Date: Tue, 11 Mar 1997 23:44:03 -0500 (EST) From: Howie Chodos <howie-AT-magi.com> Subject: Re: BHA: An Open Question. A side query. At 20:28 97-03-11 -0600, you wrote: > Howie speaks of a "simplistic correspondence theory of truth." > > For decades I have wondered about the form, "simplistic theory of x." > > My suspicion has always been that, usually, that phrase is >redundant; that for the speaker/writer *any* form of x, is by >definition, "simplistic" or "naive" or "vulgar." > > Merely a query. > > Carrol Cox Carrol, Two points. First, what do you think of people who say that they reject simplistic versions of Marxism, the kind of versions that reduce all phenomena to class, or that argue that every utterance has an implicit class content, or that paint everyone who disagrees with them as some kind of class enemy, but that they still think of themselves as Marxist? Second, I do think that there is some sense in which it is important to recognize that when we speak in terms of truths that we are utilising concepts that correspond to something that is independent of us as thinking subjects. I'm not sure how this relates to other dimensions of whatever it is that we want to call truth. But I do think that it doesn't exhaust the meaning of truth. In this sense, to reduce truth exclusively to its correspondence dimension is to misinterpret its meaning. It seemed to me that introducing a concept of absence as causal brought out the fact that there was more to truth than simple correspondence. We need to be able to make true statements that correspond to the reality of absence, that is to nothing. Howie Chodos --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
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