Date: Wed, 07 May 1997 11:46:53 -0400
From: Ruth Groff <rgroff-AT-yorku.ca>
Subject: Re: BHA: Re: a question.


Colin,

In the version of Bhaskar's facts-to-values argument with which I'm most 
familiar, the implicit value commitment is to truth.  As I understand 
it, the argument in its earlier form at least is/was directed 
specifically to the false but real appearances generated by capitalism. 
So it goes something like "Insofar as x generates and is served by 
ideological appearance y, appreciation of the falsity of y entails a 
negative evaluation of x."

In this fairly limited case, note, the `facts' which imply values are of 
a different order than your example. 

But beyond this, I would say (following a brilliant old article by 
Charles Taylor) that theories, if not individual factoids, are indeed 
*internally* related to values in the sense that they give rise to (what 
Taylor calls) a `value slope' - a set of assumptions about what is good 
for human beings.  And it is at *this* point in the argument that I do 
think that, for what its worth, the critique of value neutrality 
does require an assumption along the lines of "x is a good for human 
beings, therefore x has a positive normative value."

I wrote a short little paper comparing Bhaskar and Taylor on this point 
which I'd be happy to pass along to you if you'd like.

Still not out of the Dialectic bog,
Ruth




     --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---