From: The Instant Intellectual <SPURRETT-AT-superbowl.und.ac.za>
Date: Thu, 22 Feb 1996 10:27:51 +0200 SAST
Subject: Bhaskar Glossary
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| BHASKAR GLOSSARY |
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| Maintained by David Spurrett |
| <spurrett-AT-superbowl.und.ac.za> |
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CONTENTS:
1) Introduction
2) The Glossary
3) Nominated terms, pending entries
4) List of contributors
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---(1)------------------------------------- Introduction ---
The Bhaskar Glossary is not intended to serve as a dic-
tionary, which is to say that its primary purpose is not the
provision of definitions. Rather it is intended to give
short discussions of the most important terms in the philo-
sophical vocabulary of Roy Bhaskar. Many of these terms are
in normal philosophical usage, but are used in novel or
specific ways, some are neologisms of one sort or another,
while in many cases he repeatedly uses terms which he
defines sketchily at best, and usually in difficult to find
corners of his texts. In almost all cases there are ques-
tions of interpretation and tenability. The glossary
entries aim to satisfy the needs arising from this state of
affairs.
Where Bhaskar does provide a definition his version will
be included, but not as a replacement to the discussion of
the term in question.
This glossary is a work in progress, and criticisms of,
and suggestions about existing entries are no less welcome
than proposed new entries.
I propose to make a glossary "business posting" about once
a month listing the terms in the glossary, and those
awaiting entries, and only to send copies of the glossary in
response to requests for it. In due course we could perhaps
find an FTP home for the thing.
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---(2)------------------------------------- The Glossary ---
--------------------------
ACTUALISM (and the ACTUAL)
(Not in general philosophical usage)
RTS: (64): "I shall use the term `actualism' to refer
to the doctrine of the actuality of causal laws; that
is, to the idea that laws are relations between events
or states of affairs."
Although actualism allows that the causal link,
insofar as there is one, obtains between _events_ (un-
like empiricism which would restrict it to
_experiences_) it is susceptible to the same attacks,
and for Bhaskar's purposes is often regarded as equiv-
alent to empiricism. For an actualist a constant con-
junction is necessary for the ascription of a causal
law.
-------------------------------------
CLOSURE ("Closed" and "Open" systems)
(Not in general philosophical usage)
RTS: (70): "... I will define a `closed system' simply
as one in which a constant conjunction of events ob-
tains; i.e. in which an event of type a is invariably
accompanied by an event of type b. Clearly the pos-
sibility of such a system does not depend upon the
truth of regularity determinism. Nor need such a sys-
tem be `closed' in any more picturesque sense of the
word."
"Open" systems are simply systems which are not
closed, i.e. where constant conjunctions do not occur.
Bhaskar's division of the world into "open" and
"closed" systems in central to his justification of
transcendental realism. He marks the distinction by
referring to the world as "differentiated." The sup-
posed fact of the differentiation of the world is a
crucial part of the argument that empiricism is in-
adequate to the task of sustaining the intelligibility
of science, so it is rather disappointing that the
concept of closure is so poorly fleshed out in RTS.
A major difficulty arising with the concept of a
closure is that in terms of the transcendetal realist
philosophical ontology described by Bhaskar in RTS
closure should be virtually impossible. This would be
as a consequence of the irreducibility, autonomy and
non-additive organisational principles of the various
parts of the world. That said it is essential for
Bhaskar's account of experimental science that con-
stant conjunctions _do_ sometimes occur, i.e. that
some systems sometimes be closed. He thus needs to
say both that closure cannot occur, and that it must.
I do not think that the distinction drawn in RTS chap-
ter 2 between the epistemically dominant and recessive
versions of the conditions for closure enables this
difficulty to be disposed of.
It would seem that in order to surmount this conflict
Bhaskar needs to be more picturesque, or at least more
precise, in his stipulation of what constitutes
closure, and what its role is in science.
--------------------------
DIFFERENTIATION (of world)
By this term Bhaskar marks his distinction between
open and closed systems. He takes the fact of this
differentiation to be pretty unquestionable, since it
is easy enough to see that in many cases constant con-
junctions between events do not in fact occur. Since
a closed system is defined simply as one in which a
constant conjunction of does occur, and given that
constant conjunctions do not _generally_ occur, the
differentiation of the world follows almost by defini-
tion.
------------------------------
EMPIRICISM (and the EMPIRICAL)
Generally: (From Gk; `empeiria' = `experience')
Empiricism is the philosophical theory which holds
that all knowledge is derived from experience.
Bhaskar does not give his own definition of
empiricism, but following his definition of actualism
(RTS 64) we could say something like: "[`Empiricism'
refers] to the doctrine of the empiricity of causal
laws; that is, to the idea that laws are relations be-
tween experiences."
In practice Bhaskar often regards empiricism and
actualism as equivalent, and where it relies upon what
he calls the "Humean theory of causal laws" trans-
cendental idealism gets lumped in as well.
For Bhaskar empiricism has several other sig-
nificant features:
1) Experiences must be atomistic, ie independent of
one another.
2) Since knowedge is purely derived from sense experi-
ence there is no social aspect to knowlede, which
means that empiricism implies epistemic individualism.
-----------------
EPISTEMIC FALLACY
(Not in general philosophical usage)
RTS: (36) "[The `epistemic fallacy'] consists in the
view that statements about being can be reduced to or
analysed in terms of statements about knowledge; ie
that ontological questions can always be transposed
into epistemological ones."
--------
ONTOLOGY
Generally: Traditionally ontology as a branch of phi-
losophy is that part of metaphyscis which sudies
being, or existence itself, apart from the properties
of any particular existent.
Bhaskar distinguishes between `philosophical' and
`scientific' ontologies. A philosophical ontology de-
scribes "the kind of world presupposed by a philosoph-
ical account of science" (RTS 29, index incorrectly
refers to 26) while a scientific ontology describes
"the particular entities and processes postulated by
some substantive scientific theory." (ibid) The two
tasks do not overlap, so it "is the task of philosophy
of science to capture science's essential movement,
not to guess its eventual destination." (RTS 147)
The purpose of this distinction is to establish the
working parameters for criticism of the beliefs which
function as regulative principles for science (and
therefore for scientific ontologies) which by defini-
tion do not admit of scientific or empirical refuta-
tion.
------------
REDUCTIONISM
Generally: ?
Bhaskar uses this term in his analysis of the ontology
presupposed by actualism to designate the "research
programme" (RTS 77) of positivistic science which at-
tempts to reduce the object of study to individuals
with no internal structure, which in Bhaskar's words
"include nothing" (ibid).
Bhaskar is also concerned to refute the suggestion
that various sciences could be reduced into one anoth-
er.
-------
SCIENCE
RTS: (24) "Science ... is a social activity whose aim
is the production of the knowledge of the kinds and
ways of acting of independently existing and active
things."
RTS: (148) "Science ... is an ongoing social activity
which pre-exists any particular generation of
scientists and any particular moment of conscious-
ness."
Bhaskar's insistence upon the social character of
science is in keeping with much C20 work in the phi-
losophy of science, what is unusual is to find this
tied to an equally strong insistence upon realism and
upon the rationality and the progressive nature of
science.
-------------------------
STRATIFICATION (of world)
By this term Bhaskar marks his distinction between
events and the generative mechanisms which give rise
to the events.
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TRANSITIVE/INTRANSITIVE (objects of knowledge)
The Transitive objects of knowledge:
RTS: (21) "...knowledge ... is a social product like
any other, which is no more independent of its produc-
tion and the men who produce it than motor cars, arm-
chairs or books, which has its own craftsmen, tech-
nicians, publicists, standards and skills and which is
no less subject to change than any other commodity."
The Intransitive objects of knowledge:
RTS: (21) "...knowledge is `_of_' things which are not
produced by men at all: the specific gravity of mer-
cury, the process of electrolysis, the mechanism of
light propogation. None of these `objects of knowl-
edge' depend upon human activity."
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---(3)-------------------------------- `Undefined' Terms ---
METAPHYSICS
POSITIVISM
TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENT
TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM
TRANSCENDENTAL REALISM (and the REAL)
NATURALISM
POWER/S
TENDENCY - Possessed,Exercised,Realised,Detected/Percieved
THING
GENERATIVE MECHANISM
EVENT
CAUSE
LAW
DETERMINISM
AGENCY
PHILOSOPHY
PSYCHOLOGY
SOCIOLOGY
PHYSICS
SUBSTANCE
CAUSE
KNOWLEDGE
TRANSFACTUAL
EPISTEMOLOGY
INTERACTIONISM
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---(4)------------------------------------- Contributors ---
This is a first draft, so is all the work of yours truly. As
time goes by I'll keep a record of those who suggest entries
or who point out errors, etc.
<spurrett-AT-superbowl.und.ac.za>
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Regards,
David
The "Instant Intellectual"
(just add funding)
---------------------------------
Say that you do no work,
and that you will live forever.
- Ezra Pound
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