Date: Sat, 24 Aug 1996 10:52:23 -0600 (MDT) From: hans despain <HANS.DESPAIN-AT-m.cc.utah.edu> Subject: RE: "false consciousness" i definitely believe Tobin to have some good ideas, i am interested in both paper topics expressed. Tobin, i would *not* define a (or my) 'classical marxian' conception of ideology as false consciousness. False consciousness would be better described as a 'pre-Marxian' or Feuerbachian conception of ideology. Although the argument could be made that the 'orthodox marxian' conception of ideology has been such a conception (fc) up to the present; which is not dis-similar to a Freudian conception. Jorge Larrain and so it seems Bhaskar have attempted to reclaim a more classical usage. Whereby, the usage is not merely definational but ontological and epistemological. Again this is the direction i still need to do work. But i do think reclaiming a notion of ideology; that is the "inversion" of reality itself and not merely 'false conciousness'; hold great importance for the possiblity of human emancipation and social transformation. That is it is centeral for reconstruction of the new left, philosophically, scientifically, politically, and practically. The left must become the "enlighted common-sense of our age" (Bhaskar Reclaiming Reality, 1989:1). That is to suggest "simple" common-sense does not overcome an inverted soical reality. A "simple" common-sense is quite capable in preforming at a practical level of reproduction, but an "enlighted" common-sense is needed to (consciously) tranform the present social reality, and to create a more universal freedom for human beings. The ideological is not merely an epistemological commitment to "simple" common-sense; but an ontological commitment to an inverted reality and to a (social) practice of reproduction (and hence, the status quo). That is to say it is an ontological commitment to a 'flat' (non-depth) reality. Where reality is believed to be revealed at an empirical level as it (i.e., reality) really is. Hence, the distinction between ideological and non-ideological is not the same as falsehood versus truth (a type of Feuerbachian or Freudian distinction). For an ideological statement can be true, and the non-ideological can be false. For example, it is ture that specific minorities (groups) score lower on I.Q. tests (as Herrstein and Murray have emphasized in their *The Bell Curve* 1994); but it is ideological to claim that this is itself an ontological reflection of these individual's potentialities. And it is certainly an ideological reproduction of this empirical reality to suggest that such a result (poor scores by minorities) should be employed as a type of policy device to determine post-secondary eduction candidates. What needs to be explained (in my example) is not the genetics of different human beings, but the social structure and social sysetm which would (and does) give rise to such an inverted social reality. How, groups of human beings and individual human beings are denied (social) access to develop their own potentialities. Does this help to clairify my intention? hans d.
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