Date: Mon, 11 Nov 1996 12:16:12 -0700 (MST) From: hans despain <HANS.DESPAIN-AT-m.cc.utah.edu> Subject: BHA: Re: Domain debate Un-like Michael and Doug, i have been (trying to) follow the current exchanges on domains rather close. But often i have found it hard to follow what exactly is the subject of the debate at times. In other words it seems to me that the debate has evolved, but i am unclear if any positions have changed. Tobin in his orginial post 10-20-96 ("Bhaskar's domians") made two main arguments: (1) "Bhaskar's acceptance of experience as a major ontological domain is an error, and correcting it involves in effect using Bhaskar against himself." (2) "The domains, I believe, Should be distinguished by *emergence*". Now it has not been clear if Howard excepts the second argument about emergence constituting the distinction between the domains. Moreover, i think Tobin has been a bit loose with his use of the notion of emergence and how it (or how it should) constitutes the distinction between the domains. Although i do not except emergence as the criteria of distinction, i would agree it has something to do with especially the domain of the real D(r) and the domain of the actual D(a). There are emergent possibilities when the objects of the real interact with one another. But the distinction has to do with the powers and liabilities of things (not necessarily the emergent possiblities). In the D(a) these powers and liabilities of things may not be manifest or may be 'cancelled out', when interacting with the powers and liablities of other things. Whereby, the D(r) and D(a) are distingished. And in the D(e) the powers and liabilities may not be observed or perceived, whereby we also must make the distinction between D(e) and D(a). However, this point has not been altogether significant in the exchange between (especially) Howard and Tobin. The debate has evolved toward attempting to establish the proper significance of the domain of the subjective D(s) which includes both the empirical and conceptional (as Bhaskar says 1994:42; 84). To this task, i think, is a movement away from Tobin's initial stance (as the D(e) being an [ontological] "error"). It does indeed seem to be the case that the D(e) [and D(s)] is not part of the world itself. If this is Tobin's argument, i would agree. But to call the distinction an error i take to be a mistake (so in spirit or thrust would side with Howard here). i believe that Tobin has implicitly been attacking the idea that the D(e) is part of the world itself. But i don't believe this to be Bhaskar's stance, so i don't believe Tobin to be critiquing Bhaskar; rather they would seem to be in phase about this. What i believe to constitute the distinctions of domains is *immanent* in the possibility of the activity of science itself. That is to say for the activity of science (and its history) to possible there must be an ontological distinction such that D(r) > D(a) > D(e). To repeat, emergence may be involved here, but it is by no means the criteria. Ontological stratification is a condition for the possibility of science. Which also establishes Bhaskar's critique of (Humean) "constant conjuctivitis" (Bhaskar 1994:222); and grounds induction, transcendental reasoning, and falsification in science (Bhaskar 1994:23). Moreover, i would accept that the D(e) is a "subset" of the D(a); but would simply add that both are in turn a "subset" of the D(r). The idea here is that although the interaction of real things may led to an emergence, they also may not. And even when the do not, we still can distingish between the D(r) and D(a). So in this sense, i don think that Howard really means to argue against the idea of "subsets", but is arguing in favor of a distinction. Where i believe Howard to be mistaken is his implicit acceptence of the criteria of emergence (or at least his *absence* of an explicit critique of this stance). hans d. --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
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