From: "Hans Despain" <DESPAIN-AT-econ.sbs.utah.edu> Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 17:34:23 GMT-700 Subject: Lawson, critical realism and P.K. In November of 1992 Tony Lawson presented a paper on critical realism and the Post Keynesian tradition, at a conference at the University of Utah (U.S.A.) "introducing" the Post Keynesian and Marxian economic traditions to one another, more recently (summer 1994) this paper was published in the *Journal of Post Keynesian Thought* vol. 16, pp. 503- 538. Below I summarize Lawson's article and arugment, which claims that the Post Keynesian tradition is implicitly (or should be) committed to critical realism. I then attempt to critique this view, and question the Post Keynesian critical realist commitments which Lawson attempts to agrue are present within their tradition. I suggest that though such commitments were present in their genesis or roots (e.g. the Classical tradition of Smith, Ricardo, and Mill; Marx; and Keynes), the Post Keynesians, rather than embracing have distanced themselves to their founding thinkers' (implied) ontological commitments. Lawson identifies five "seemingly diverse features" of the Post- Keynesian economic tradition: (i) opposition to so-called neo-classcial orthodoxy (ii) significant emphasis upon methodological questions and reasoning (iii) "various substantive themes": (a) the economy is viewed as a dynamic historical process (b) uncertainty in economic life (c) human [agency] choice is real (d) economic and political institutions shape economic events [structure] (e) the aim of human emancipation; (iv) Post-Keynesian are united in their claimed status as an alternative to contemporary orthodoxy; (v) their roots are within the traditions of Keynes, Classical economics, and Marx. Lawson says, "the obvious question that arises here [...] is, can such apparently disparate features as these be interpreted as mutually supportive/consistent and central characteristics of some coherent whole or perspective [...] I shall answer in the affirmative" (505- 6). Lawson is able to "answer in the affirmative" on (Bhaskarian) philosophical grounds: "it is the philosphical system stylized here as critical realism that provides the coherence to the noted nominal features of Post Keynesian contribution" (507). Next, Lawson accusses contemporary economic methodology to be committed to or "rooted in an unsustainable Humean version of positivism" (506). He (accurretly) claims this on the orthodoxy conceptions of ... (a) science (axiomatic-deductive) (b) human beings (as passive rational maximizers) (c) the limited usefulness of methodology (509). Next, he summarizes the transcendental realist perspective and ontological commitment. He compares and constrasts transcendental realism and positivism in a purely Bhaskarian fashion. And then develops (Bhaskar's) critical naturalism (512-525). With critical realism in hand, Lawson claims that such a philosophical (or methodological) commitment (could) renders the Post Keynesian tradition a coherent philosophical perspective (525). Lawson warns that he has merely Lockean motives to employ methodological and philosophy of science arguments -- or his construction of and commitment to the philosophical ontology of critical realism -- only "to act as a ground-clearing device", whereby critical realism by itself does not and "cannot do the work of science" (525). Hence; in agreement with Outhwaite (1987) and Bhaskar (RR, 1989); critical realism "is a perspective [...] that is ontologically bold, but substantively [or epistemologically] cautious" (526). Lawson continues: "It [critical realism] is, then, not surprising, and indeed it is perfectly desirable, that competing accounts are sought [... and] it is not surprising _per se_ to find the specific claims or viewpoints of individual Post Keynesians diverge when considering matters of a highly concrete substantive sort" (526). Wherefore, Lawson claims that "[t]he usual or most prominent nominal features of Post Keynesianism _can_ be rendered intelligible as aspects of a coherent position. [...] Whether or not this conclusion is a welcome one, I [accepting a Lakatosian criteria] am not aware of any other equally explanatory powerful interpretation than can render the manifest phenomena, results, or cliams of this tradition intelligible" (535). My problem is that I am not willing to accept that critical realism accomplishes (for the Post Keyensian tradition) what Lawson is claiming. However, if all he is saying is a critical realist (ontological) commitment to science would *help* unite the Post Keynesian tradition (if they were willing to accept it), I find some sympathy to his argument, but if he is arguing (as I understand him) that the critical realist (ontological) commitment is implied in the Post Keynesian tradition, in the same sense that it is in the Marxian tradition, I *firmly* disagree. Lawson emphasizes that the Post Keynesian tradition is rooted in the Keynesian, Marxian and Classical (Smith, Ricardo, Mill) tradition, whereby he claims one can find implied commitment to a critical realist ontology, this I easily accept. However, the Post Keynesian tradition, rather than embrace the (implied) ontologocial commitment of these traditions, (most often) distances themselves from it. For example, the (Post) Keynesian and (Post) Sraffian traditions reject the conception of (Marxian) Value; with respect to *relational* conceptions and *dialectics* this is certainly not critical realism in my estimation. Moreover, I question the Post Keynesian aims of human emancipation, especially in their Classical and Keynesian roots. Or stronger, I do not accept that the emancipatory aims of the Post Keynesian tradition are in phase with the emancipatory aims of critical realism. Their Smithian, Ricardian, Millean and Keynesian commitments often allow them to accept the instutitional structures of capitalism, and might not be in phase with a (real) emanipatory orienation. [Also, I am not sure that Bhaskar epistemological relativism allows Lawson to claim the pluaralism which plauges economic in general and the Post Keynesian tradition specifically? This is in agreement with economic methodologists, such as B. Caldwell, D. Redman, and S. Dow.] The Post Keynesian commitment against othordox economic theory, their emphasis on methodological issues (possibly methodological confussion); and quasi-(human) emancipation, is not in my view an implicit commitment to the philosophical onotology of critical realism. However, if Lawson were to successful in convincing Post Keynesian to take serious critical realism the tradition would be the better for it. (IMHO) Lawson has employed critical realism as an apology for the methodological confussion; and misplaced emancipatory aims of the Post Keynesian tradition, without emphasizing the reasons that Post Keynesians ought to subscribe to the ontological orienation of critical realism; and attempt to avoid the absolute methodological pluralism which is in fashion in the orthodox economic tradition. hans despain University of Utah despain-AT-econ.sbs.utah.edu ------------------
Display software: ArchTracker © Malgosia Askanas, 2000-2005