Date: Sat, 28 Jun 1997 08:42:06 +0100
To: bhaskar-AT-jefferson.village.Virginia.EDU
From: ccw94-AT-aber.ac.uk (COLIN WIGHT)
Subject: Re: BHA: Bhaskar & Althusser (II)


Oscar,

many thanks yet again for your insights. Just one comment.  Well two
actually. Yes you're absolutely correct about Althusser and I doubt that RB
would deny the influence. The second point is:

>2.Bhaskar writes: "..society may be regarded as an ensemble of powers 
>which exist, unlike other powers, only as long as they are exercised; 
>and are continually exercised via (i.e. in the last instance through) 
>the intentional action of men." The footnote corresponding to this 
>paragraphs affirms that "For the concept of powers conntinually 
>exercise we have of course groomed the concept of tendency." (RTS, 1997, 
>196).
>3.The passage is pretty clear: Society is an ensemble of powers. Such 
>powers exist only as long as they are exercised, and they are 
>'continually' exercised via the intentional action of men. If they cease 
>to be exercised, they cease to exist. If such powers cease to exist, 
>then the corresponding society, which is an ensemble of such powers, 
>ceases to exist as well. Therefore, such powers must always be 
>exercised, otherwise society (i.e. a particular society corresponding to 
>a particular ensemble of such powers)would not exist. 

We've sort of been over this terrain before on the list, and i think such a
proposition needs handling with care. Of course, no humans acting no
society. But this is more a theoretical limit highlighting the manner in
which these two elements of a complex social ontology are co-constituted.
But within given societies unexercised powers can and do exist, both in
virtue of the activity of people and in virtue of the inactivity of people.
The British state has the power to violently put down insurrections but such
power is not being exercised here and now and hasn't been for some time
(although the miners strike 1984, might constitute an example).

Also, on the tendencies. Well tendencies can be latent. Dogs have both the
power to bark, and do indeed tend to bark, but are not always barking (you
might want to argue that this is an example of tendency2, but actually while
all (sic) dogs have the power(tendency1) to bark not all dogs display a
tendency (2) to bark, as did my terrier. It is implicit in Bhaskar's account
of causation, and ontology, that such powers (tendencies) are still existing
even when not exercised. Also, powers can be exercised yet unrealised, due
to the existence of coutervailing tendencies.


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Colin Wight
Department of International Politics
University of Wales, Aberystwyth
Aberystwyth
SY23 3DA

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