Date: Wed, 2 Oct 1996 23:11:24 -0500 From: derekh-AT-yorku.ca (Derek Hrynyshyn) Subject: Comments on RTS2-1.5A Thanks to Hans E for posting the latest section from the text. I think that the way laws are talked about in this section answers many of the concerns I had a while ago about the difference between the laws (or representations of them) and the tendencies that they represent in the real world. But I am still not quite convinced by the argument, not totally. I think that there is some linguistic slight of hand going on here. Bhaskar has just taken the idea of laws, and since there are difficult questions about the ontological status of them, has used the word "tendencies" instead. Which Newton did 300 years ago. What exactly is a tendency, and what is its ontological status? Is it some kind of transfactual connection between a set of conditions and a necessary consequence of them? A causal connection? If so, doesn't this just circle back and beg the question about the ontological status of causation? Perhaps I am too critical here. Maybe we can be satisfied with the knowledge that given some conditions, there will always be necessary consequences, and call this knowledge of causal laws. But i am not sure and would like to hear what others say on this. Is anyone else left with gnawing doubts about the adequacy of this? Or does Bhaskar mean something different and more adequate? As an aside, is there anyone out there who has given any thought to the application of critical realism to mathematics? Are mathematical relationships a deep structure? If not, what ontological status do they have? Derek. Derek Hrynyshyn, Graduate Program Phone: 650-2276 in Political Science, derekh-AT-yorku.ca York University Ross S609 Communications Officer, CUPE local 3903 Fax: 736-5480 ******** Office: 736 - 5154 http://www.yorku.ca/org/cupe/cupe3903.htm
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