Date: Wed, 18 Sep 1996 19:52:46 -0400
From: porporad-AT-duvm.ocs.drexel.edu (Doug Porpora)
Subject: ontological objectivity



        Because I think Howard so well expresses Bhaskar's position on
relations existing only in their effects, I wonder, Howard, if I can press
you (and everyone) on this position along the lines I think Andy is
intimating as well. Consider Howard's first proposition:

1.  Society exists in its effects.  In this instance we accept
causal, rather than perceptual, criteria for establishing an
existence claim.

        That is what I understand Bhaskar to be saying as well.  But I
think I have  a problem with it.  Would we equally say that the structure
of a bridge only exists in its effects, in the stresses, strains and
supports that the physical structure produces?

        If not, what is the difference between the physical structure of a
bridge and the social structure of a society?  Certainly, there would be no
social structure without people acting like people, but, equally, there
would be no physical structure to the bridge without the physical materials
behaving in their characteristic way.  So, again, what's the difference?

        Howard's next two propositions were:

2.  Society's effects are on the intentional actions (broadly so
called) of persons.

3.  Without the intentional actions of persons, society, e.g.
social relations, cannot exist.

        Taken together, I find these ambiguous in much the same way as
Bhaskar is ambiguous.  On one interpretation, there, again, would be no
social relations without people doing something intentionally. That seems
undeniable.

        On another interpretation, however, the propositions may be taken
as suggesting that a specific relation X only exists to the extent that
people intentionally act in X-like ways.  For many relations, that is true.
Ownership only exists to the extent that people behaviorally observe
ownership. (I hope we're agreed, Colin.)

        Now, suppose, as in the case of capitalism, people intentionally
observe the rules of ownership and observe it not only in relation to what
Marx calls personal property but also in relation to what Marx calls
private property, i.e., the means of production.

        So all this ownership observation creates the relation of
ownership.  However, it turns out that because the people intentionally
observe the ownership of private as well as personal property, and because
the owners of private property dispose of their property as they do, there
are not enough jobs to go around.  There is a disparity between jobs and
job-seekers.

        This disparity is,itself, a new relation that is the unintended
consequence of people intentionally observing the rules of property
ownership.  So, as on the first interpretation above, that disparity would
not exist were people not doing something intentionally. (This, I think, is
Tobin's point.)

        But here is the ambiguity. On the second interpretation of Howard's
two propositions, a relation X only exists if people intentionally act in
X-like ways.  So in this case, the disparity between jobs and job-seekers
only exists if people intentionally behave in what, I guess, we would call
job disparity- like ways.

        Well, what ways are those? Applying for jobs and not getting them?
Giving up finding a job at all and going on welfare?

        The problem is compounded by the fact that absolutely no one in the
society need be aware of the disparity between jobs and job-seekers for the
disparity to exist. The dominant ideology may go on insisting there are
enough jobs with everyone believing it.

        The point is that there seems to be an ontological difference
between the contractual relation Yvonne and Xavier enter in Howard's
example and the relational disparity between jobs and job-seekers in my
example.  In Howard's example, the contract does only exist in the
intentional behavior of those who believe in contracts.  That relation is
closely tied to rules.  But that does not seem the case with the disparity
between jobs and job-seekers. Although the disparity is a relation that is
the unintended consequence of rules (pace Tobin), it is not a relation that
is,itself, governed by rules as is contractual obligation.

        Because the contractual relation is rule-governed, we can identify
violations of its observance.  Can we similarly speak of behavioral
violations of the disparity between jobs and job-seekers?

        My last point is that not finding a job and suffering because of it
are not necessarily intentional actions -- particularly if the first is
done in good faith.  We may intentionally look for a job in good faith,
but, then, we do not intentionally not find one.  And when we fail to find
a job, we do not intentionally suffer because of it.  Both are something
that happens to us rather than something we do.  They happen because of the
existence of a certain social relation, which, I think, exists independent
of subsequent behavior.

        To conclude, I concede the first interpretion of Howard's two
propositions -- that social relations can only exist with people behaving
intentionally, but I dispute the second interpretation -- that no social
relation X exists unless people behave in X-like ways.

NOTE TO HOWARD:  My wife, too, is an excellent if sometimes acerbic editor.
In your case, however, you might mention to your wife that we need to speak
of ontological objectivity to distinguish it from epistemological
objectivity, which is the only kind of objectivity most of our colleagues
recognize.  I would refrain from accusing her of the epistemic fallacy.








doug porpora
dept of psych and sociology
drexel university
phila pa 19104
USA

poporad-AT-duvm.ocs.drexel.edu