From: ccw94-AT-aber.ac.uk
Date: Thu, 26 Sep 1996 11:34:46 +0100
Subject: Re: social ontology


Derek, I'm sorry if you find the present discussion tedious. I could have
made my postings more Bhaskaresque by including copious quotes (i) to
display my frightful knowledge of the Bhaskar corpus, or, (ii) to use his
work to gain authoritative support for my arguments. Neither option seemed
attractive. Andy raises important questions about the validity of Bhaskar's
whole project. These need answering. 

Once again excuse my tone.

OK, Andy lets take this head on. What's realism? What's Critical Realism?
What's Transcendental Realism?

You claim that:

>There are realities. Relativism holds that there is one
>reality but that we all see it differently. I disagree with this position; 
>it is idealism. 

Notwithstanding that this is just about the most perverse reading of
relativism I've ever come across, I'm unsure how you are defining idealism
here but, on my definition, idealism normally refers to the view that
'objects are constructed out of appearances or ideas'. If I say that there
is but one reality that we all describe differently this hardly seems to
constitute idealism. Also, remember Marx's remarks about drowning men saving
themselves by getting rid of the concept of gravity. I suppose it's
perfectly feasible for you to redefine realism/idealism in whatever way you
see fit. Still, as RB points out whatever the merits of the denial of
reality in theory this is never the stance in practice. I doubt whether even
you would be able to construct a reality that enables you to substitute
cyanide for water.

(Small footnote to Michael and Ruth: The differentiation of reality is part
and parcel of Bhaskar's philosophical ontology. But, it is the object which
determines the cognitive possibilties for us, not us for it. Thus
necessitating that ontological questions come first. Epistemological
discourses in ontological vacuums are vacuous. So Ruth, I agree, we can
discuss later the difficulties and peculiar nature of social reality.) But
often the Dr. Johnson argument works best. 

Andy goes on:

>On the point of absences, you need to make this clearer. As for the
>assertion that there is but one reality, it is precisely on this point
>that disagree. It asserts the existence of a reality we can never know,
>that at best we only have different perceptions of it. 

How does this conclusion follow from the premise? you really have the most
remarkable ability to draw conclusions that are not inherent in the premise.
Who said anything about us being unable to know anything about this reality.
But it's not this simple or this hard. As Margolis puts it, 'We cannot
seriously believe that science totally misrepresents the world, nor can we
determine the fit' (this is paraphrased).

>It
>also leads to the hierarchical arrangement of knowledge systems as we
>assert one epistemological frame to be more objective in its perception of
>this one reality. 

Another conclusion that does not follow from the premises. (See above about
ontological matters coming first.) The assertion of one epistemological
frame over another, certainly does happen, but not in an ontologiccal
vacuum. Lets look at some examples (keeping an eye on Ruth and Michael's
point about ontological differentiation):

Theory 1        The Earth is round.
Theory 2        The Earth is flat.

Theory 1        Millions of Jews were murdered in Germany between 1939-1945.
Theory 2        There was no Holocaust.

Theory 1        Women today, generally, fare less well in Western societies.
Theory 2        Women today, generally, fare better in Western societies.

can you make no epistemolgical heirachy here Andy? Still it's not a heirachy
that can be decided in advance of object specification.

All of this stems from the liberal conception of human
>beings and of our ways of knowing, particularly the trap of empiricism. 

See all arguments above about ontology having priority over ways of knowing,
which actually Andy, I'm afraid to add, is what you do. That is, privilege
the ways of knowing about mental illness as sacrosanct.

A
s
>Bacon argued, quite falsely, that our knowledge of the thing (the "idols") 
>prevent us from seeing the thing for what it really is. How would know the
>thing apart from knowing it? 

By your own account, perhaps. Through in and by Praxis. Again examples

Theory 1        we can not walk on water
Theory 2        We can walk on water

Word of advice though Andy, I suggest you only try 2 in water no deeper that
your own height.

Or again, bearing in mind Ruth and Michael's excellent points about object
differentiation:

Theory 1        Global capital tends to relocate to Home countries.
Theory 2        Global capital is used in Host countries to improve the
social                 conditions of the peasants.


Sounds silly when you say it out loud, when
>you make it explicit, but that is what is being argued here. What the
>thing is is what we believe we see, 

Yes but that is your view is it not. Things are just as we make them?

and in modifying the way we see we see
>a different thing. In the former view, the empiricist view, we assume the
>intransitivity of the object world. 

No actuallly, you're totally wrong here, empiricism is a form of idealsim.
The existence of the object depends on the fact or possibility of it being
experienced. That's why Bhaskar is such a big spanner in the works of all
attempts to move beyond empiricism. 

 Thus your
>earlier assertion regarding the intranstivity of the observing an
>argument. I could not disagree more. The act of understanding the
>situation involves active interpretation of the interaction. 

Well absolutley, again you are, for some reason I can not yet make out, keen
to attribute to me positions i do not hold. If I don't know what an argument
is i could hardly examine one. But the interpretation of the interaction
does not mean that one has to be in the argument, thus allowing the
conditions of possibility for third party description of the argument.
Someone, earlier raised the issue of referential detachment. This is
important. The possibility, nay necessity, of referential detachment is a
practical presupposition of human activity. The word football is not the
football it describes.

>to a question of critical realism or transcendental realism. I hold the
>latter is idealism because it assumes the existence of something that
>cannot be verified, i.e. its ideal absolute form. 

No it does not. Where are you getting this from? You need to distinguish
between transcendental and transcendant. The former derives from Kant and is
an inquiry into the conditions of possibility for a given activity. It
generally takes the form: "What must be the case for X to be possible?"
It is not at all a 'thing-in-itself' theory of which we can say nothing.

I agree with Gramsci's
>observation that transcendental realism is "religious residue." 

Well this is rich coming from Gramsci, probably the most idealist of Marxists.

I disagree
>with Bhaskar on the degree of transcendental (or what he calls "simple") 
>realism in Marx's work. Based on very few fragments, which are at best
>implict (although one is quite explicit, I must admit) Bhaskar develops a
>view not unlike Althusser regarding the maturation of Marx's thinking. I
>think the case is overstated, and that the majority of Marx's writings
>reflect a critical realism. 

Oh but Bhaskar would agree with you, but only argue that it was never made
explicit. In fact, he would probably argue that critical realism formed a
necessary although unthematised philosphy bedrock for Marx.

>I believe in mind-independent reality.

Pardon! Surely I've missed a move or two here. I think this too. How does
this stand in relation to your some of your earlier statements.


>But I am also critical enough to know that I cannot assert the existence
>of something that is unverifiable. 

Oh so you are an empiricist? Non? A Popperian one at that maybe?

So the real object of my study of
>something like mental illness should be either on its phenomenal form
>using my categories, or on the first order objectivations of the culture I
>am studying, again using my categories. 

OH, that clinches it you are an empiricist! But, of course, this is our
first point of contact with reality, but the important question is do we
give these incorrigible status or subject them to critical scrutiny. through
retroductive arguments perhaps, postulating unobservabable causal mechanisms?

It depends on which reality I want
>to access.

A mind independent one or a culturally constructed one? How many realities
are we talking about here?

>However, it is clear, that there is not one reality here. 

Sorry Andy, but the way you use the term reality has me really confused
here. You say you believe in a mind independent reality and talk about
realities. I mean, consider the following in relation to your claim to
believe in a mind independent reality.
>
I have a problem with the notion of external
>historical "laws" of development, or physical reality as supposed to exist
>outside of human cognition. 

Either there is a very deep argument going on here which I don't have the
intellectual tools to keep up with you (a distinct possibility I admit) or
you are contradicting your self.

And so in "revealing" this really real reality
>we apply the methods of science, which are human constructions, and so the
>object, rather than being uncovered, is eveloped in greater layers of
>scientific construction. 

This is all pure Kuhnian transcendental idealism. You still conflate the
intransitive dimension with the transitive. Or perhaps you reject these
categories and say there is only the transitive (this is actually what you
argue in a number of places). But if so, you can not really maintain your
claim to beleive in a mind independent reality. Have you ever read Judith
Butler? You'd like her I guess. There is a materiality but we can say
nothing of it. Or Rorty I suppose.

And finally, your idealism becomes unabashed.

>
>I disagree that social reality, and its ideational products, arise from
>physical reality. When Marx uses the term "material" he does not use it in
>the vulgar sense of "physical reality." He means our reproduction of our
>material existence. Humans "humanize" the object world, filling up their
>social world with objects they create. Even our physical culture is human
>produced, its objectivation coming through human labor, an inherently
>social exercise. It was Engels that argued that our the form and content
>of our thoughts arise from the physical "substratum." In a piece of paper
>he threw away, he worked it out to its logical conclusion: that the
>thought content, then, could not differ from the actual physical
>organization of the universe. We can see why he threw this thought away. 

Whatever the above para is it's not realism, and certainly not Bhaskar's
form of realism. As for Engels, well, probably because he lacked a theory of
emergence and stratification.
>
>I am indeed giving you my interpretation of historical materialism. I
>believe it is in line with Marx's formulation. But if I believe that the
>process of knowing is interpretation then I cannot do anything other than
>present my "version" of historical materialism. I do not presume to know
>what your interpretation is; I set out my "version" prior to hearing your
>"version." You assumed that I presumed your position.

No I didn't, I questioned your conflation of historical materialism with
your account of historical materialism.

>Historical materialism is constantly in a process of production. I agree. 
>This is a fundamental premise undergirding my stance. Historical
>materialism, as I earlier noted, has the capacity to locate itself
>historically and adapt to the process of historical change. As for
>differientiating ontology from epistemology, this is an impossibility. I
>assert what I know, and what I know contains what I hold to be real or not
>real. How might I explore my ontology apart from my epistemology? I would
>really like an answer for this. And I will wait until hell freezes over
>because, again, it is impossible - it is a contradiction. This is the
>ontological fallacy, rather paradox.

The foundational fallacy. If we can't have certain knowledge of our ontology
its little other than our epistemology. Of course, we can only know the
world through our descriptions of it. But the world itself speaks to us
through our interactions of it as you yourself admit. If you really have so
much difficulty distinguishing your ontology from your epistemology, pray
tell me, do you play football? by kicking the word or the thing that the
word describes? 


>
>I always tell my students that they being culturally relative does not
>mean you have to be morally realitive. You should fight for what you
>believe in. You should judge things, what is better than this, where we
>draw the line. I have very deeply held convictions. As long as relativity
>is taken to the extreme level of reconizing multiple realities then I
>don't have a problem. It is when one asserts the existence of one reality
>that everybody has different takes on that I have problems with.

Sorry, you've lost me again. So where is the mind independent reality? Look,
there is a tribe in the Amazon jungle that still believes that the Earth is
flat, still believes that the Earth is the center of the universe. Now I,
probably like you, would fight to preserve their right to believe in these
things and to reserve their way of life without our interference. Still is
their account of reality, er, I looking for the right word here, more
accurate than ours. Does it better describe the mind independent reality you
_say_ you believe in?


>Okay, if I misunderstood, I apologise. However, I do not assume that
>another culture's concepts are sacrosanct. Take the instance of FGM. I
>hold a position that my belief that the practice should be discontinued is
>superior to the belief that it is culturally bounded and therefore not
>subject to my moral judgment. 

Sorry, this is important. Why? Why this issue and not mental ilness? And on
what grounds? They are not hurting women, it's good for them. That's their
reality. There is not one thing which is being done which we decribe as FGM,
but they as saving their women from themselves. These are two different
realities according to your philosophy. So your grounds for intervention can
only be your cultural value superiority.  I on the other hand would engage
in a dialogue that attempted to put forward my case based on ontological
considerations - i.e. actually this practice causes pain: it does not really
function in the manner you believe: women as human beings have an intrinsic
value independent of your cultural descriptions of them etc. You on the
other hand seem to have no arguments to present to them other than "I don't
like your reality". What can you do about it. (i) Retreat into a Rortyesque
form of displaying sympathy to them? They'll appreciate that I'm sure. You
care, how nice. Or, (ii) Use multiple missiles and totally destroy all
elements of their culture and impose yours. 

> Sorry, again I don't understand. Who is guilty of holding a transhistorical
>> ontology absolutely? You perhaps, in advocating that the ontology embedded
>> in certain cultural construals of mental illness are simply 'true for them'.
>> This seems ontologically absolutist. On the account I'm avocating it is
>> perfectly feasible that another cultures account of mental illness might
>> more accurately capture more of that phenomena that "ours". 
>
>How can an assertion that something is true for them and not for us
>translate into ontological abolutism?

Because it is ontologically absolute for them and ours for us. We create our
reality/ontology they create theirs. There is a difference between
absolutism and universalism.

>
>It is not a fallacy to tie ontology to epistemology. It is reality. To
>assume an epistemolgically-independent ontology, while an assumption I
>happen to agree with, is far less real than the former stance. One deals
>with realty. The other deals with the unknown. I mean consider the
following in relation
> So I disagree.

Well you don't actually do you? You admit that there is an ontological realm
that we epistemologically examine. If there were no ontological realm
independent of our epistemology, you are commited to the view that global
warming, for example, had no existence until we became aware of it. Very
strange don't you think?

>Critical realism entertains mind
>independent reality, but the ontology of that reality is dependent on
>epistemological systems. If, on a foundational philosophical level, to be
>a realist is to assert the existence of one reality that lies outside of
>epistemological system, then I am not a realist. But I am willing to
>entertain the argument. However I am not about to allow idealism to usurp
>the term realism to legitimate its position (making it convenient to label
>detractors as "anti-realist"). 

Back to the question I opened with. Is it possible to be something you are
without knowing it? I think so, and as a good empiricist might say, the
evidence is in the text. Realism, a general definition, taken from the
Fontana dictionary of Modern Thought: "the theory that there is a world of
material things in space which do not depend for their existence on the fact
that some mind is aware of them." 

Are you an idealist Andy? I don't know? 

>Again, as I originally stated, the ruling class dominate and control the
>means of ideational production. I also stated that ideational construction
>occurs throughout the class structure. These two statements are not
>contradictory, and negate your charge here.

And is controlled by the ruling elite. No such negation occurs. The
ideational construction that occurs throughout the class structure is that
of the ruling elite. Isn't this the basis of Marx's theory of ideology, see
also Lukes 3rd level of power.
>
>They also have many other motivations to produce mental illness outside of
>their functional position vis-a-vis the ruling class.

How is that possible? Since the ideational realm is controlled by the ruling
elite, even the outside motivations are subject to such domination. Read
Foucault.


>They are consequences of the strawman you have created, not of my actual
>argument.

Sorry if I've misunderstood, can you give me your arguemnt again then.

>
>I fail to understand how it is possible to even make this statement. If we
>do not construct the social world then who does? God? Mother Nature? What
>entity, what force, besides human beings in active interaction in social
>structure that they and the forebearers have produced, construct the
>world? This is the flaw of idealism. This is where Althusser falls down.
>The production of a subjectless history.

Andy, Andy please, don't let your empiricist ontology blind you to
considerations of tense. The world we inhabit today was created by the long
dead. We get what we are given, we can reproduce it or transform it. We do
not construct it, it must preexist us in order for us to act. Consider any
social act, it is an act of reproduction not construction. In order to act
we need socail tools. History is a heavy burden to bear. wouldn't it be nice
if we could simply begin from scatch and construct Kant's perpetual peace?

>> To
>> suggest as much is a denial of history and also of tense. The past pre-dates
>> us. We get given a set of structures and social objects which we interact
>> within. The socail world pre-exists us. It exists prior to our birth. This
>> is the essence of Marx's dictum, 'Men make history etc....' 
>
>"Men make history..." Exactly! What does that mean? WE make history. Make
>= construct. Right? Marx wasn't talking about the gods when he said "men."

But the last part of the dictum Andy!!! 
 

>It would appear, considering how often you use it, that the cultural
>belief in the theory of gravity is sacrosanct to you.

Dr Johnson is a good friend to the realist. But your flippant statement
above does not refute the veracity of the arguement. if only because the
belief in gravity appears not to be culturally specific nor concept
dependent. It appears to work whether you know it or not. Also, again keep
your/my epistemolgy and ontology apart. I am not committed to any sacrosanct
theory of gravity, but only to the belief that there is a force which seems
to work in this way. Who describes it best, Newton or Einstein? I don't know.

Thanks, things are clearer now? You don't like the postulation of
unobservables in theory do you? That's the problem.

Hope you haven't taken offense, but as I say we haven't had a good argument
on this list. If I've got your position wrong, please feel free to correct
me, maybe off the list if others prefer.

Colin.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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"We stand at the end of the age of reason. 
 A new era of the magical explanation of the world is rising" 
 (Adolf Hitler)


Colin Wight
Department of International Politics
University of Wales, Aberystwyth
Aberystwyth
SY23 3DA

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