Date: Sat, 29 Mar 1997 13:37:42 -0800 (PST)
From: LH Engelskirchen <lhengels-AT-igc.apc.org>
Subject: BHA: analytics and actualism


 
Thanks to Tobin for his mention some weeks back of the reissue of
RTS.  I also sent off for a copy and received back a handsome
purple copy.  Provoked to turn to section 4 of chapter 2 . . . 
 
In section 2 of chapter 2 the conditions for closure were
presented; in section 3, the concept of action implied by them was
brought out; in section 4, the realist account of laws is
counterposed to the actualist account. (RTS 103). 
 
The realist account depends on the distinction between structures
and events, since by "asserting a normic statement one is not
asserting the realization of the consequent; but the operation of
a mechanism irrespective of its results."  
 
My question goes to the connection made explicit at 137 of PLATO
and presented also in DIALECTIC on the connection between the
analytical problematic and actualism.
 
Why is it actualism gives rise to analytics, rather than
dialectics?
 
And how does the counterposition of an actualist account of laws to
a realist account in section 4 of chapter 2 of RTS get reflected in
the counterposition of an analytical problematic to a dialectical
one?
 
Howard
 
Howard Engelskirchen
Western State University
 
          "What is there just now you lack"     Hakuin


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