Date: Mon, 6 Jan 2003 12:08:25 +1100 (EST)
From: =?iso-8859-1?q?Richard=20Collins?= <richard_collins1-AT-yahoo.com.au>
Subject: Re: AUT: Midnight Notes and East Timor


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"There is no indication of that Falintil, had they acted, would have been any match
for the Indonesian army in military terms, nor that they would have been capable to defend anybody at all, except in the jungle. It is very hard to take the rest seriously if this "solution" is not even considered, which to me unfortuntaly appear to
be a far more realistic one than your scenario above. But if you have evidence suggesting the contrary, please let us know."
You may be write on this. I was speculating based on the success of the resistance up 1999. The combination of military resistance in the jungles and strikes and street protests in the towns had created a serious crisis for Indonesia. The crisis in Indonesia in 1998 both spurred the East Timorese on and weakened Indonesia's ability to crack down.
The result of the crisis in Indonesia was a significant weakening of the Military's position in politics. This ground has since been regained somewhat but this is an important consideration.
Combine this with an Australian government that was at least as concerned with "preserving order" in the region as it was with appeasing Indonesia and you have a situation where it would have been difficult for Indonesia to crack down in East Timor without Australian backing.
But remember this is speculation.
 
"What about the very likely alternative, that you do not even consider, that they would not left at all. Or does there here enter an undue confidence in Western powers? That they would made sure the Indonesian troops left in all circumstances, and that no massacres on a far larger scale would take place? What evidence to you have for that the massacres had not continued, and even on a larger scale, had not the U.N. troops been sent in?"
 
The combination of the struggle in East Timor and in Indonesia through 1998 and 1999 had created a crisis in East Timor. This crisis lead the Australian government and the Indonesian government to concede a ballot on independence to the East Timorese. This is a concession with neither of them wanted to give but the struggle had made them decide this was their best option.
This makes me think that Indonesia's presents in East Timor had become untenable. The Indonesians made one last attempt to intimidate the East Timorese into voting against independence but this was never going to work.
So I think that we can reasonably assume that Indonesia was coming out of ET, the question was how. Gusmao and Ramos Horta went for the passive UN-paved way that secured their position in the new East Timor. In my (speculative) opinion their was another option, they could have called up a revolutionary uprising. In 1974 pro-Indonesian groups in East Timor attempted to stage a coup after Fretilin won elections. In response Fretilin called for an insurection and the East Timorese repsonded and they took over. Admittedly the Indonesians invaded soon after but this with Suharto at the height of his power the weak and divided Indonesia on 1999.
 
"Let us say that the Australian and other governments had made it clear that they would not enter under any circumstances. Would not that have changed anything on the ground? Again, it appears that you actually rely on the "good will" of Western powers. Somehow this is incalculated as a literally vital part of the premises,
in fact too a far greater extent than I ever even would dreamt of. To some degree it is correct to do so, as these governments are also under political pressure, but
I would never rely on it to the extent that you implictly appear to do."
I'm not sure what you are getting at here. I never imputted "goodwill" on Australia going in, I believe it was purely aimed at serving their best interests by asserting themselves militarily in the region, promoting domestic militarism and ensuring a compliant independent East Timor.
Had Australia refused flattly to intervene this would have changed things. A decision like that would signal Australian approval for an Indonesian crack down. It would be code for "We are not going to do anything so do what ever is necessary". This is what happened in 1975. The Australian government knew of the planned invasion. Obviously they couldn't publicly say "Indonesia you are free to invade" so they used silence as tacit approval.
I don't believe this was a possibility. If it was the Australian government would have taken it. As I said abaove the combined crises in Indonesia and East Timor had removed this option.
"One last comment. So far, every contributor to this discussion who have strongly argued that we should have fought to keep the U.N. troops from going to East Timor, appear to magically have dreamt the Indonesian armed forces away. It is almost if as they never even where there in the first place. This kind of Western-centrism is in fact a very common psycological trait among liberals and the left, however you define either term"

I hope my comments above had fixed this deficiency with my original post. I don't wish the Indo military away. I think the people of ET and the students and urban poor of Indo did this themselves.

Richard



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"There is no indication of that Falintil, had they acted, would have been any match
for the Indonesian army in military terms, nor that they would have been capable to defend anybody at all, except in the jungle. It is very hard to take the rest seriously if this "solution" is not even considered, which to me unfortuntaly appear to
be a far more realistic one than your scenario above. But if you have evidence suggesting the contrary, please let us know."

You may be write on this. I was speculating based on the success of the resistance up 1999. The combination of military resistance in the jungles and strikes and street protests in the towns had created a serious crisis for Indonesia. The crisis in Indonesia in 1998 both spurred the East Timorese on and weakened Indonesia's ability to crack down.

The result of the crisis in Indonesia was a significant weakening of the Military's position in politics. This ground has since been regained somewhat but this is an important consideration.

Combine this with an Australian government that was at least as concerned with "preserving order" in the region as it was with appeasing Indonesia and you have a situation where it would have been difficult for Indonesia to crack down in East Timor without Australian backing.

But remember this is speculation.

"What about the very likely alternative, that you do not even consider, that they would not left at all. Or does there here enter an undue confidence in Western powers? That they would made sure the Indonesian troops left in all circumstances, and that no massacres on a far larger scale would take place? What evidence to you have for that the massacres had not continued, and even on a larger scale, had not the U.N. troops been sent in?"

The combination of the struggle in East Timor and in Indonesia through 1998 and 1999 had created a crisis in East Timor. This crisis lead the Australian government and the Indonesian government to concede a ballot on independence to the East Timorese. This is a concession with neither of them wanted to give but the struggle had made them decide this was their best option.

This makes me think that Indonesia's presents in East Timor had become untenable. The Indonesians made one last attempt to intimidate the East Timorese into voting against independence but this was never going to work.

So I think that we can reasonably assume that Indonesia was coming out of ET, the question was how. Gusmao and Ramos Horta went for the passive UN-paved way that secured their position in the new East Timor. In my (speculative) opinion their was another option, they could have called up a revolutionary uprising. In 1974 pro-Indonesian groups in East Timor attempted to stage a coup after Fretilin won elections. In response Fretilin called for an insurection and the East Timorese repsonded and they took over. Admittedly the Indonesians invaded soon after but this with Suharto at the height of his power the weak and divided Indonesia on 1999.

"Let us say that the Australian and other governments had made it clear that they would not enter under any circumstances. Would not that have changed anything on the ground? Again, it appears that you actually rely on the "good will" of Western powers. Somehow this is incalculated as a literally vital part of the premises,
in fact too a far greater extent than I ever even would dreamt of. To some degree it is correct to do so, as these governments are also under political pressure, but
I would never rely on it to the extent that you implictly appear to do."

I'm not sure what you are getting at here. I never imputted "goodwill" on Australia going in, I believe it was purely aimed at serving their best interests by asserting themselves militarily in the region, promoting domestic militarism and ensuring a compliant independent East Timor.

Had Australia refused flattly to intervene this would have changed things. A decision like that would signal Australian approval for an Indonesian crack down. It would be code for "We are not going to do anything so do what ever is necessary". This is what happened in 1975. The Australian government knew of the planned invasion. Obviously they couldn't publicly say "Indonesia you are free to invade" so they used silence as tacit approval.

I don't believe this was a possibility. If it was the Australian government would have taken it. As I said abaove the combined crises in Indonesia and East Timor had removed this option.

"One last comment. So far, every contributor to this discussion who have strongly argued that we should have fought to keep the U.N. troops from going to East Timor, appear to magically have dreamt the Indonesian armed forces away. It is almost if as they never even where there in the first place. This kind of Western-centrism is in fact a very common psycological trait among liberals and the left, however you define either term"

I hope my comments above had fixed this deficiency with my original post. I don't wish the Indo military away. I think the people of ET and the students and urban poor of Indo did this themselves.

Richard