From: "Tobin Nellhaus" <nellhaus-AT-gwi.net> Subject: BHA: Re: Do Groups Mean Date: Sat, 26 Apr 1997 17:00:43 -0400 I don't have time to respond in detail to Howard's very interesting discussion, but I'd like to look a bit at just one of his points: his effort, if I understand him correctly, to separate meaning and intention. At first this sounded promising to me, but as I rolled it around in my head, I wasn't so sure. In fact, I'm not convinced this separation is possible. Please note, I am not "attacking" the suggestion, simply asking some questions about it, which quite possibly Howard (or others) will answer to my satisfaction. The reason I am balking at this distinction is (at least initially) political. Suddenly I had an image of those characters out in Colorado or someplace who published a book on how to make bombs, which evidently got pretty broad circulation among right-wing extremist groups here (much on our minds again, now that the Oklahoma City bombing trial has started). The publishers can say, "We're just distributing information--we don't intend anyone to *use* it, though that's their choice.* A neat separation of meaning and intention. Now in this case obviously we could say that these publishers are being disingenuous, but my concern is, do we want to support a philosophical point that can so readily allow such rationalizations? More broadly, this seems to bring in a fact/value distinction which positivism upholds and Bhaskar demolishes. Re group thinking, I recently stumbled across the following: "An entity *x* may be said to possess a *mind* at time *t* if and only if it is the case that it possesses at *t* the capacity either to acquire or to exercise the acquired ability to creatively manipulate symbols" (PON2, 81 [near the start of Ch. 3]). Note: "an entity." 'Nuf said.... --- Tobin Nellhaus nellhaus-AT-gwi.net "Faith requires us to be materialists without flinching": C.S. Peirce --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
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