Date: Fri, 18 Apr 1997 12:24:31 -0400 (EDT)
From: Howie Chodos <howie-AT-magi.com>
Subject: Re: BHA: Fetishism


Just a few (final?) comments on Colin's latest.

What I had in mind when I suggested that the legal system recognises forms
of unintended action were situations where the individual is deemed to not
be responsible for the outcome of his/her actions on grounds such as
temporary insanity. Though I am no legal scholar, it seemed to me that once
we allow that this kind of action occurs, we open the door to an
(approximate) analogy between "the devil made me do it" and "the system made
me do it". This is not the same problem as that of unintended consequences,
since it is more concerned with the shaping of the motivational structure of
individual action rather than with the degree of responsibility for an
unintended outcome. I agree with Colin that determining the degree of
responsibility has to be an empirical matter, and I was arguing that
accepting the idea of a duality of agency would encourage us to do this kind
of analysis by looking at both structurally determined factors and
individual free agency. 

But I am still puzzled by how structure relates to structuratum in his
version of this process. Colin writes: "Structure, for me, refers to the
relations between the constituent elements which make up a structuratum. A
structuratum, we might like to say, emerges out of the various structures
which make it up, and it has a concrete existence, whilst a structure, as a
set of relations is abstract." I have a lot of difficulty with the idea that
structures are somehow "abstract". In fact, I am tempted to say that it goes
against the underlying thrust of the TMSA as best I understand it. Even if
the concrete effects that the TMSA attributes to ontologically irreducible
social structures are simply carried over to the "level" (or whatever) of
the structuratum, it still seems to me that the addition of this further
concept simply confuses matters. Furthermore, I think it is a step backwards
to conceptualise social relations as definitively abstract by relegating the
concrete to the new dimension of the structuratum.

Finally, I would be interested in hearing more from Colin (whenever it is
convenient, of course) on how bringing the individual back in helps him deal
with issues in the field of IR. While I appreciate his general point that
simply treating the state as an individual writ large has serious negative
consequences, I'd be curious to see how the differences in theoretical
approches might influence analysis of particular cases.

Howie Chodos 



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