Date: Fri, 19 May 2000 20:33:46 -0400
Subject: Re: Can Postmodernism Survive?


Something like this:  No one can speak properly about that which nothing can
be said, but rationality (discourse) totalises and speaks about all that is,
as if all that is can be said.  Postmodernism moves in and against the
discourse of reason in relation to the possibility of the unsayable.



David Schenk wrote:

> *cough*
>
> Perhaps I should back up a bit.  It seems my post was rather widely
> misunderstood both in its content and its intent.  I realize that a
> significant number of people on lists such as these are accustomed to
> employing a wide variety of rhetorical devices, one of which is to ask
> leading questions as a strategy for casting aspersions on some
> philosophical position or figure.  I *AM* **NOT** doing that.  The
> question presented in the title is sincere and right now I just don't know
> what its answer will be.
>
> First and foremost I want to make sure I put all my cards on the table so
> no one feels compelled to worry about the possibility of some nefarious
> ulterior motives, or whatever. :P To that end, I want to post a short note
> thanking everyone who responded for responding, especially those who did
> so with the goal of helping me come to terms with some of these questions
> and the relevant material, but I also want to make a few disclaimers in
> light of the more heated and even angry responses I got.  Specific
> responses to those messages that interest me will follow sometime over the
> next few days.  Right now I'm a bit too busy for that, as it will take a
> while.  Sooo......
>
> (1)  Apparently I ruffled a few feathers with my post.  I did not intend
>      to offend or irritate anyone with this.  When I say I am trying to
>      understand and when I say I do not wish to be combative or rude, I
>      mean it.  If I did come off as combative, I must apologize for that.
>
> (2)  As for the principle of charity, I *am* employing it.  If I am guilty
>      of anything, it is simple naivete about the views in question.  In
>      connection with this, I would dearly love to discuss the varieties of
>      kinds of reasons with John Ransom and any other interested parties,
>      along with a discussion of the nature of rationality and whether or
>      not the term is polyvalent, and if so to what extent and finally,
>      well, so what?
>
> (3)  I know virtually nothing of Bataille aside from a few bits that a
>      friend explained to me.  I posted to the Bataille list simply because
>      I am told he's considered a bigwig among American postmodernists.
>      Apparently, the Spoon Collective has no POMO-l, and certainly no
>      analytic-philosopher-meets-POMO-l.  Its too bad.  Both could serve
>      very noble purposes.
>
> (4)  I really don't care much about "winning" or "losing" various
>      arguments or rhetorical flame wars, here, so either drop your swords
>      or go ahead and run me through with them-- I seriously don't care.
>      In this spirit, I will make the preemptive move of declaring
>      everyone else victors over me so we can forget about it and get on
>      with what matters.  I have seen too many otherwise promising
>      discussions decay into flame wars and ad hominens.  Frankly, it's
>      depressing.  It's also kind of dumb.
>
> (5)  I _do_ have definite views about this, and my tentative position is
>      that postmodernism and poststructuralism are intellectually untenable
>      for much the same reason that the theories of philosophers like Kuhn,
>      Feyerabend, Sellars, and the later Wittgenstein are intellectually
>      untenable.  Nonetheless, I am *NOT* wedded to this claim.  In all my
>      philosophical studies I have a standing policy of leaving the door
>      open to theories I consider implausible.  How else could I have
>      changed my mind about so much over the past ten years?  I mean,
>      heavensakes, I started out actually believing that moral values are
>      _relative_ way back when...
>
> (6)  I am unimpressed by appeals to the fact that the laws of reason do
>      not rationally justify themselves.  That strikes me as a line of
>      argument structurally (and intellectually) akin to the argument
>      whereby the proposition "there is no truth" is shown to be
>      self-defeating, thus refuting global relativism or social or
>      linguistic constructivism or the "Strong Programme" or whatever
>      folks choose to call it around here.  It is cheaper than a cheap
>      stunt. <<2>> On the other hand, I most certainly am impressed by any
>      nice clean, tidy, formally valid arguments the conclusions of which
>      go something like "the laws of reason are not universally binding,"
>      or "the laws of reason cannot be known to be universally binding," or
>      even better "the laws of reason can be proven not to be universally
>      binding."  I mean, even Descartes in Med. I and Hume in his Treatise
>      gave us good reasons to worry about that.  In connection with this, I
>      am very interested in the reply from John Ransom.  If it can be made
>      to go, it strikes as one of the most promising lines of argument,
>      though we will have to evaluate it for formal soundness.
>
>      Broadly speaking, what I'm wondering is whether or not an argument
>      similar to or better than the sort I allude to above might be found
>      somewhere between the pages of some book, article, or the plurals
>      thereof by Lyotard, Baudrillard, Bataille, Derrida, Foucault, Adorno,
>      or anybody else popularly associated with "postmodernism" and
>      "poststructuralism."  I'm quite familiar with the process of digging
>      genuine and good arguments out of the writings of philosophers who
>      are hostile to the notion of being understood by the rest of us.  I
>      spent ten years doing just that with Heidegger, and some of his
>      quasi-Kantian phenomenological arguments really are excellent.
>
> (6)  Part of my budding interest in postmodernism in general is the fact
>      that Ill be sitting in on a Heidegger seminar in the fall and I was
>      advised to go back and re-read some of these authors in connection
>      with him.  Additionally, a friend of mine in the Philosophy
>      Department espouses strong sympathy for postmodernism, and since I
>      know for a fact that he is not a supercilious dolt, I figure it's
>      likely the authors he admires aren't dolts either.  Seems plausible,
>      right?  Of course, many people who are not dolts are nonetheless
>      wrong, they just aren't stupidly wrong.
>
> (7)  For those who are more interested in being combative and verbally
>      beating up on a dyed-in-the-cloth analytic metaphysician, be my
>      guest.  My ego is located elsewhere, so I'm likely to be a very easy
>      and passive target.
>
> In conclusion, I should like to say that I am very pleased both by the
> volume and the nature of the responses I have received.  Several people
> were very gracious and helpful and furthermore it seems my stumbling
> efforts had the salutary effect of bringing new life to some lists that
> were very very dead for quite some time.  I just hope I can keep track of
> what information and which arguments on this matter are relevant to which
> lists over the coming months.
>
> Cheers,
>
> David Schenk
>
> --------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> <<1>> Regarding this, I suppose I should point out that Kuhn is NOT even
>       vaguely representative of where philosophy of science stands
>       today.  His views died a much-deserved death over twenty years
>       ago.  Scientific anti-realists would do better to look to Bas Van
>       Fraasen for the grist they seek.  I do not say this to chastise
>       anyone.  After all, just as I know very little of postmodernism
>       right now, it is only to be expected that many other people know
>       very little of contemporary philosophy of science.  As a hint, I
>       should mention that the field simply does not contain much talk
>       about "paradigms" nowadays, not the least because that has got to be
>       one of the most ill-formed and poorly defined concepts in the
>       business.
>
>       If anyone wants to get into the debates over Kuhn and philosophy of
>       science, I'd be happy to do so either via private email or at least
>       under a new heading for the posts.  A substantial chunk of my
>       dissertation is in the philosophy of science (someday Ill finish
>       that accursed thing... someday...) and I dare say that is a field I
>       know quite well.  If he is anything at all, Kuhn is an object lesson
>       in how not to be a logical positivist (that is what he was, after
>       all).
>
> <<2>> I will include an explanation of why such responses do not impress
>       me in my next post.  It is unfortunate that many people try to use
>       just such a strategy, because as arguments go it is a failure.