From: louis_irwin-AT-mail.fws.gov
Date: Fri, 11 Jul 97 17:06:00 -0700
To: <bhaskar-AT-jefferson.village.Virginia.EDU>
Subject: Re[4]: BHA: RTS 2-2 and 2-5



Colin,

I think I see now where we agree and where we diverge.  Let me try to 
reconstruct your comments in the following sequence.  I put the 
corresponding numbers in front of your text below.

1. Regularity Determinism (RD) is not the thesis of closure.  RD gets 
its force from closure and depends on it, but it is a different 
thesis.

2. The world seems to be open, but that is not an assumption, it can 
be given a transcendental argument as follows.  If the world were 
closed then experimentation would not be necessary, but 
experimentation is necessary, therefore the world is open.

3. This transcendental argument refutes RD.

4. Since the world has been shown by transcendental argument to be open, 
contingency must exist in the world.

5. Therefore strong actualism must fail, because contingency conflicts 
with the determinism of strong actualism.

Now with one caveat I am in agreement with you on 1, and I agree 
steps 3-5 follow, but we disagree over 4.  The caveat on 1 is that 
I agree that strictly RD is the thesis that constant conjunctions 
of events prevail.  Since closed systems are defined to be those in 
which constant conjunctions of events prevail, I take RD to be 
equivalent the thesis of closure.  So I don't see any real 
disagreement between us there.

The point I tried to make in my earlier post reconstructing RTS 
2-5 (in its item 4) was that item 4 here is at least prima facie 
disputable and so requires the additional transcendental argument 
Bhaskar provides on p. 116 (with which I expressed a problem).  
Strictly, openness only implies the defeat of constant 
conjunctions and regularity determinism.  What if constant 
conjunctions did not prevail yet the world in all its irregularity 
were still predetermined?   If that were possible then the world 
could be open yet lack contingencies.  That is the Laplacean 
loophole which I felt Bhaskar was going after at p. 116. I don't 
think closure is refuted until that final loophole is closed.

Again, I think our disagreement lies over how to argue for the 
final position, rather than over that position itself.

Louis Irwin

______________________________ Reply Separator _________________________________
Subject: Re: Re[2]: BHA: RTS 2-2 and 2-5

Colin's comments:

You argue:

>Regularity determinism is the thesis that the world is closed, 
>while strong actualism is the thesis that the world is subject 
>to complete atomistic state descriptions. 

1.
You see I don't view RD in the manner you describe it. RD only gets its 
force in closed systems, but is not in itself a thesis that the world is 
closed. To put this simpler, RD depends on closure. 

2.
Now, as far as we can tell the world is not closed but open. Hence RD is 
refuted. But RD is not refuted by the fact that the world is open. In order 
to achieve the refutaion of RD we need to locate a necessity, experiments, 
from which to say, 'if the world is closed this would not be necessary'. 
The argument of the openess of the world is a transcendental argument 
derived from the necessity of experiments to manufacture closure. 

3.
>From this transcendental argument however, flows the refutation of RD. 

4. and 5.
But equally, if RD fails strong actualism, as you describe it, must also 
fail since in open systems contingency must play some role (as a result of 
the refutation of RD). 

Anyway, it's a long time since I went over RTS, so I accept you may have a 
point, I'll have to go back and look at all of this. One thing does spring 
to mind however. RB's arguments in RTS 2-5 may be a "bridge too far". Maybe 
the trajectory makes little sense because its not needed. Anyway, like I say 
I accept that you may have a deeper argument that I am simply failing to 
grasp. So I'll give it some thought. 





     --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---