From: The Instant Intellectual <SPURRETT-AT-superbowl.und.ac.za> Date: Mon, 12 Feb 1996 08:31:47 +0200 SAST Subject: Re: the importance of mechanisms Hello again, [This is a repost of something which did not seem to make it over the technical hurdles presently in place when I posted it last week. Apologies if anyone ends up getting it twice.] BTW: I've only just joined the list, so have picked up this thread "on the fly." Feel free to mail me to point out places where my posting evidences a failure to grasp what is actually at issue in the discussion. >> Ubiquity determinism can talk of mechanisms, and >>_must_ be interpreted mechanistically, as long as we don't think >>of `springs', `pulleys', `clocks' etc., but perhaps complex >>computer systems, adaptive control systems, quantum computers >>etc. These are all mechanisms, but of a different kind. >Although I am in general in agreement with much of what is being said I >still don't see why it is being insisted in using the term 'mechanism', >mechanistically. In his afterword to the Shotter book (Conversational >realities) RB notes that the term mechanism, even when used in the natural >sciences cannot be interpreted 'mechanistically'. Moreover, I.P. Wright >seems, at one level, to be equating the term mechanism with 'enduring' >processes - i.e. Smiths Invisible Hand - whereas to me, a causal mechanism >can be a momentary 'process/entity/element/thing' which is contributory to >an actualisation, whether known, empirically observed or not. Although I do >accept the arguments that other mechanisms do endure. I have a physicist acquaintance who balks at Bhaskar's term "mechanism" because he thinks that it implies that Bhaskar's philosophy is "mechanist", and therefore smacks of physicalism. I disagree with him, and with any attempt to impose ad hoc restrictions on the application of the term "(generative) mechanism." A "mechanism" is just "the feature/s of the world which enable phenomena X to be accounted for." Surely a Critical Realist would agree that it cannot be decided in advance whether the mechanism in any particular case would be, say, physical, or enduring, or new or whatever. It _is_ the case, though, that one's metaphysical commitments will constrain one's parameters for what counts as an acceptable mechanism - so that a physicalist would insist that the mechanism be physical, and an individualist that it not refer to irreducibly non-individual phenomena, an actualist that it take a regularity determinist form, etc., etc. This means that in any explanatory debate about some "X" there will be space for contention on what sort of mechanism would be likely/possible/theoretically acceptable. -------------------> EXAMPLE: >------------------------------------- Say I am trying to explain consciousness, and believe: (a) That consciousness is real, and irreducible to the purely physical, (b) That materialism is true. (c) That some form of Darwinism is correct, so that there has been matter longer than there has been life, and life longer than there has been consciousness. [I think this is roughy the CR position...] In _this_ case I would more or less have to believe that the mechanism which explains consciousness is in some way emergent from matter, but had not always been real (and so that it would be possible for the mechanism to once more cease to exist). Under the same constraints, though, were I interested in something like electromagnetism I think it would be proper to imagine the mechanism explaining _that_ phenomenon to be a permanent feature of reality. ----------------------------------> ENDS >-------------------------- Since I don't think we can profitably argue _in general_ about the particular properties of mechanisms, it would seem more sensible to take each mechanism on its own (or some relevantly related set of mechanisms) and contest the issues that arise there. Regards, David Spurrett The "Instant Intellectual" (just add funding) --------------------------------- Say that you do no work, and that you will live forever. - Ezra Pound ------------------
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