Date: Sat, 8 Mar 1997 23:25:39 -0800 (PST)
From: LH Engelskirchen <lhengels-AT-igc.apc.org>
Subject: BHA: second thesis


Thanks to Colin for the correction.  I certainly did not mean to
say that the fourth sense of truth depends on our knowing, in
action or otherwise, and I also agree on the relevance of the
second thesis on Feuerbach, relevant so often to our discussions. 
 
But with the correction, and precisely bringing to bear the second
thesis, isn't the point that insofar as such knowledge is
accessible to us, we must realize it in action, ie in the
transformative negation of the given.
 
But then what does "typically achievable when referential
detachment occurs" mean?  Here is the whole quote I am puzzled
about from Plato 64:
 
"the truth as ontological, no longer tied to language use per se
and in this sense objective and in the intransitive dimension,
typically achievable when referential detachment (see s1) occurs;"
 
What does referential detachment have to do with the second thesis? 
Or with ontological truth?  Referential detachment establishes the
thing referred to, even if it is what I just said, as intransitive. 
But what does that have to do with any kind of truth?
 
* * * 
 
Thanks also to Gary for his review and particularly for the
examples.  I have too few such examples at my command and hope
others will follow the model.  Also, Gary, I hope you will post the
other notes you mentioned to the list as a whole.  I'd certainly
like to see them.
 
* * * 
 
A second thought on Michael's point about preferring one theory
over another because that theory can explain at least one
significant phenomenon that the other cannot explain.  It occurs to
me that this is *never* the way theories are preferred in science. 
Neoclassical economics is not dominant because it explains some few
more phenomena than marxist economics.  Not Einstein's physics over
Newton's either.  We don't choose the wave theory of light over the
particle theory on that basis or whether the dormant dna in an
ewe's udder can be revived to replicate the whole sheep.  In fact,
where choices are made I suspect it is much more likely to be a
consequence of depth rather than horizontal calculations.  I mean,
if I can show one event is the result of a generative mechanism and
the generative mechanism's mechanism, I will go with that rather
than another theory which lacks depth, but explains more events.  
Could Marx in 1848 explain more economic phenomena than Smith and
Ricardo?  
 
One explanation of the "at least one significant phenomenon more"
approach is in the PON discussion of agency and is presented as a
response to the *indeterminacy of translation* -- "one chooses the
translation which is explanatorily most adequate . . . in the
context of what is already known about the organization of the
society in question (and societies in general)."  But here it is a
comparison of meanings at the margin within the framework of the
same language.  The shift from Newton's to Einstein's physics is
more like a complete change in language.  If in science one theory
explains 49% and another 51%, my guess is judgment as between the
two will be withheld.
 
I thought well if it doesn't work in science, maybe at least it
works in political affairs, Ruth's focus, where collectivities must
act, as individuals do, without always waiting for clear consensus. 
But I doubt this is the way political decisions are made, or that
a case could be made that this is how they should be made.  
 
* * * *
 
I wanted also to add that DIALECTIC is not Bhaskar's only difficult
work and in my view anyone with any questions about any text should
raise them without concern for sidetracking from anything else
that's going on for exactly the reason Ruth raises -- very very few
of us have any live body at hand to turn to for help with this
stuff.
 
As for DIALECTIC I join Colin's request for someone to take a stab
at clarifying the 1M through 5C schema.  Tim provided a first rate
introduction in his paper for RM.  Could you explain the point you
made there Tim, by way of introduction to the effort?
 
Also, as for RTS, perhaps there is a bridge in this.  1M is said to
be characterized by a critique of actualism.  Chapter 2 which we
now read in RTS is the most sustained such critique I am aware of
in Bhaskar.  How does what we read clarify our understanding at
least of 1M?
 
 
Howard  
 
     "What is there just now you lack"  Hakuin
 
Howard Engelskirchen
Western State University


     --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---