From: louis_irwin-AT-mail.fws.gov
Date: Thu, 10 Jul 97 17:07:58 -0700
To: <bhaskar-AT-jefferson.village.Virginia.EDU>
Subject: Re[2]: BHA: What must the world be like for facism?



Marshall Feldman wrote: "I think he starts with experimental sciences 
and then finds analogies in social science, thereby legitimating the 
social sciences or social theories that conform to the analogy and 
providing an immanent critique of those that don't."

You are right that he starts with the experimental sciences, but I 
don't see the way he extends into social explanations as being 
analogous to the former, although there are many links between the two 
methodologies.  In the experimental sciences one describes a 
regularity, proposes possible causes, eliminates the untenable ones, 
then verifies the reality of the hypothesized mechanism - this is the 
DREI (?) methodology.  In the social sciences he proposes a distinct 
methodology, because one must deal with complex conjunctures, break 
them down into component causes, etc. - the RRR? methodology.  I 
forget how much of this he lays out in RTS as opposed to later works.

Maybe I'm missing your point.  Are you criticizing, not the structures 
of the two methodologies, rather the common links between them as 
being on the experimental sciences side and hence possibly leaning 
towards a kind of scientism?

Louis Irwin

______________________________ Reply Separator _________________________________
Subject: Re: BHA: What must the world be like for facism?

At 04:40 PM 7/8/97 -0700, Louis Irwin wrote:

>> 6. Suppose we ask the question, "What must the world be like for fascism to 
>> be possible?"  Here there are two lines of answer.  One (6a) identifies the 
>> conditions of existence for fascism as a social movement.  This really is a 
>> social science/social theory question (e.g., Poulantzas' "Fascism and
>> Dictatorship").  The other (6b) is about fascism's ideology.  In other
>> words, we'd ask, "What must the world be like for racism to be true (valid, 
>> warranted, etc.)?"
>>
>
>(6a) deals with fascism as an institution and its conditions of possibility. 
>(6b) deals with fascism as an ideology and its conditions of validity.
> Are you viewing (6b) as somehow an instance of (6a) in parallel to
> the general/specific questions above?  If so, I don't understand how 
> that could be so.

No.  I'm pointing out an ambiguity in the question itself.  I think the 
answers are radically different.

>> 10.  So, isn't RB giving pride of place to physical/experimental sciences 
>> and using their characteristics to discredit other practices claiming
>> "scientific" status?  Isn't this what Habermas calls "scientism?"  I'm not 
>> saying this is good or bad, but I do think it may be there.
>>
>
>RB delineates the natural and social sciences and presents elaborate 
theories of
>the general type of causal analysis involved in each.  Social sciences are 
more
>complex and more prone to ideological distortions, but I don't think RB 
>discredits them in relation to the experimental sciences.

I didn't mean to imply he discredits them.  Instead, I think he starts with 
experimental sciences and then finds analogies in social science, thereby 
legitimating the social sciences or social theories that conform to the 
analogy and providing an immanent critique of those that don't.

I think his emphasis on causal analysis is more a result of his argument 
than a premise.  So, we do get back to experimental science at the root.

Thanks for your comments.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
---------
Marshall Feldman, Associate Professor                               
marsh-AT-uriacc.uri.edu
Graduate Curriculum in Community Planning and Area Development       
401/874-5953
The University of Rhode Island                                       
401/874-5511 (FAX)
94 West Alumni Avenue, Suite 1; Kingston, RI 02881-0806


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