Date: Mon, 26 Feb 1996 01:42:29 -0700 (MST)
From: HANS DESPAIN <HANS.DESPAIN-AT-m.cc.utah.edu>
Subject: Bhaskar 'concrete singularity'


Colin brings up a very interest topic.

The notion of human nature itself is at stake.  

Bhaskar's development of the concrete singularity is attempting to navigate 
a fine line between 'the real'; 'the actual'; and 'the empirical'.  How 
to distingish them in Colin's example i am not sure.

But the concrete singularity is a function of many sociological,  
historical, and material determinations. Moreover, i want to avoid 
Colin's suggestion that the social relations are determining the "core 
species-being".  This is denying a core species-being in an Althusserian 
manner, which seems to be a great mistake.

It is the case that social relations influence and can contradict the 
core species-being, but it does not determine it.  Moreover, it is 
through these various historical contradictions between social relations 
and the species-being that we can say something (if just a little) about 
the core species-being.  

It seems to me that for Bhaskar the core universal human nature (or the 
Feuerbachian species-being) is not determined, but rather realized 
through human praxis as a function of individual "stratification of 
action" as modeled in various writing (e.g. *Plato Etc.* p. 99).

The problem to me is not to be able to say exactly what is core universal 
human nature and what is socially determined or specific to concrete 
singularity (which of course is important); but rather to realize that 
concrete singularity is 'over-determined'.

That is we may not have any (or very little) control of core universal 
human nature (what ever that may be) but we very much have some input in 
what manifests in each concrete singularity.  Specifically by consciously 
attempting to institute humane production and social relations, or at 
least not consciously allowing inhumane production and social relations. 

So that we can understand ethically: "In seeking to satisfy my desire, 
I am logically committed to the satisfaciton of all dialectically similar 
desires.  (This does not depend upon the judgement form, but is implicit 
in action as such)" (Bhaskar 1994:141).

And we must understand (moral) praxis to be in part an experimental process, 
where the objects of morality are intransitive.  And Bhaskar adds: "Moral 
irrelaism secretes an implicit reaism, normally the status que ante, or 
one bit of it, an analogue of the ontic fallacy (more usually in 
emotivist, decisionist or personalist and/or traditionalist guises), and, 
as one would expect, a Tina compromise form" (1994:109-10). 

In any event i would like to very much pursue Bhaskar's moral realism and 
ethical naturialism.  i am very interested to hear comments concerning 
especially chapters 5, 6 and 7 of *Plato Etc.* (and perhaps how they 
relate specifically to chapter 4 of *Dialectic*).

looking forward to further discussion

hans despain
University of Utah
despain-AT-econ.sbs.utah.edu

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