File spoon-archives/bhaskar.archive/bhaskar_1997/97-05-14.000, message 9


Date: Mon, 28 Apr 1997 13:06:30 -0400 (EDT)
From: Howie Chodos <howie-AT-magi.com>
Subject: Re: BHA: Do Groups Mean


Thanks to Howard for the stimulating post. I am far from sure that I've got
a handle on all of it, but there are a few points that I would like to press. 

First, I think that the distinction between meaning and intent is legitimate
and important. I see it as being quite central to the structure of the TMSA,
in that it grounds the possibility that we transform/reproduce social
structures through our activity without necessarily intending to do so. The
meaning of social action depends on more factors than simply subjective
intent. When a factory worker goes to work in the morning she reproduces
capitalism, not because she necessarily intends to do so (although that too
would be possible) but because she needs to earn a wage that will support
her and her family. In this sense, there is not one unique meaning that can
be ascribed to her actions, but multiple meanings, both of an 'objecive' and
a 'subjective' nature, which must be desrcribed in order to generate an
(approximately) accurate picture of what is transpiring.

But I am less convinced of the way Howard is trying to deploy this
distinction in discussing questions of causality. I guess his post has still
left me confused as to exactly what he means by 'causally efficacious'. On
the one hand, he tells us that "We start out with the idea that generative
mechanisms are causally efficacious" (point #1). No problem here. He
subsequently (point #3) affirms that: "The person who commands does really
intend to make a trench, but it is not his or her intentional activity that
is causally efficacious in the sense of transforming nature". And further
that: "The command is efficacious as a social form of meaning", but not as
the reason which is a cause in the transformation of nature. This is where I
begin to have serious doubts.

These doubts are further reinforced by his reading of Bhaskar's Social Cube.
He quotes RB as follows:

"Power(1) relations are manifest on plane A, but power(2) relations, though
they may be mediated by material transactions with nature, are limited to
planes C, B and D (the last two of which are directly connected by the
homonymy implicit in intra- subjectivity)."

where:

Plane A = "plane of material transactions with nature."
Plane B = "plane of inter/intra subjective [personal] relations
Plane C = "plane of social relations"
Plane D = "plane of subjectivity of the agent."

And Howard concludes that: "Plane A is reserved to power(1) relations". 

Now I confess to never having tried very hard to understand Bhaskar's social
cube, though based on the brief presentation that Howard makes I find
nothing incongenial in its essential structure. The four 'planes' do seem to
me to describe the ontological field of social activity. But I wonder if
when Bhaskar says that "Power(1) relations are manifest on plane A" that
this is the same thing as Howard's conclusion that "Plane A is reserved to
power(1) relations"?

I would understand Bhaskar's power(1) as describing what I would call 'power
to', or the ability to apply some means to attain a desired end. His
power(2), I would call 'power over', or the ability to have the attainment
of the desired end mediated by the direct action of other agents. The
distinction that I would then see between power(1) and power(2) has to do
with the nature of the means available to someone to accomplish their
desired ends, to engage in the transformation of nature, and not with
questions of presence or absence of causality. Both kinds of power are
causally efficacious (in fact, I cannot conceive of a definition of power of
any kind that would not involve causal efficacy, or at least potential
causal efficacy).

In this sense, I would not agree with Howard's conclusion ("The person who
commands does really intend to make a trench, but it is not his or her
intentional activity that is causally efficacious in the sense of
transforming nature"), since the mediation implied by power(2) does not mean
that causal efficacy resides only with the agent involved in the expenditure
of physical and mental energy that directly transforms nature. In fact, I
would argue that exactly the opposite conclusion flows from the original
premiss of Howard's discussion, namely the separation between meaning and
intent. Because the meaning of social action, and hence its consequences,
cannot be equated with the subjective intent of the agent involved, we
*must* posit the causal efficacy of structures, and of power(2) relations,
in order to explain outcomes. What other factors could account for the
possible disjunction between individual intent and actual outcome? Why else
would we want to transform existing social structures to make them more
amenable to human emancipation?

So while I do agree that the distinguishing feature of the individual human
agent is (potentially reflexive) intentionality, we also need to acknowledge
that this intentionality itself is shaped by social factors. Once we do this
there can no longer be any rigid line of demarcation between direct and
indirect causal factors in producing any given social outcome. Only agents
act intentionally, but the outcome of their actions, both in terms of
meaning and in terms of the actual transformation of nature or of society,
is never determined solely by that intentionality. I think it is the merit
of the TMSA to allow us to think in these terms.

Howie Chodos



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