File spoon-archives/bhaskar.archive/bhaskar_1996/96-05-20.182, message 134


From: The Instant Intellectual <SPURRETT-AT-superbowl.und.ac.za>
Date: Mon, 15 Apr 1996 17:00:43 +0200 SAST
Subject: reading group: RTS preface


Greetings,

I've been somewhat slack regarding the reading group, and will remain 
so for at least two weeks more in virtue of ghastly levels of marking 
committments. (Some 300 essays, as well as tutorials, sob sob...)

Even so, I would like to get some textual discussion going, and given 
the shortage of copies of RTS figured a kind of summary would help.

Here follow some remarks on the RTS preface which may be of use:

---------------------------------------------------------------------
RTS NOTES: PREFACE

The Realist Theory of Science (RTS) preface is something which can be 
used in the case against the claim that Roy Bhaskar (RB) is a truly 
awful writer, since it is actually quite terse and clear, and even 
elegant at times. It is also a useful 'mission statement' at the 
beginning of his first major work, and what is still one of his most 
important.

Baskar opens by rejecting the once popular view that there were in 
fact no real problems of philosophy. (It is clear enough that he has 
the later Wittgenstein in mind here.) He insists that this 
'interesting' view is particularly deficient when it comes to 
science:

"Whatever the merits of such a view in general, it is quite untenable 
for any philosopher who is concerned with science." (RTS: 6).

Bhaskar goes on to list a few examples to illustrate, and then, while 
admitting that there has been some 'creative activity' in philosophy 
of science, states that he feels philosophy of science has been 
inadequate to the tasks a hand. He argues that the reason for this is 
that philosophy provides the 'tools' for philosophy of science, and 
that this means philosophy of science can sometimes eelag behind the 
needs of the moment.

[As an aside this seems like a rather dodgy theory of the 
relationships between science, philosophy and philosophy of science. 
Perhaps this would be worth discussing, especially in the light of 
some of RB's later work on these issues...]

Next RB asserts that a 'mutually beneficial relationship between 
science and philosophy' is possible, has obtained in the past, but is 
not presently the case. He states:

"However, those philosopher of the present who insist upon their 
total autonomy from the natural and human sciences not only 
impoverish but delude themselves. For they thereby condemn themselves 
to living in the shadow cast by the great scientific thought of the 
past." (RTS: 7)

RB fleshes out his argument with a series of examples and analogies. 
[There may be more room for discussion about RB's theory of science, 
philosophy and so forth here as well. I'm not so sure that he's 
actually _read_ the Foucault to which he gestures later in his 
preface...]

Anyway, RB sets out his aims, of which the primary one is to develop 
a 'systemmatic realist account of science' which will involve 
articulating a comprehensive alternative to positivism. The secondary 
aim (related intimately) is to 'show once-and-for-all why no return 
to positivism is possible.' (RTS: 8) RB indicates that a mainstay of 
his argument will be a transcendental approach (he does not use that 
term, but does indicate that he is interested in 'conditions' of 
possibility and plausibility) and that an analysis of the place of 
experience in science will be used against positivism. (Clearly if 
this works it is a good idea, since the experience issue is one where 
positivists tend to feel strongest.)

He goes on to draw a schematic map of the philosophy of science 
industry at the time of his writing. He suggests that the work may 
roughly be divided into two strands of criticism of positivism. The 
'twin templates' of the positivist conception of science are, he 
says, that science has a 'certain base' and a 'deductive structure.' 
(RTS: 8) The two streams of criticism are, on the one hand, a stream 
emphasising the 'social character of science' exemplified in work by 
Kuhn, Popper, Lakatos, Feyerabend etc., and, on the other hand, a 
stream emphasising the 'stratification of science., This second 
stream is associated with the work of Hesse, Harre and others. (RB 
does not say what he means by stratification here.)

Those with a knowledge of Kant will probably see where this is going, 
and RB does not disappoint us. 

He sets out to 'synthesise these two critical strands' and goes so 
far as to refer to this as a 'Copernican revolution, in the 
philosophy of science. (Kant has called his programme the same 
thing.)

The final paragraph of page 9 is RB's outline of the project of RTS. 
In the main he contends that the synthesis of the two critical 
strands will not be stable without a revised ontology, but also 
contends that such an ontology is actually presupposed by the 
workings of science.

"The basic principle of realist philosophy of science, viz. that 
perception gives us access to things and experimental activity access 
to structures that exist independently of us is very simple. Yet the 
full working out of this principle implies a radical account of the 
nature of causal laws, viz. as expressing tendencies of things, not 
conjunctions of events." (RTS 9f)

Bhaskar wraps up with the claim that he does not pretend to solve any 
'general problems of philosophy' but rather to eegive an adequate 
account of science.AE He proposes to do this by concentrating on 
'science' rather than 'knowledge.'

His final paragraph emphasises the need to guard against 
anthropocentrism, and includes a passing reference to Foucault.

--------------------------------------------------------> Ends >------

I'm making notes on RTS for my own use anyway - so please let me know 
if further postings in this vein would be of use to anyone else.

>Moreover, i am a bit concerned that the mere notion of a reading 
>group has discouraged other discussions; i hope that the reading 
>group will not drown out other discourse.  

I hope not either - althoug there was never that much. I think 
clearly marking reading group postings by their headings should keep 
clear what is what, though.

Best,
David
The "Instant Intellectual"
(just add funding)
---------------------------------
 Say that you do no work,
 and that you will live forever.
                    - Ezra Pound

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