Date: Sun, 15 Aug 1999 07:33:54 -0700 (PDT) From: Paul Bryant <levi_bryant-AT-yahoo.com> Subject: Re: silence J. Foster-- Apologies for interrupting this thread, but I have a few question regarding your remarks on concepts. --- "J. Foster" <borealis-AT-mail.wellsgray.net> wrote: <The concept is timeless, but is it a general concept <openfor discussion, or <is it an absolute concept that is not open for <discussion?Is this concept <yours alone or is it shared? As a rule, absolute <andgeneral concepts have <the power to annul time. Since philosophy does <notconstruct concepts but <merely defines or explains concepts, perhaps you can <tellme how something <like masculinity can be defined in this way? You <supplied asimple predicate <timelessness but you have not demonstrated a proof <yet. Howwould that be <done is my question? Mathematics supplies <rigorousdefinitions to supportive <of proofs, it is axiomatic in definition, but in <philosophythere is no such <rigour. Mathematics constructs concepts, while <philosophylooks on only. <Philosophy in large part only corrects the <understanding ofconcepts, and it <does not create concepts. Your concept of man thus <isdiscursive since it is <not self-evident that masculinity is timeless in a <purestate. What is meant <by timeless? Minimally, it seems to me that your remarks on the difference between mathematical and philosophical approaches to concepts presuppose a particular concept of what a concept is. This is especially evident in your claims that mathematics offers rigorous proofs for its concepts, whereas philosophy does not. The claim that one ought to provide a proof for a concept strikes me as particularly strange. We do not prove concepts, but conclusions following from particular sets of propositions. Perhaps you can elaborate a bit more on what you believe a concept is and what it means to prove a concept. Secondly, what is the difference between constructing a concept and analyzing a concept, and why does the former practice only belong to mathematics? Your statement that philosophy only analyzes concepts seems to lead to one of two conclusions: Either (1) on concepts are created by mathematics and thus philosophy is parasitic on mathematics insofar as it analyzes the concepts produced by mathematics (a rather strange consequence insofar as we are then led to wonder what rigour mathematics could possibly have if it has not analyzed its own concepts, or (2) the concepts that philosophy analyzes are natural kinds or essences that are simply there at hand to be analyzed. Either of these results follows from your initial claim that only mathematics constructs concepts. But it's also questionable to assert that philosophy constructs no concepts of its own. Certainly Descartes concept of the Cogito, Spinoza's concept of Conatus, Kant's concept of a Transcendental Condition, Hegel's concept of a Dialectical Contradiction, or even Bataille's concept of Death are not merely the result of analysis but represent real constructions and interventions in the field of discursivity... Which is to say that they represent interventions in a Problem in much the same sense that mathematical constructions intervene on a Problem. Finally, the claim that a concept remains discursive is tautologous and doesn't really represent any counter-argument to the timelessness of a concept. Discursivity and conceptuality just are the same thing. Your suggestion seems to be that the discursivity renders it arbritrary or contingent in nature. Is that really the case? Just as in mathematical construction, there are many "conceptual" solutions to a particular problem, so too in philosophy we can imagine that there are many conceptual productions that are adequate to a problem. The fact that there are many solutions to a problem in no way counts as evidence against the solution, but only demonstrates that a solution admits of many actualizations that are nonetheless timeless. Demonstrating that Marsha's concept of Man is contingent and arbritrary depends on much more than simply showing that there are other competing concepts of Man... It would consist in demonstrating that these concepts (1) arise out of the same problem space, since problematicity is a necessary condition for the construction of concepts, and (2) that the concepts (actualities) that arise out of this problem space are actually at odds with one another or represent solutions to a *false problem*. Paul _________________________________________________________ Do You Yahoo!? Get your free -AT-yahoo.com address at http://mail.yahoo.com
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