Date: Mon, 28 Apr 1997 13:06:30 -0400 (EDT) From: Howie Chodos <howie-AT-magi.com> Subject: Re: BHA: Do Groups Mean Thanks to Howard for the stimulating post. I am far from sure that I've got a handle on all of it, but there are a few points that I would like to press. First, I think that the distinction between meaning and intent is legitimate and important. I see it as being quite central to the structure of the TMSA, in that it grounds the possibility that we transform/reproduce social structures through our activity without necessarily intending to do so. The meaning of social action depends on more factors than simply subjective intent. When a factory worker goes to work in the morning she reproduces capitalism, not because she necessarily intends to do so (although that too would be possible) but because she needs to earn a wage that will support her and her family. In this sense, there is not one unique meaning that can be ascribed to her actions, but multiple meanings, both of an 'objecive' and a 'subjective' nature, which must be desrcribed in order to generate an (approximately) accurate picture of what is transpiring. But I am less convinced of the way Howard is trying to deploy this distinction in discussing questions of causality. I guess his post has still left me confused as to exactly what he means by 'causally efficacious'. On the one hand, he tells us that "We start out with the idea that generative mechanisms are causally efficacious" (point #1). No problem here. He subsequently (point #3) affirms that: "The person who commands does really intend to make a trench, but it is not his or her intentional activity that is causally efficacious in the sense of transforming nature". And further that: "The command is efficacious as a social form of meaning", but not as the reason which is a cause in the transformation of nature. This is where I begin to have serious doubts. These doubts are further reinforced by his reading of Bhaskar's Social Cube. He quotes RB as follows: "Power(1) relations are manifest on plane A, but power(2) relations, though they may be mediated by material transactions with nature, are limited to planes C, B and D (the last two of which are directly connected by the homonymy implicit in intra- subjectivity)." where: Plane A = "plane of material transactions with nature." Plane B = "plane of inter/intra subjective [personal] relations Plane C = "plane of social relations" Plane D = "plane of subjectivity of the agent." And Howard concludes that: "Plane A is reserved to power(1) relations". Now I confess to never having tried very hard to understand Bhaskar's social cube, though based on the brief presentation that Howard makes I find nothing incongenial in its essential structure. The four 'planes' do seem to me to describe the ontological field of social activity. But I wonder if when Bhaskar says that "Power(1) relations are manifest on plane A" that this is the same thing as Howard's conclusion that "Plane A is reserved to power(1) relations"? I would understand Bhaskar's power(1) as describing what I would call 'power to', or the ability to apply some means to attain a desired end. His power(2), I would call 'power over', or the ability to have the attainment of the desired end mediated by the direct action of other agents. The distinction that I would then see between power(1) and power(2) has to do with the nature of the means available to someone to accomplish their desired ends, to engage in the transformation of nature, and not with questions of presence or absence of causality. Both kinds of power are causally efficacious (in fact, I cannot conceive of a definition of power of any kind that would not involve causal efficacy, or at least potential causal efficacy). In this sense, I would not agree with Howard's conclusion ("The person who commands does really intend to make a trench, but it is not his or her intentional activity that is causally efficacious in the sense of transforming nature"), since the mediation implied by power(2) does not mean that causal efficacy resides only with the agent involved in the expenditure of physical and mental energy that directly transforms nature. In fact, I would argue that exactly the opposite conclusion flows from the original premiss of Howard's discussion, namely the separation between meaning and intent. Because the meaning of social action, and hence its consequences, cannot be equated with the subjective intent of the agent involved, we *must* posit the causal efficacy of structures, and of power(2) relations, in order to explain outcomes. What other factors could account for the possible disjunction between individual intent and actual outcome? Why else would we want to transform existing social structures to make them more amenable to human emancipation? So while I do agree that the distinguishing feature of the individual human agent is (potentially reflexive) intentionality, we also need to acknowledge that this intentionality itself is shaped by social factors. Once we do this there can no longer be any rigid line of demarcation between direct and indirect causal factors in producing any given social outcome. Only agents act intentionally, but the outcome of their actions, both in terms of meaning and in terms of the actual transformation of nature or of society, is never determined solely by that intentionality. I think it is the merit of the TMSA to allow us to think in these terms. Howie Chodos --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
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