
Yet another Leninist/statist project will certainly be
met by the greater part of the working class in the U.S.
in a whole other way than genuinly libertarian
social revolutionary project would. A sure way to kill
the revolution simultanelusly from within and without
would be through "red terror" and other such forms of
"biological warfare".

"Scott suggests there could be need for a
repressive apparatus," you write. I ask, for what -- 
and the answer is far from obvious -- and at
what cost? At least I would like to know 
very precisly what is meant by an "oppressive
apparatus" here.
        Of course I can think of quite a few in South
America that will need to be disarmed, and very
likely they will not all do so voluntarily. Though part
of these armed forces might simple crumble, and many
change sides. The potential scenario we are
talking about is after all NOT yet another Che
Guevarist/Maoist or whatever guerilla group. That
would be doomed.
        Militias? Perhaps, even very probably, though
these should not be romantized. I would suggest
they be put under the direct control of grandmothers,
delegated by  community organizations. I am serious. 
It need not only be grandmothers of course, it might
be grandfathers and other persons in the community
that wield an authority/respect not rooted in brute
force. I've seen numerous of examples of people who
otherwise act as they do not understand any other
language than violence, turn meek as a lamb
confronted with the face or voice of such authorities.
        I would further suggest they are only given a
defence function, and not generally "law and order"
functions, and futher that the members of the militias
rotate, and that they are dissolved altogether -- temporarily
or more permanenenty -- when an emergency situation
passes. What in the final end will determining factor
is however the mentality one manages to create in
the process. Thus also the importance of such people
as for insatnce grandmothers.
        Some things undoubtly will have to be improvised
in relation to the concrete situation. A critical aspect
being the co-ordination of such forces when needed.
And you certainly do not opt for the least experienced
if confronted with elite troops.
The moral authority of the communities (and "grand-
mothers") will in all circumstances be the determining
factor. The greater the awareness of the dangers in-
volved, so that preventive counter-measures can be
applied at every step, then also the less the probability
that these forces will constitute themselves as a force
apart from, and thus also increasingly in oppostion
to the (confederation of) communities.
        Another important aspect of this, all too often
forgotten, even if it is on this terrain a social revolution
will have its greatest potential force, is the morally
undermining of enemy forces from within. The February
revolution of 1917 (which involved far more fighting
than the October events) would never had suceeded
without it. What turned out to become one of the
greatest defeats of the CNT, was that they never had
given the petty-bourgeoisie much thought. They thus
become recruiting ground for both the Fascist and
Stalinist forces. Again the importance of politics and
thinking in terms of social relations. By conqeuring
minds -- at least too the point of "neutrality" -- you also
reduce the numbers of guns that will directed against you.
That is one of the reasons why "red terror" always
works counter-revolutionary.
        And at last, one of the most decisive "battles,"
if a social revolutionary situation were to develop and
spread in South America, would have to be fought
in the United States.

Harald













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