Date: Thu, 27 Feb 2003 09:47:40 -0500
From: Nicholas De Genova <npd18-AT-columbia.edu>
Subject: Mike Davis on the "revolution in military affairs" 
To: undisclosed-recipients:;



SLOUCHING TOWARD BAGHDAD....
>By Mike Davis
>
>Imperial Washington, like Berlin in the late 1930s, has become a
>psychedelic capital where one megalomaniacal hallucination
>succeeds another.  Thus, in addition to creating a new
>geopolitical order in the Middle East, we are now told by the
>Pentagon's deepest thinkers that the invasion of Iraq will also
>inaugurate "the most important 'revolution in military affairs' (or
>RMA) in two hundred years."
>
>According to Admiral William Owen, a chief theorist of the
>revolution, the first Gulf War was "not a new kind of war, but the
>last of the old ones."   Likewise, the air wars in Kosovo and
>Afghanistan were only pale previews of the postmodern blitzkrieg
>that will be unleashed against the Baathist regime.  Instead of old-
>fashioned sequential battles, we are promised nonlinear "shock
>and awe."
>
>Although the news media will undoubtedly focus on the sci-fi
>gadgetry involved - thermobaric bombs, microwave weapons,
>unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), PackBot robots, Stryker fighting
>vehicles, and so on - the truly radical innovations (or so the war
>wonks claim) will be in the organization and, indeed, the very
>concept of the war.
>
>In the bizarre argot of the Pentagon's Office of Force
>Transformation (the nerve center of the revolution), a new kind of
>"warfighting ecosystem" known as "network centric warfare" (or
>NCW) is slouching toward Baghdad to be born.   Promoted by
>military futurists as a "minimalist" form of warfare that spares lives
>by replacing attrition with precision, NCW may in fact be the
>inevitable road to nuclear war.
>
>FROM DESERT STORM TO WAL-MART
>
>Military "revolutions" based on new technology, of course, have
>come and gone since air-power fanatics like Giulio Douhet, Billy
>Mitchell, and Hugh Trenchard first proclaimed the obsolescence
>of traditional armies and battleship navies in the early 1920s.  This
>time, however, the superweapon isn't a long-distance bomber or
>nightmare H-bomb but the ordinary PC and its ability, via the
>Internet, to generate virtual organization in the "battlespace" as well
>as the marketplace.
>
>Like all good revolutionaries, the Pentagon advocates of RMA/
>NCW are responding to the rot and crisis of an ancien regime.
>Although Gulf War I was publicly celebrated as a flawless victory
>of technology and alliance politics, the real story was vicious
>infighting among American commanders and potentially
>disastrous breakdowns in decision-making. Proponents of high-
>tech warfare, like the 'smart bomb' attacks on Baghdad's
>infrastructure, clashed bitterly with heavy-metal traditionalists, while
>frustrated battlefield CEO Norman Schwarzkopf threw stupefying
>tantrums.
>
>The battles continued back in the Pentagon where the
>revolutionaries -- mostly geekish colonels bunkered in a series of
>black-box think tanks -- found a powerful protector in Andrew
>Marshall, the venerable head of research and technology
>assessment.  In 1993, Marshall - a guru to both Dick Cheney and
>leading Democrats - provided the incoming Clinton administration
>with a working paper that warned that Cold War weapons
>"platforms" like Nimitz-class aircraft carriers and heavy tank battle
>groups were becoming obsolete in face of precision weapons and
>cruise missiles.
>
>Marshall instead proselytized for cheaper, quicker, smarter
>weapons that took full advantage of American leadership in
>information technology.  He warned, however, that "by perfecting
>these precision weapons, America is forcing its enemies to rely
>on terrorist activities that are difficult to target."  He cast doubt on
>the ability of the Pentagon's fossilized command hierarchies to
>adapt to the challenges of so-called "asymmetric warfare."
>
>The revolutionaries went even further, preaching that the potentials
>of 21st century war-making technology were being squandered
>within 19th century military bureaucracies. The new military forces
>of production were straining to break out of their archaic relations
>of production. They viciously compared the Pentagon to one of the
>"old economy" corporations -- "hardwired, dumb and top-heavy" --
>that were being driven into extinction in the contemporary "new
>economy" marketplace.
>
>Their alternative?  Wal-Mart, the Arkansas-based retail leviathan.  It
>may seem odd, to say the least, to nominate a chain store that
>peddles cornflakes, jeans and motor oil as the model for a leaner,
>meaner Pentagon, but Marshall's think-tankers were only following
>in the footsteps of management theorists who had already
>beatified Wal-Mart as the essence of a "self-synchronized
>distributed network with real-time transactional awareness."
>Translated, this means that the stores' cash registers
>automatically transmit sales data to Wal-Mart's suppliers and that
>inventory is managed through 'horizontal' networks rather than
>through a traditional head-office hierarchy.
>
>"We're trying to do the equivalent in the military," wrote the authors
>of Network Centric Warfare: developing and leveraging information
>superiority, the 1998 manifesto of the RMA/NCW camp that
>footnotes Wal-Mart annual reports in its bibliography.  In
>"battlespace," mobile military actors (ranging from computer
>hackers to stealth bomber pilots) would be the counterparts of
>Wal-Mart's intelligent salespoints.
>
>Instead of depending on hardcopy orders and ponderous chains
>of commands, they would establish "virtual collaborations"
>(regardless of service branch) to concentrate overpowering
>violence on precisely delineated targets.  Command structures
>would be "flattened" to a handful of generals, assisted by
>computerized decision-making aides, in egalitarian dialogue with
>their "shooters.'"
>
>The iconic image, of course, is the Special Forces op in Pathan
>drag using his laptop to summon air strikes on a Taliban position
>that another op is highlighting with his laser designator. To NCW
>gurus, however, this is still fairly primitive Gunga Din stuff. They
>would prefer to "swarm" the enemy terrain with locust-like myriads
>of miniaturized robot sensors and tiny flying video cams whose
>information would be fused together in a single panopticon picture
>shared by ordinary grunts in their fighting vehicles as well as by
>four-star generals in their Qatar or Florida command posts.
>
>Inversely, as American "battlespace awareness" is exponentially
>increased by networked sensors, it becomes ever more important
>to blind opponents by precision air strikes on their equivalent (but
>outdated) "command and control" infrastructures.  This
>necessarily means a ruthless takeout of civilian
>telecommunications, power grids, and highway nodes: all the
>better, in the Pentagon view, to allow American psy-op units to
>propagandize, or, if necessary, terrorize the population.
>
>THE PENTAGON'S WHIRLING DERVISHES
>
>Critics of RMA/NCW have compared it to a millennial cult,
>analogous to bible-thumping fundamentalism or, for that matter, to
>Al Queda.  Indeed, reading ecstatic descriptions of how "Metcalfe's
>Law" guarantees increases of "network power proportional to the
>square of the number of nodes,'" one wonders what the wonks are
>smoking in their Pentagon basement offices.  (Marshall,
>incidentally, advocates using behavior-modifying drugs to create
>Terminator-like 'bioengineered soldiers.')
>
>Their most outrageous claim is that Clausewitz's famous "fog of
>war" -- the chaos and contingency of the battlefield -- can be
>dispelled by enough sensors, networks, and smart weapons.
>Thus vice-admiral Arthur Cebrowski, the Pentagon director for
>"force transformation," hallucinates that "in only a few years, if the
>the technological capabilities of America's enemies remain only
>what they are today, the US military could effectively achieve total
>"battlespace knowledge."
>
>Donald Rumsfeld, like Dick Cheney (but unlike Colin Powell), is a
>notorious addict of RNA/NCW fantasies (already enshrined as
>official doctrine by the Clinton administration in 1998).  By opening
>the floodgates to a huge military budget (almost equal to the rest
>of the world's military spending combined), 9.11 allowed
>Rumsfeld to go ahead with the revolution while buying off the
>reactionaries with funding for their baroque weapons systems,
>including three competing versions of a new tactical fighter. The
>cost of the compromise - which most Democrats have also
>endorsed - will be paid for by slashing federal spending on
>education, healthcare, and local government.
>
>A second Iraq war, in the eyes of the RNA/NCW zealots, is the
>inevitable theater for demonstrating to the rest of the world that
>America's military superiority is now unprecedented and
>unduplicable.  Haunted by the 1993 catastrophe in Mogadishu,
>when poorly armed Somali militia defeated the Pentagon's most
>elite troops, the war wonks have to show that networked
>technology can now prevail in labyrinthine street warfare.
>To this end, they are counting on the combination of battlefield
>omniscience, smart bombs, and new weapons like microwave
>pulses and nausea gases to drive Baghdadis out of their homes
>and bunkers.  The use of "non-lethal" (sic) weapons against
>civilian populations, especially in light of the horror of what
>happened during the Moscow hostage crisis last October, is a war
>crime waiting to happen.
>
>But what if the RNA/NCW's Second Coming of Warfare doesn't
>arrive as punctually promised?  What happens if the Iraqis or
>future enemies find ways to foil the swarming sensors, the night-
>visioned Special Forces, the little stair-climbing robots, the
>missile-armed drones?   Indeed, what if some North Korean
>cyberwar squad (or, for that matter, a fifteen-year-old hacker in Des
>Moines) manages to crash the Pentagon's "system of systems"
>behind its battlespace panopticon?
>
>If the American war-fighting networks begin to unravel (as partially
>occurred in February 1991), the new paradigm - with its "just in
>time" logistics and its small "battlefield footprint" - leaves little
>backup in terms of traditional military reserves.  This is one
>reason why the Rumsfeld Pentagon takes every opportunity to
>rattle its nuclear saber.
>
>Just as precision munitions have resurrected all the mad
>omnipotent visions of yesterday's strategic bombers, RNA/NCW is
>giving new life to monstrous fantasies of functionally integrating
>tactical nukes into the electronic battlespace.  The United States, it
>should never be forgotten, fought the Cold War with the permanent
>threat of "first use" of nuclear weapons against a Soviet
>conventional attack.  Now the threshold has been lowered to Iraqi
>gas attacks, North Korean missile launches, or, even, retaliation
>for future terrorist attacks on American city.
>
>For all the geekspeak about networks and ecosystems, and
>millenarian boasting about minimal, robotic warfare, the United
>States is becoming a terror state pure and simple: a 21st century
>Assyria with laptops and modems.
>
>Mike Davis is the author of City of Quartz, Ecology of Fear, and most 
>recently, Dead Cities, among other works.  He now lives in San Diego.



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