From: Erik Hoogcarspel <jehms-AT-globalxs.nl>
Date: Thu, 21 May 1998 14:52:34 +0100
Subject: Re: The existence of existence


Op 20-mei-98 schreef Soren Pedersen:


>What most postmodernists say, I presume, is that existence is the 
>condition of possibility of discourse (i.e. of being). Discourse must 
>be about something other than itself. It cannot be a causa sui, the 
>cause of its own cause. But this "other"-than-discourse can never be 
>approached in any linguistic or practical way without immidiately 
>being co-opted into a discourse. So the existence of something 
>"other"-than-discourse would have to be considered a 
>metaphysical theological claim; yes, I think I agree with you if 
>that's what you're saying, but then again, I've confused myself.

First of all I think the cause of a discourse is not what it's about. That
would be the reason. The cause of a discourse might be interesting for a
psychologist, but it shouldn't be interesting for participants (if it were,
they were making the 'ad hominem' mistake). The reason of a discourse, i.e. the subject and the engagement of authors, can only be stated in the discourse itself, if this happens, the discourse becomes reflective or philosophical. Montaigne already said that most books by far are about other books. Discourse is mostly about other discourses. Moreover a discourse always contains a censorship on certain questions about essence and existence, somethings are just supposed to exist and just this way. You cannot talk or think about everything in all possible ways. Even a discourse about discourses supposes the existence of discourses and all the ontological mumbo jumbo that comes with it. Semiosis is not lineair: it has no beginning and no end.

>"Existence can only be thought as relative", you say. Hmmm, wasn't it 
>Umberto Eco who once said that the only event that escapes semiosis 
>is death. If that's true, we can think of non-existence (death) as a 
>singular, authentic, unmediated, phenomenon. 

Come on, some deaths, like those of Socrates, Jesus and Lady Die, have been an occasion for an ocean of chitchat. And if you mean the personal death, do you want to follow Eco into a mediaeval or Heideggerian momento mori or being-unto-death? If my death is the end of semiosis for me, why would this be a moment for authenticity? Doesn't one have to be in the first place and moreover to be an author as well in order to be authentic?

The existence of 
>non-existence and, hey, isn't that exactly the definition of the 
>baudrillardian simulacrum. How nice - perhaps the simulacrum 
>represents the transcendental signified we all long for.

IMHO a simulacrum is something that exists and doesn't exist according to the same discourse. This becomes possible because language has become a brothel, discourses have continuous intercourse, they are full of holes and Gates, they don't have the assent of authors, they don't need it because money talks.


>Erik, I read your post through once more and came to the conclusion 
>that you conceptualize the existential world (the world apart from 
>human beings, i.e. what Bhaskar calls the intransitive realm) similar 
>to the way Saussure conceptualizes the linguistic realm. All 
>existential objects should be defined by "their non-coincidence with 
>the rest". This would make the concept of thing-in-itself senseless, 
>because everything would be relational. Perhaps this is the 
>Nietzschean world as will-to-power:

Sounds very Sartrian to me (cf. 'ane'antir'), in Buddhist philosophy it's called 'apoha': 'cow' = 'all but not 'cow''. I think Nietzsche came to very similar conclusions because of his meditations on perspectivism.

>The properties of a thing are effects on other "things": if one 
>removes other "things," then a thing has no properties, i.e., there 
>is no thing without other things, i.e., there is no 
>"thing-in-itself." (Will to Power, 557)

>Of course, Nietzsche forgot the singular existence of non-existence 
>and therefore of the Baudrillardian simulcrum, cf. my last post (ha 
>ha ha).

Hmmm, go easy on the aquavit, Soren. If nonexistence would exist then only relatively, in respect to existence being expected. When you are waiting for someone to come, there is a nonexistence of that person, there would also be a nonexistence of Mikey Mouse and of a herd of kangarous, but that's not an existing nonexistence ;=). To my mind a simulacrum exists, it's a sign, but it confirms and denies being a sign at the same time. It says 'I mean something, but don't ask me what'. Maybe you could call it a kind of semiotic bureaucracy (cf. Kafka): it's all about the procedure=2E

regards

erik