File spoon-archives/bhaskar.archive/bhaskar_1996/96-09-26.073, message 85


Date: Wed, 25 Sep 1996 00:42:56 -0400 (EDT)
From: Andrew Wayne Austin <aaustin-AT-utkux.utcc.utk.edu>
Subject: Re: social ontology


On Tue, 24 Sep 1996 ccw94-AT-aber.ac.uk wrote:

> I wonder how Andy can claim to "know" this though? I take it that he
> considers himself enough _in_ the channel to "know". (although I agree with
> the claim that positivism masquerades as realism)

I presume to know in various ways: belief systems, sensory apparatus,
interdependency with others. I know that I cannot know unless I intervene
in the world or the world impinges on me. I also have no sense of what I
cannot know because this would involve knowing it first, which is a
contradiction. The question is as silly as it is serious.

For example, I can tell you that the correspondence theory of truth
detection is a farce, and this is the main method implied here: If our
models represent reality then they are (there is always hedge) more or
less true models. However, to measure any model against a set of truth
criteria means that one must have knowledge before hand of the reality the
model is to represent. If this is so, why have a model? So the next step,
since we still wish assert mind independent reality, is to test the model
within a paradigm that makes intelligible facts contained and generated
within the model. Great, I find this perspective useful. Will it reveal
truth? Is it mind independent? 

We could go through all the various epistemological models one-by-one -
there are several within the paradigm (if you can call it that) of realism
alone - but suffice to say, as I have already said, my way of knowledge is
not divorced from the social reality in which I move. We demonstrate
theory through praxis, and through praxis we demonstrate theory. The
retroductive (or retro-deduction) method seems a logical way to pursue
things. I like that model. Being critical as well as reflexive allows the
frame to transform as we impose ourselves on the subject matter. You have
to track the sight if you wish to hit a moving target.

> >I am going to argue, therefore, from a
> >Marxian position (not orthodox Marxism).
> 
> Again I am glad that Andy "knows" better than I the Marxian position,
> although might it not be a little pertinent to suggest that not everyone
> would agree with his dogmatic epistemological stance.

I do not believe that my statement presumes your lack of knowledge
vis-a-vis Marxism. I merely wanted to point out that I would be arguing
not from a position dialectical materialism, but rather from an historical
materialist position. It is a distinction I have learned to put upfront.
Saves a lot of grief.

> >These knowledge systems are produced throughout the class structure. 
> >However, the knowledge systems that tend to dominate are those knowledge
> >systems propagated by the ruling class. 
> 
> Why? I tend to agree actually, but still, this claim is a priori science.

I do not believe that the observation that the ruling class dominate the
means of ideological production is a priori; rather, this position is
induced from social reality (facts in evidence). I was very skeptical of
the claim that the ruling class control the thought products of society
(it sounded conspiratorial to me) but after considerable research into the
matter I have become convinced that they, in fact, do. Did my Marxian
frame guide me to ask the right sorts of questions that would yield the
answers? Did my Marxian frame guide me to look in certain places for
confirmation of the hypothesis? Yes on both accounts. However, power
elite theory also guided me through this task, helped me formulate
questions, directed me to the data, and I returned upon their theories the
view that the Marxian position was more correct considering the evidence. 
This is social scientific research. It is one of the many ways I know
things. 

> >They have this ability because
> >they generally control the various means of ideational production. 
> 
> Might we not also add the material means as well?

Well, yes, of course. It is their control of the material means of
production that allows them to control the ideational production. 

> >That the specific content of the social production process is not
> >transhistorical or transcultural (I believe we all agree on the basic
> >premise of historical materialism), it logically follows that the specific
> >content of knowledge is not transhistorical or transcultural either.
> 
> Yes, yes. The social production of knowledge by means of knowledge.
> Epistemological relativism.

This is a principle assertion derived directly from the historical
materialist model. Consciousness arises from the material (that is the
production of material life in the social system - we have to be clear
about what Marx argued) base. If the material base varies from historical
epoch and cultural frame, then the thought product must also vary (unless
it is transmitted to another cultural frame, perhaps, but even then it
would be superficial, not connected to deep structure). I do not think, at
least on the metalevel, which is where I am moving in these posts, that
this rises to the epistemological relativism, for I am asserting a general
proposition regarding knowledge production transcontexually. But this is
clearly a sticky point for me, for my assertion here is not universal, and
since I am not an absolute being, my assertion here cannot swallow up all
of reality; I could very well be wrong about this... er, about my
assertion not being universal, not about me being an absolute being. 

> >Unfortunately, knowledge systems are the way we access reality. (We know
> >this to be true because we cannot know outside of knowledge - an obvious
> >contradiction.) If would therefore follow from the previous premise
> >regarding the emergence of knowledge from social production that any
> >knowledge system does not have the capacity to accurately reflect the
> >social reality of a culture from which it was not produced. 
> 
> Why? Who says? This is a priori science again. Whether or not we can
> understand other societies depends on active engagement with them, not an
> ethnocentric dismal of their concepts, nor an equally ethnocentic elevation
> of their concepts to the status of 'true for them, but not for us'.

I would never dismiss another culture's conceptual understanding of their
own way of life. They probably know much better than me. It is their
reality. The abstract scientific categories I would bring to understanding
their mode of life are lubricated with extreme caution. You say I should
not elevate their concepts to a status equal with ours - this presumes an
inherent superiority of our position! Might it be better said: we should
not elevate out concepts to a status where ours are more true than
their's? Or how about not making such assertions at all? I mean, who is
doing the elevating here? Really depends on where you start, doesn't it?
What you have said here is an excellent demonstration of the importance of
the position I am advocating. At least from *my* perspective (for you
relative types).

> >Moreover, any
> >specific knowledge system is incapable of accurately reflecting the
> >manifold totality of the social formation from which it was produced. 
> 
> The above applies. But there is a deeper problem. Andy seems to assume that
> cultures/societies/communities are monolithic hermetically sealed units with
> no areas of overlap. Very strange atomistic, dare I say, empiricist ontology
> at work here.

I do not assume this. Moreover, everything I have said would seem to
counter a charge of radical empiricism.

> >Since we must access reality through knowledge systems, then this charge
> >of epistemic fallacy falls victim to the same predator as absolute
> >idealism: realism. 
> 
> Can you explain? Moreover, the realism that Andy seems to advocate seems a
> very superficial surface realism at best.

How do you expect to stand outside of knowledge to behold your
transhistorical ontology absolutely? It involves a contradiction, don't
you think? If you assert an ontology that remains the same despite the
knowledge system being applied to its understanding then the burden of
proof rest entirely with you. If you assert God, then you must prove it.
To assert absolute reality is to assert God. This is exactly the
perspective that critical realism seeks to counter. (I am being to believe
what is advocated here is transcendental realism.) 

> >To naturalize a knowledge system is to lose objectivity. 
> 
> But nobody has done this. No one is saying that Western discourses of mental
> illness have captured for all time the essence of human mental illness.

So then why was my position attacked so forcefully? If there has been no
naturalizing of a knowledge system, and if this admission is to suggest
that I have a made a false charge the character of which you do not want
to be associated, then why argue away from something you agree with? I
don't understand the motivation here. 

> >The bourgeois
> >scientist seeks to naturalize his ontology, to make transitory social
> >reality, one which serves the ruling circles, appear to be eternal. 
> 
> Excuse me for pointing this out, but isn't this exactly what Andy is guilty of. 
> 
> Premise 1       All knowledge is socially produced
> Premise 2       All knowledge is the tool of the ruling elite
> Premise 3       The ruling elite in a given society define mental illness as
> X
> 
> Conclusion:     Mental illness is X because the ruling elite say so. (A

Number one, "all knowledge is socially produced." This is a true
statement, as near as I can tell. Again, I could be wrong; certainly my
truth statements do not swallow everybody up. Number two, "all knowledge
is a tool of the ruling class," is a false statement, both empirically and
according to my argument. I specifically said that knowledge was produced
throughout the class structure. So this is a strawman. "The ruling elite
in a given society define mental illness," is another strawman. The
professional class that works to legitimate and protect the status quo
defines what mental illness is. A panel of psychiatrists sit around a
table and vote. Their law book is the DSM-IV. But in a more general sense
the statement assumes that all societies have a conception of mental
illness, and, furthermore, that the ruling class does the defining. I have
made no such claim - not even close. The conclusion is somewhat good,
except that I would say that society in general comes to define what is
mental illness, if mental illness is a reality in that culture. 

> >It
> >recognizes the realities it constructs as a priori facts that it
> >discovers. 
> 
> Seems to me to be more than a little conflation of tense going on here. We
> don't construct the social world, we reproduce it and in certain instances
> transform it. However, much the status of gods attracts us, we are thrown
> into a pregiven social world, constructed by the long dead.

We do construct the social world. The social world is produced and
sustained by real human beings in interaction. I am not sure of your
argument here.

> The heirachy is not a priori. Still, as Bhaskar constantly reminds us, the
> belief that it's not good to leave seminar rooms by second floor windows
> seems to be a universal one. At least, anyone who doubted it might find it
> difficult to tell how it worked out. Some beliefs are simply better than others.

Absolutely. But I prefer to reserve judgement specific to the case.

> Thanks. 

Thanks you. It is a good exchange. I would only advance the final point
that things are not things-in-themselves. One of the basic tenets to
social understanding is to recognize the primacy relationship between
object and subject. It is that relationship that is crux of reality. 

One note on all this, I do not mean to presume anything of your position. 
I just thought that since so many of my posts are, at least I believe that
they are, incorrectly interpreted that I decided to back up and lay out
what I believe. I fully recognize that the people on this channel have a
firm grasp of Marxism. However there are different interpretations of
Marxism. Mine is a bit different from the mainstream, I am realizing, than
those on the list, and therefore I thought it best to make a few
foundational statements.

I enjoy the debates. Didn't mean to get so tied up in one so early. I
thought my remarks regarding ethnography and historicity were relatively
uncontroversial. I am glad they weren't. :)

Andy




   

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