File spoon-archives/bhaskar.archive/bhaskar_1996/96-05-20.182, message 25


From: "Hans Despain" <DESPAIN-AT-econ.sbs.utah.edu>
Date:          Thu, 4 Jan 1996 17:34:23 GMT-700
Subject:       Lawson, critical realism and P.K.


In November of 1992 Tony Lawson presented a paper on critical realism 
and the Post Keynesian tradition, at a conference at the University 
of Utah (U.S.A.) "introducing" the Post Keynesian and Marxian economic 
traditions to one another, more recently (summer 1994) this paper was 
published in the *Journal of Post Keynesian Thought* vol. 16, pp. 503-
538.

Below I summarize Lawson's article and arugment, which claims that the 
Post Keynesian tradition is implicitly (or should be) committed to 
critical realism. I then attempt to critique this view, and question 
the Post Keynesian critical realist commitments which Lawson attempts 
to agrue are present within their tradition.  I suggest that though 
such commitments were present in their genesis or roots (e.g. the 
Classical tradition of Smith, Ricardo, and Mill; Marx; and Keynes), 
the Post Keynesians, rather than embracing have distanced themselves 
to their founding thinkers' (implied) ontological commitments.

Lawson identifies five "seemingly diverse features" of the Post-
Keynesian economic tradition:

  (i) opposition to so-called neo-classcial orthodoxy
  
 (ii) significant emphasis upon methodological questions and reasoning
 
(iii) "various substantive themes":
        (a) the economy is viewed as a dynamic historical process
        (b) uncertainty in economic life
        (c) human [agency] choice is real
        (d) economic and political institutions shape economic events
            [structure]  
        (e) the aim of human emancipation;
        
 (iv) Post-Keynesian are united in their claimed status as an 
      alternative to contemporary orthodoxy;
  
  (v) their roots are within the traditions of Keynes, Classical 
      economics, and Marx.         

Lawson says, "the obvious question that arises here [...] is, can such 
apparently disparate features as these be interpreted as mutually 
supportive/consistent and central characteristics of some coherent 
whole or perspective [...] I shall answer in the affirmative" (505-
6).  Lawson is able to "answer in the affirmative" on (Bhaskarian) 
philosophical grounds: "it is the philosphical system stylized here 
as critical realism that provides the coherence to the noted nominal 
features of Post Keynesian contribution" (507).

Next, Lawson accusses contemporary economic methodology to be 
committed to or "rooted in an unsustainable Humean version of 
positivism" (506).  He (accurretly) claims this on the orthodoxy 
conceptions of ...
                (a) science (axiomatic-deductive)
                (b) human beings (as passive rational maximizers)
                (c) the limited usefulness of methodology (509).
                
Next, he summarizes the transcendental realist perspective and 
ontological commitment.  He compares and constrasts transcendental 
realism and positivism in a purely Bhaskarian fashion.  And then 
develops (Bhaskar's) critical naturalism (512-525).

With critical realism in hand, Lawson claims that such a philosophical 
(or methodological) commitment (could) renders the Post Keynesian 
tradition a coherent philosophical perspective (525).  

Lawson warns that he has merely Lockean motives to employ 
methodological and philosophy of science arguments -- or his 
construction of and commitment to the philosophical ontology of 
critical realism -- only "to act as a ground-clearing device", 
whereby critical realism by itself does not and "cannot do the work 
of science" (525).  

Hence; in agreement with Outhwaite (1987) and Bhaskar (RR, 1989); 
critical realism "is a perspective [...] that is ontologically bold, 
but substantively [or epistemologically] cautious" (526). 

Lawson continues: "It [critical realism] is, then, not surprising, and 
indeed it is perfectly desirable, that competing accounts are sought 
[... and] it is not surprising _per se_ to find the specific claims 
or viewpoints of individual Post Keynesians diverge when considering 
matters of a highly  concrete substantive sort" (526).               
 
Wherefore, Lawson claims that "[t]he usual or most prominent nominal 
features of Post Keynesianism _can_ be rendered intelligible as 
aspects of a coherent position. [...] Whether or not this conclusion 
is a welcome one, I [accepting a Lakatosian criteria] am not aware of 
any other equally explanatory powerful interpretation than can render 
the manifest phenomena, results, or cliams of this tradition 
intelligible" (535). 

My problem is that I am not willing to accept that critical realism 
accomplishes (for the Post Keyensian tradition) what Lawson is 
claiming.  

However, if all he is saying is a critical realist (ontological) 
commitment to science would *help* unite the Post Keynesian tradition 
(if they were willing to accept it), I find some sympathy to his 
argument, but if he is arguing (as I understand him) that the 
critical realist (ontological) commitment is implied in the Post 
Keynesian tradition, in the same sense that it is in the Marxian 
tradition, I *firmly* disagree. 

Lawson emphasizes that the Post Keynesian tradition is rooted in the 
Keynesian, Marxian and Classical (Smith, Ricardo, Mill) tradition, 
whereby he claims one can find implied commitment to a critical 
realist ontology, this I easily accept.

However, the Post Keynesian tradition, rather than embrace the 
(implied) ontologocial commitment of these traditions, (most often) 
distances themselves from it.  For example, the (Post) Keynesian and 
(Post) Sraffian traditions reject the conception of (Marxian) Value; 
with respect to *relational* conceptions and *dialectics* this is 
certainly not critical realism in my estimation.

Moreover, I question the Post Keynesian aims of human emancipation, 
especially in their Classical and Keynesian roots.  Or stronger, I 
do not accept that the emancipatory aims of the Post Keynesian 
tradition are in phase with the emancipatory aims of critical 
realism.  Their Smithian, Ricardian, Millean and Keynesian commitments 
often allow them to accept the instutitional structures of 
capitalism, and might not be in phase with a (real) emanipatory 
orienation.

[Also, I am not sure that Bhaskar epistemological relativism allows 
Lawson to claim the pluaralism which plauges economic in general and 
the Post Keynesian tradition specifically?  This is in agreement 
with economic methodologists, such as B. Caldwell, D. Redman, and S. 
Dow.]

The Post Keynesian commitment against othordox economic theory, 
their emphasis on methodological issues (possibly methodological 
confussion); and quasi-(human) emancipation, is not in my view an 
implicit commitment to the philosophical onotology of critical 
realism.  However, if Lawson were to successful in convincing Post 
Keynesian to take serious critical realism the tradition would be the 
better for it.

(IMHO) Lawson has employed critical realism as an apology for 
the methodological confussion; and misplaced emancipatory aims of the 
Post Keynesian tradition, without emphasizing the reasons that Post 
Keynesians ought to subscribe to the ontological orienation of 
critical realism; and attempt to avoid the absolute methodological 
pluralism which is in fashion in the orthodox economic tradition.

hans despain
University of Utah
despain-AT-econ.sbs.utah.edu

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