File spoon-archives/bhaskar.archive/bhaskar_1997/97-01-11.090, message 82


From: "hans despain" <DESPAIN-AT-econ.sbs.utah.edu>
Date:          Fri, 10 Jan 1997 14:19:56 GMT-700
Subject: BHA: We need to be more careful


To repeat myself (and also so we are not in so much agreement) i 
assert that the way the intransitive and transitive dimensions are 
being discussed tends to commit a type of categorial error.

In brief, the distinction between the two dimensions are a 
philosophical argument meant to ground, understand, explain and make 
sense of the activity of science (and its practical applications, 
along with practical living).  More specifically, the ID/TD 
distinction is a transcendentally established philosophical condition 
which must be the case for the possbility of scientific activity.

In this sense it is to commit a (Kantian) *transcendental illusion* 
to believe that this philosohical distinction warrants us (prior to 
actual scientific work) to declare this or that (hypothesized or 
epistemological) entity as being part of the intransitive dimension.
Moreover, even when we have traveled through the process of 
science, we should remain skeptic about what we actually claim to be 
intransitive.

As a means of an example, allow me to take flight into the misty realm 
of political economy.  As an example there exists in broad agreement 
within political economy that a socio-economic structure (dubbed) 
capitalism exists (this is true save the historical relativist 
tradition, and contemporary post-structualist political economy).

However, even when there seems to be broad agreement about the 
existence of the (social) entity (or structure) there exists great 
disagreement to what constitutes (as essential properties and 
characteristics; including its powers, liabilities, and general 
tendencies as a social structure) capitalism as a socio-economic 
structure (or as a mode of production).  There are at least six 
significant (real) definations.  Next, one still has to confront 
the historical school tradition (and) now post-structualism with 
respect to its (the social structure captialism) every existence, or 
its ontological status.

A commitment to critical realism does necessarily commitment us to 
any particular (real) defination, nor even necessarily to the 
existence of capitalism.  What a commitment to critical realism does 
do, and particularally a commitment to critical naturalism (and still 
more specifically a commitment to TMSA) is that we should search for 
and investigate the existence of social structures (as an 
intransitive object that must exist for the possiblity of agency).

Critical realism has nearly nothing to say about the particular 
*scientific onotolgy* which we attempt to (re-)construct with are 
activity as economists (or as scientists in general).  And to repeat 
the scientific ontology cannot be said to have actually ever find 
intransitivity, at least not in this sense that our knowledge is not 
fallible, to think otherwise is to commit the ontic fallacy.

Further, however, a commitment to critical realism has another very 
important understanding with respect to its (or Bhaskar's) 
description of scientific activity (e.g., the transitive process).  
Namely, the distinction between ID/TD, and more broadly a commitment 
to "deepth realism" suggests at the very least that we should as 
scientists attempt to reach the Leibnizian level of science by 
attempting to construct a "real" defination of our object (e.g. 
capitalism or the mode of production).  This is in contra-distinction 
to both neo-Kantian (e.g. versions of Keynesianism) and neo-
Nietzschean (e.g. post-strucutualist political economy) inspired 
schools of thought; along with being in contradiction to modes of 
idealist definations found in traditions committed to neo-
Kantian inspired idealism (e.g. Weberian or Tawney's Geist), logical 
postivism (e.g. Chicago [Freidman]) and empiricism (mainstream neo-
Classical, or Schumpeterian methodological commitments).

In sum, we should never, prior to the actually activity of 
the scientific process, nor before a transcendental reflection and 
dialectical critique of its (i.e. science) metaphysical results 
(dogmatically) maintain what properly belongs in the transitive and 
intranstive dimensions.  This is the job of science to *attempt* to 
sort out at the Leibnizian level, but never at the expense of a 
skeptical attitude of this attempt.  In short, intransitivity and 
transitivity are not boxes to through our dirty landary and 
subjective biases.

hans d.

p.s. if it would be helpful, i could be much more specific about the 
usages of the terms ID/TD which i am taking issue with.  But in 
general i am quite uncomfrontable with how the general discussion has 
developed.


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