From: "Soren Pedersen" <speder-AT-post2.tele.dk>
Date: Sun, 6 Sep 1998 11:27:33 +0200
Subject: Re: nz,s worlds



> i'm sorry i've studied Nz for along tome and have never heard that he has
> proposed three worlds,he abolished the true and the apparent world and wants
> us to live in the "real"world if we can overcome our platonic-christian
> concepts and as for Baud it seems that he is taking Derridas' declaration
> that there is no nature to imply that simulacra are a reality and we should
> treat them as such,to quote'why wouldn't there be as many real worlds as
> there are imaginary ones?why would there be only one real world?'(radical
> thought).he goes on to say that only reality fanatics react negatively...
> and again i ask why does baud say that the truth complicates things ...
> my name is jeff and iam havoc
> i would be interested in your comments

It is, of course, against the whole spirit of Nietzsche to schematize 
or logicize his thoughts as I did in the last mail. But it is a good 
entry point to understand Baud's concept of simulation. In 'Reason 
in Philosophy' from Twilight, Nietzsche writes:

"The grounds upon which 'this' world has been designated as 
apparent establish rather its reality - another kind of reality is 
absolutely undemonstrable."

"The characteristics which have been assigned to the 'real being' 
og things are the characteristics of non-being, of nothingness - the 
'real world' has been constructed out of the contradiction to the 
actual world: an apparent world indeed, in so far as it is no more 
than a moral-optical illusion." ('real world' = 'true/metaphysical 
world' in Hollingdale's translation).

This is hard to decipher. There are three different worlds in play 
here, a true (real/metaphysical), apparent and actual world. There 
is reason to believe that Nietzsche thinks of the apparent and 
actual world as coincident, and that his wish to abolish the 
apparent world is a matter of linguistics (we should call the 
apparent world by its right name, i.e. an actual world). A 'real' 
abolisment of the apparent world would be the end of the world.

But only from the perspective of Nietzsche. Baudrillard sees no 
problem in abolishing the actual world. Surely, it is the end of the 
world, but we didn't notice (cf. his endless references to Canetti). 
So we could discuss: does the simulacrum exists? Baudrillard 
would say yes, "today reality itself is hyperrealist", or "an 
objectivity finally free of the object" (SED, p74/72). Baudrillard 
brings philosophy back on the right track. His aim is nothing less 
than an investigation into the "being of beings". What he finds is 
that the being of beings is nothingness.

The difference between Nietzsche and Baudrillard could also be 
explained in a different way. Nietzsche's beautiful account of 
metaphysical chaos at the end of the 'Will to Power' represents an 
accurate picture of the elimination of ontological space through 
transborder movements. We are no longer capable of imposing 
"upon becoming the character of being" (WP, 617), neither are we 
capable of living in a schizoid flow of difference (only data 
processing machines are). Thus, we have superimposed upon the 
cybernetic network, a logic of simulation that ensures our survival.

- Soren