Date: Thu, 11 Oct 2001 08:23:35 +0100 (BST)
From: =?iso-8859-1?q?anna=20miller?= <ruboutthewords-AT-yahoo.co.in>
Subject: Re: Baudrillard Dream


 11 October 2001 08:20 GMT+1 
 Home > Argument  > Commentators 

 Francis Fukuyama: We remain at the end of history

 'I remain right: modernity is a very powerful freight
train
 that will not be derailed by recent events, however
 painful'

 11 October 2001

 A stream of commentators has been asserting that the
tragedy
 of 11 September proves that I was utterly wrong to
have said
 more than a decade ago that we had reached the end of
 history. The chorus began almost immediately, with
George
 Will asserting that history had returned from
vacation, and
 Fareed Zakaria declaring the end of the end of
history.

 It is, on the face of it, nonsensical and insulting
to the memory
 of those who died on 11 September – as well as to
those who
 are now participating in military raids over
Afghanistan – to
 declare that this unprecedented attack did not rise
to the level
 of a historical event. But the way in which I used
the word
 "history" was different. It referred to the progress
of mankind
 over the centuries toward modernity, which is
characterised by
 institutions like liberal democracy and capitalism.

 My observation, made back in 1989 on the eve of the
collapse
 of communism, was that this evolutionary process did
seem to
 be bringing ever larger parts of the world toward
modernity. And
 if we looked beyond liberal democracy and markets,
there was
 nothing else towards which we could expect to evolve.
Hence
 the end of history. While there were retrograde areas
that
 resisted that process, it was hard to imagine an
alternative
 civilisation in which people would genuinely want to
live –
 particularly after socialism, monarchy, fascism, and
other
 varieties of authoritarian rule had been discredited.

 This view has been challenged by many people, and
perhaps
 most articulately by Samuel Huntington. He argued
that rather
 than progressing toward a single global system, the
world
 remained mired in a "clash of civilisations" where
six or seven
 large cultural groups coexist without converging and
constitute
 the new fracture lines of global conflict. Since the
successful
 attack on the centre of global capitalism was
evidently
 perpetrated by Islamic extremists unhappy with the
very
 existence of Western civilisation, observers have
been
 handicapping the Huntington "clash" view over my own
"end of
 history" hypothesis rather heavily.

 I believe that in the end I remain right. Modernity
is a very
 powerful freight train that will not be derailed by
recent events,
 however painful and unprecedented. Democracy and free
 markets will continue to expand over time as the
dominant
 organising principles for much of the world. But it
is worthwhile
 thinking about what the true scope of the present
challenge is.

 It has always been my belief that modernity has a
cultural
 basis. Liberal democracy and free markets do not work
at all
 times and everywhere. They work best in societies
with certain
 values, whose origins may not be entirely rational.
It is not an
 accident that modern liberal democracy emerged first
in the
 Christian West, since the universalism of democratic
rights can
 be seen in many ways as a secular form of Christian
 universalism.

 The central question raised by Mr. Huntington is
whether
 institutions of modernity will work only in the West,
or whether
 there is something broader in their appeal that will
allow them
 to make headway in non-Western societies. I believe
there is.
 The proof lies in the progress that democracy and
free markets
 have made in regions like East Asia, Latin America,
Orthodox
 Europe and South Asia. Proof is also offered by the
millions of
 Third World immigrants who vote with their feet every
year to
 live in Western societies and eventually assimilate
to Western
 values.

 But there does seem to be something about Islam, or
at least
 fundamentalist Islam, that makes Muslim societies
particularly
 resistant to modernity. Of all contemporary cultural
systems,
 the Islamic world has the fewest democracies (Turkey
alone
 qualifies), and contains no countries that have made
the
 transition from Third to First World status in the
manner of
 South Korea or Singapore.

 There are plenty of non-Westerners who prefer the
economic
 and technological part of modernity and hope to have
it without
 having to accept democratic politics or Western
cultural values
 as well (for example, China or Singapore). There are
others
 who like both the economic and political versions,
but just can't
 figure out how to make it happen (Russia is an
example). For
 them, transition to modernity may be long and
painful. But
 there are no insuperable cultural barriers likely to
prevent them
 from getting there.

 Islam, by contrast, is the only cultural system that
regularly
 seems to produce people, like Osama bin Laden or the
 Taliban, who reject modernity lock, stock and barrel.
This
 raises the question of how representative such people
are of
 the larger Muslim community. The answer that
politicians East
 and West have been putting out since 11 September is
that
 those sympathetic with the terrorists are a "tiny
minority" of
 Muslims. It is important for them to say this, to
prevent
 Muslims as a group from becoming targets of hatred.
The
 problem is that dislike and hatred of America and
what it
 stands for are clearly much more widespread than
that.

 Certainly the number of people willing to go on
suicide
 missions and actively conspire against the US is
tiny. But
 sympathy for them – feelings of schadenfreude at
collapsing
 towers, an immediate sense of satisfaction that the
US was
 getting what it deserved, to be followed only later
by pro forma
 expressions of disapproval – is characteristic of
much more
 than a "tiny minority" of Muslims. It extends from
the middle
 classes in countries like Egypt to immigrants in the
West.

 This broader dislike and hatred would seem to
represent
 something much deeper than mere opposition to
American
 policies like support for Israel, encompassing a
hatred of the
 underlying society. Perhaps, as many commentators
have
 speculated, the hatred is born out of a resentment of
Western
 success and Muslim failure. But rather than
psychologise the
 Muslim world, it makes more sense to ask whether
radical
 Islam constitutes a serious alternative to Western
liberal
 democracy.

 Even for Muslims themselves, political Islam has
proven much
 more appealing in the abstract than in reality. After
23 years of
 rule by fundamentalist clerics, most Iranians, in
particular
 nearly everyone under 30, would like to live in a far
more liberal
 society.

 All of the anti-American hatred that has been drummed
up
 does not translate into a viable political programme
that Muslim
 societies will be able to follow in the years ahead.

 We remain at the end of history because there is only
one
 system that will continue to dominate world politics
– that of
 the liberal-democratic West. This does not imply a
world free of
 conflict, or the disappearance of culture as a
distinguishing
 characteristic of societies. But the struggle we face
is not the
 clash of several distinct and equal cultures
struggling amongst
 one another like the great powers of 19th-century
Europe. The
 clash consists of a series of rearguard actions from
societies
 whose traditional existence is indeed threatened by
 modernisation. The strength of the backlash reflects
the
 severity of this threat. But time and resources are
on the side
 of modernity, and I see no lack of a will to prevail
in the West
 today.

  

 The writer is a professor of international political
economy at
 the John Hopkins School of Advanced International
Studies.
 This article first appeared in the 'Wall Street
Journal'

 ©

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