From: "Tobin Nellhaus" <nellhaus-AT-gwi.net> To: <bhaskar-AT-jefferson.village.Virginia.EDU> Subject: BHA: Re: Understanding DCR Date: Mon, 30 Jun 1997 09:02:47 -0400 Hello D.P.-- Just a couple comments and questions; I'm sure others will also pipe in. You write: > The most basic point of Bhaskar concerns the nature of > scientific explanations. In his view, every explanation (not only > scientific) consists in postulating one or more *generative > mechanisms* (deductive structures) which, if present, will produce > the phenomena we are trying to explain. I'm not entirely certain what you mean by the gloss, "deductive structures," but it *sounds* as though you understand generative mechanisms as existing only in the mind, as something in logic or reasoning. I'd like to emphasize that for Bhaskar, generative mechanisms exist *in reality*, which in most instances means outside the mind. So, to take the current example, a realist theory would state that to the best of our understanding and evidence, tectonic plates (which cause earthquakes by shifting) really exist, and are *not* simply representations in our minds. Of course, our evidence and understanding may alter, and we may come to believe that some other mechanism is in fact at work in producing earthquakes, but that mechanism would still exist independent of our reasoning about it. (The distinction here appears in a number of Bhaskar's concepts, such as the "epistemic fallacy" by which some people collapse being into knowledge of being, and the difference between the transitive and intransitive dimensions of knowledge.) > He traces a lot of philosophical debate to > come to the conclusion that most of the criteria suggested by > ‘received philosophy’ share one great weakness: they all presuppose a > closure, i.e., they all presuppose invariance of empirical > relationships; implying, these criteria do not apply where the > invariance cannot be guaranteed, e.g., as in *open systems*. His > solutions (he seems to be still modifying them) consist of (i) a > polyvalent (or, differentiated) ontology and (ii) obtaining closure > for the system in which the events occur. A couple of things. I think it might be better to say that the "one great weakness" is monovalence, that is, the unstratified concept of reality, and that the notion of closure etc has to be introduced in order to sustain that monovalence. Also, just for clarification, while invariance may not obtain in open systems, the mechanisms which operate in closed systems also operate in open systems, even if their operation is obscured, deflected, blocked, not elicited, etc. But in no event does Bhaskar offer closure as a "solution." On the contrary, one of his points is that science is possible within open systems--a notion that is contentious to positivists and conventionalists alike, but which Bhaskar argues is possible in part because closure is not in fact necessary for science at all. Hope that's useful. Cheers. --- Tobin Nellhaus nellhaus-AT-gwi.net "Faith requires us to be materialists without flinching": C.S. Peirce --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
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