File spoon-archives/bhaskar.archive/bhaskar_1997/97-01-11.090, message 35


From: "Tobin Nellhaus" <nellhaus-AT-gwi.net>
Subject: BHA: Re: Journal for the theory of social behaviour, etc.
Date: Mon, 30 Dec 1996 09:22:20 -0500


Doug--

Many thanks for the information about the journal, and for the news about the
conference and the new Center for Critical Realism.  Any info about what
things the Center will be doing?

As you say, the existence of JTSB needn't foreclose the possibility of
another journal; there may still be good reasons to pursue the idea,
particularly in the U.S. context.  Ditto for developing a local Web site.  My
main interest in these ideas is finding ways to promote CR, especially in the
U.S.

A couple questions/comments.  You write:

>         At the JTSB conference, Bhaskar spoke of the need for a theory to
> be able to account for its own production, a test, Bhaskar argued, that
> pomo fails.  He further spoke of the ineluctability of ontology and of
> postmodernism's commission of a "performative contradiction" where what one
> says contradicts one's ability to say it -- another flaw in pomo.

I'm curious about the ambiguity of your phrase, "its own production."  Does
this refer to a theory's historical emergence, its social basis, its logical
foundations, its process of generating ideas, or its output?  All of those? 
Is this ambiguity yours or Bhaskar's?  Is there any way to demonstrate
conclusively that a theory "is able to" make such an account if (for whatever
reason; perhaps it is a new theory) none of its theorists happen to have done
so?  And what need such an account consist of (e.g, regarding a theory's
historical basis, is a "history of ideas" adequate?)?

>         To end on a substantive note, it seems to me, Tobin, that in any
> set of elements (such as women in the world) there will always be a level
> of abstraction at which they have some property in common and a level of
> concreteness at which their properties differ.  The question is whether the
> level of abstraction at which they share a commonality is a useful one.
> (The observation is actually Chomsky's.)  Thus, pomo's anti-essentialism
> seems just an a priori (dare I say foundationalist?) demand that we always
> remain at a level of concreteness where difference reigns.

Oh-oh.  If most PoMo theory is "concrete," I'm operating at a lower level of
consciousness than I ever feared possible!  But joking aside, I'm skeptical
of this account of post-al theory, in part because it tends to treat
difference itself abstractly.  Its concept of difference also derives from
the Saussurean conception of *langue*, a terrible abstraction which still
lurks heavily in the PoMo background.  (Let's not even touch the abstraction
and universalization in Lacanian theory.)

Regarding the concept of categories, I'll certainly agree that some
abstractions are pretty useless, and also that there are some "pure"
categories in which all members uniquely share some property (or set of
properties).  But the latter are basically special cases: most categories are
"fuzzy."  (I find George Lakoff's arguments on this point quite convincing,
and he is evidently committed to a version of realism, enough I think that CR
should pay attention.  Which isn't to say I agree with everything he says.) 
So with a category like "men" or "women," once you start looking at all the
variations of build, body hair, chromosomal oddities, genital mismatches,
organ removals, mastoid developments, sexual desires, social positions, table
manners, etc etc etc, one does begin to wonder how a rigid category can
possibly be concocted, and whether it's even worth the effort.  The concept
of fuzzy categories (with, say, a statistical high point) then becomes rather
handy, and also might cool some of the furor over the category of "women." 
(But not all: categories frequently have "best examples," and there are
clearly political implications in that identification, e.g. if the favored
example is a straight, white, blonde and slender professional woman with 1.5
kids, a seat on the local church board, and the Home Shopping Network on her
speed dial.)

Of course, since I'm a stereotype myself, who am I to say?

---
Tobin Nellhaus
nellhaus-AT-gwi.net
"Faith requires us to be materialists without flinching": C.S. Peirce



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