File spoon-archives/bhaskar.archive/bhaskar_1996/96-09-26.073, message 31


From: shmage-AT-pipeline.com
Date: Tue, 17 Sep 1996 04:31:46 GMT
Subject: Astrology and Psephology


In RTS 2-1.4, Bhaskar writes: 
 
"for the transcendental realist it is the 
nature of the object that determines the possibility of a science.  Thus he

can allow, without paradox, that there may be no humanly intelligible 
pattern to be discovered in the stars or politically intelligible pattern
in 
voting behaviour. So that no science of astrology or psephology is
possible, 
no matter now scrupulously `scientific method' is adhered to." 
 
I am confuse by two aspects of this short paragraph.  If it is "the 
nature of the object that determines the possibility of a science," how is
the nature of the object to be known if it cannot be made intelligible to
us--but how can it be made intelligible if it is not a *possible*  object
of science?  
The second problem is the presence of the indicative mode--"no science of
astrology or psephology is possible," in a sentence presented as following
>from a conditional proposition--"there may be no humanly intelligible 
pattern to be discovered in the stars or politically intelligible pattern
in 
voting behaviour."  But given that astrology and psephology are real social
practices with claims, however disputed, to practical efficacy based on
cognitive validity, how can *philosophy* presume to dispute their status as
sciences absent a definitive scientific refutation of their claims? 
 
Shane Mage



   

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