File spoon-archives/aut-op-sy.archive/aut-op-sy_2003/aut-op-sy.0302, message 215


From: "Harald Beyer-Arnesen" <haraldba-AT-online.no>
Subject: AUT: reasons for war
Date: Wed, 19 Feb 2003 07:02:52 +0100



----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Tom Messmer" <messmer-AT-endpage.com>
To: <aut-op-sy-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu>
Sent: 17. februar 2003 01.44
Subject: AUT: SF March/extended rantoid


What is the reason for going to war on Iraq?
Well, it is very unlikely that there is only one
reason, and it is very likely that it is a blend
of rational and irrational/ideological ones. One
may for instance ask would it in this case had
made a difference if Al Gore had been elected
president? I suspect it just might.

One pretty obvious reason is that Iraq is the
most geo-strategical important state in the
so-called Middle East -- apart from its own
oil resources, bordering on Turkey, Iran, Kuwait,
Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Syria -- and unlike
the oil-dynasties of  of the Arabian Peninsula
is is "real country". And September 11 certainly
has not made the confidence among the U.S.
elite in relying on Saudi-Arabia alone any
greater.
        The advantage of Iraq -- that it is "real
country" --  is however also the problem. It will
never be possible to achieve the kind of class
compostion chracteristic for the oil-dynasties
of the Arabian peninsula there.
        It would be perfect as a protectorate, But
that would require a colonial style permanent
military presence.
        If they only want to maintain a "friendly regime," it is
a question of how greedy they can be, even if they have
the great advantage in that most of the Iraqi oil industry
and infrastructure will need to be rebuilt, which again
produces the need for foreign finances, or in other words
a pretty perfect blackmail situation. I suspect it is this
last scenario they are imagining.  It just might work. But
I am not too sure. Iraq could as easily prove a far greater
headache than the Arabian Peninsula.

Tom wrote: "I heard Ahmed Rashid  analyze the Bush
administration's stance the other day and he seemed to
feel that while there is a component related to Oil, Iraq
is already ready and willing to sell us all the oil we'd ever
want, its not as if the Iraqi regime has ever balked at
selling anything to anyone! ..."

The last is obvious. Oil is pretty useless as a commodity if
not sold. In normal times larger oil exporting economies
would also have pretty much the same economical intererest
as capitalists in North America, European Union, Japan
and so on, as they tend to invest much of their petrodollars
in these markets. As some might remember even Ghadaffi
and Co owned a large share of FIAT for a while. They also
generally will have a shared intererest in price predictability,
while in important aspect a greater shared interest with the
multi-national oil companies  -- in maintaining relative
high prices, than with the industry in general, more interested
in lower prices.
         From the question such as nationalization and "national
control" of oil resources this might however look quite
differerent..


If your look at this from the point of securing the position
as the main mover in the global power games -- from
a economical military and power for the hell of it point
view -- a more direct control of the main region of oil-
resources on a global scale -- should not be under-
estimated. It is very unlikely that U.S. foreign policy would
be based on the assumption that all conflicts between
major powers will be solved through some pseudo-neutral
"international law" for all future, and where being good
at selling commodities is all that counts. They even know
all too well that things are not like that now. added to this
is almost certainly the psycological part of U.S. self-
reliancy and the combination oil-cars-airplanes as an
essential part of the "American way of life".

On the other hand. Is this game really possible much
longer? It is hard to tell but the logic of it sems allmost
too colonial to be realistic in the long term. And China
seem to be moving pretty fast ahead. A full confrontation
with the European Community/Russia  also seem to
be a bit more than realistically can be swallowed on
home grown.


"What if there is relatively little loss of life ... ?" Thomas
asks. That to me seems only plausible if the regime
falls apart only as soon as the war begins. This is a
real possibility, if not the most likely. And it is far
from sure that it would create the situation easiest for
US-British forces to control. On the contrary.

Should it be a question of "how do we police Iraq, or
better, how are we to police the world?" then it would
be rational to enter a process which bit by bit leads
to the same kind of independence-dependence
as the more sucessful Asian economies. The creation
of a new South Korea might of course be the bright
thing to do -- and Iraq might also have the potentials -- but
I have extremely hard to imagine the Bush
administration thinking in such terms. Blair might
talk about it. But talk is it also all it will be.
        Bush and Co seem completly absorbed by the idea of war,
conquest and US greatness, and real and imagined threats 
to that greatness and "way of life" seen around every corner:.
Still defending the Alamo.


The defence of the holy dollar is also as others remarked
part of this. Though in the short term it might be hard to see
why its position should rely on going to war on Iraq. Saddam
certainly would be more than glad for some more of
those petrodollars. Stil it links up with the rest. And in longer
term perspective it makes sense.

The recycling of the acculmulation argument of  George Monibot --
how predictable from that corner -- I however do not give much
for. It is filled with contradictions.   

Harald.





     --- from list aut-op-sy-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---

   

Driftline Main Page

 

Display software: ArchTracker © Malgosia Askanas, 2000-2005