File spoon-archives/bhaskar.archive/bhaskar_1996/96-07-26.024, message 102


From: "hans despain" <DESPAIN-AT-econ.sbs.utah.edu>
Date:          Fri, 19 Jul 1996 01:52:31 GMT-700
Subject:       RTS intro


i must be brief, but i have a few questions.

First, like others on this list, i too believe transcendental realism 
to have very important implications for a marxism program 
specifically and emancipatory aims in general.

However, my aim in this post is much more narrow.

On page 14 of the introduction Bhaskar says: "In science there is 
a kind of dialectic in which [1] regularity is identified, [2] a 
plausible explanation for it is invented, and [3] the reality of the 
entities and processes postulated in the explanation is then 
checked." 

Bhaskar says that the "classical empiricist" stops at stage one [1], 
"transcendental idealism" at stops at stage two [2], while 
transcendental realism moves on to stage three [3].

Is this a fair characterization of a "classical empiricist" 
persumedly of the Humean variety?  That is does there exist a 
tradition that actually stops at the identity of regularity (save the 
dogmatic and careless statistcian)?

Also the transcendental idealist tradition seems to be too massive, 
it seems it must include pragmatism, heumeneutics, critical theory, 
and various realisms (e.g. Putnam's 'internal realism').

It is not clear to me the exact aim of Bhaskar here.  But, am i 
correct to interpret him as saying there are in the main three (very 
broad or) general traditions in the philosophy of science? ...  One 
(classical empiricism) that wants to sharply dichotomize 
(however falsely) between positive and normative statments (facts and 
values); a second (transendental idealism) that is agnostic to the 
realism of assumptions and theory; and a third (transcendental 
realism) that demands realism of theory (and assumptions) as a 
criteria to establish the grounds of causal law and natural necessity. 

If this be close, perhaps he should not call these traditions, but 
tendencies with the philosophy of science.

If this interpretation is correct it seems to me that there exists no 
clear distinction between the thinkers and traditions that Bhaskar 
might have in mind.  It is not clear to myself that any thinker(s) 
would fit Bhaskar's classical empiricist, while too many may fit his 
transcendental idealism; while, many other may fit his transcendental 
realism in disagreement with Bhaskar himself.

However, i would like to maintain that those traditions willing to 
defend the arbitariness of theory (transcendental idealists) are prone 
to a defense of the status quo (i would be willing to expand these 
thoughts).

Also i would like to here some thoughts on the epistemic fallacy has 
it is introduced on page 16; and stratification as it is briefly 
suggested in the introduction.

Personally, i have great sympathy toward the epistemic fallacy, while 
i am less convinced by the argument for stratification of nature.

hans d.












   

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